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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
 
CHARGES 
 
The Appellants have been convicted in the Pitcairn Islands 
Supreme Court of the following: 
 
(a) Stevens Raymond Christian 
 
 Charges 
 (i) Rape contrary to s7 of the Judicature Ordinance 
1961 and s1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 
(x4); 
 (ii) Rape contrary to s14 of the Judicature Ordinance 
1970 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. 
 Sentence 
 4 years imprisonment 
 
(b) Len Carlisle Brown 
 
 Charges 
 Rape contrary to s7 of the Judicature Ordinance 1961, 
the Judicature Ordinance 1970, and s1 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 (x2). 
 Sentence 
 2 years imprisonment with leave to apply for home 
detention 
 
The sentences have been suspended and the Appellants 
remain on bail pending the determination of this appeal. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
In relation to human rights issues, contrary to an earlier 
apparent concession by the Public Prosecutor that the 
Human Rights Act 1978 applied to the Pitcairn Islands, it 
would appear not to have been extended to them, at least in 
so far as the necessary protocols to the Convention have 
not been signed to enable Pitcairners to appear before the 
European Court: R (Quark Fisheries Ltd) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] 3 WLR 
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837 (Tab     ). In a statement to the Board on 31 October 
2005, the Public Prosecutor accepted that English law 
reflected the principles embodied in statements of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and that this applied to 
the Pitcairn Islands. Submissions are advanced on this 
premise.   
 
DISCLOSURE 
 
As the Record demonstrates, there has been a 
considerable volume of disclosure and historical research.  
The respective Governors of the Pitcairn Islands have 
greatly facilitated this process. 
 
In respect however of some requests, where the disclosure 
would have consisted of legal advice, privilege has been 
claimed by the Governors.  In particular, privilege has been 
claimed in respect of the following categories of documents: 
 
(a) Certain correspondence from legal advisers, 
including the Pitcairn Islands Legal Adviser, Mr 
Treadwell; 
 
(b) Information relating to the decision to proceed by 
way of the Pitcairn Island Public Prosecutor, that is to 
create a new prosecuting office rather than proceed 
by way of English prosecuting authority to consider 
the prosecution of indictable crime on Pitcairn; 
 
(c) Information relating to the decision to proceed by 
way of judges appointed from New Zealand rather 
than England to try serious indictable English crimes. 
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The Governors were aware that the Public Defender had 
sighted some of the documents for which privilege is 
claimed (some of these documents have in fact been 
published on the internet).  It has always been maintained 
by the Public Defender that some of those sighted 
documents, and no doubt others unsighted, would be 
helpful to the Board in determining the present issues.  
Notwithstanding the requests by the Public Defender for the 
Governors to waive privilege, it has been maintained. 
 
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 
 
I Jurisdiction:  
 
 Purported Application of the British Settlements Act 
  During the relevant time, the Pitcairn Islands did not 
fall within the definition of “British settlement” in the 
British Settlements Act 1887, and the Orders in 
Council made under that Act in relation to the Pitcairn 
Islands were accordingly ultra vires. 
 
II Whether The Sexual Offences Act 1956 was 
Incorporated into the Laws of the Pitcairn Islands  
 
(a) An inadequate phrase to communicate the 
incorporation of English Penal Law 
 The Appellants submit that the importation 
provisions of the Judicature Ordinances 1961 
and 1970 did not adequately communicate to 
them, the fact that English criminal law applied 
to them. 
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(b) Uncertainty in the Phrases of Importation 
The Appellants submit that the expressions 
"substance of the law" and “statutes of general 
application” which appear in the Judicature 
Ordinances 1961 and 1970 were uncertain 
phrases and did not identify the relevant penal 
law so as to incorporate English penal law into 
the law of the Pitcairn Islands. In the absence 
of an express statutory provision identifying 
what English penal statute applied to them or 
a judicial declaration, Pitcairners were not 
informed of the relevant penal law that applied 
to them.  It is submitted that in the modern 
era, such phrases are an inadequate vehicle 
to incorporate penal law. 
 
(c) Absence of an Appeal Right 
It is submitted that the local circumstances did 
not allow for the incorporation of English penal 
law because there was no provision under 
Pitcairn Islands law for an appeal from 
conviction for an offence under the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956.  At the relevant date at 
which the Judicature Ordinances 1961, and 
1970 purported to incorporate English penal 
law, an Englishman would have had a general 
appeal right to the Court of Criminal Appeal. 
Provision for appeal from the Pitcairn Islands 
Supreme Court was not made until the 
Pitcairn Court of Appeal Order 2000.   
 
 It is further submitted that a defendant on trial 
in the Pitcairn Islands either at the time of the 
 
 
 
 
10 
passing of the relevant Ordinance purporting 
to import English penal law or at the time of an 
alleged offence would have been in a worse 
position than an Englishman facing charges 
under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and thus 
local circumstances precluded the importation 
of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.  
 
III Abuse of Process 
 
The Appellants submit that there were serious 
deficiencies in the administration of criminal justice 
on the Pitcairn Islands prior to these offences being 
prosecuted. The Sexual Offences Act 1956 was 
never published on the Pitcairn Islands. This alone 
or combined with the absence of any British police 
presence on the Pitcairn Islands, inadequate 
provision for local policing and administration of local 
Island crime, and the late constitution of the 
machinery of justice after the decision was taken to 
prosecute ("the promulgation and late constitution 
issues") meant that Pitcairners were not adequately 
forewarned that they were liable to prosecution 
under English penal law and what those offences 
and penalties were. Further, it is submitted that the 
late constitution of the machinery of justice 
compromised the appearance of even-handed 
justice, and caused unreasonable delay in the 
charging of the Appellants.  In the face of these 
deficiencies, the prosecutions constitute an abuse of 
process, a denial of justice and/or are unfair under 
s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
(a) The Failure to Publish The Sexual Offences 
Act 1956 
 The Pitcairn Islands Supreme Court found that 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was never 
published in the Pitcairn Islands. The 
Ordinances were regularly promulgated by 
sending them to the Island Secretary for 
publication on the Notice Board at 
Adamstown, (and no objection is taken as to 
their promulgation in that regard). The 
Appellants submit that because the provisions 
of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 were never 
published on the Island, the Rule of Law was 
not complied with.  As a consequence, the 
Appellants should not have been prosecuted 
for alleged violations of English criminal law.  
 
(b) Absence of a British Police Presence and 
Deficient Local Policing and Administration 
 The failure to publish English criminal law was 
further compounded by an absence of a 
British police presence on the Pitcairn Islands 
and deficient local policing and administration.  
Successive administrators of the Pitcairn 
Islands had not sought to have any British 
police placed on the Pitcairn Islands until the 
arrival of Kent Police in or about 1996.  The 
only police presence has been Island police 
who were responsible for prosecuting Pitcairn 
Island local law before the Island Court. The 
evidence suggests that after 1971 the Pitcairn 
Island Court may have fallen into desuetude, 
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so that there was no enforcement of penal 
laws on the Island for many years until the 
present proceedings.   
 
 The situation that had pertained for so many 
years on Pitcairn Island wherein only Island 
law and local crimes had been investigated 
and prosecuted by local Island police and the 
local Island court magistrate, contrasts with 
the present situation. Since 1996, there has 
existed a considerable British police presence 
on Pitcairn Island both in the form of 
investigating officers from Kent Police and 
members of the Ministry of Defence police. 
The Appellants submit that the absence of an 
British Police presence on the Pitcairn Islands 
meant that there was no practical 
demonstration of an intention to enforce 
English penal law on the Pitcairn Islands until 
recent times. This deficiency meant it was not 
practically foreseeable that Islanders would be 
prosecuted for sexual offending under English 
law. 
 
(c) The Late Constitution of the Machinery of 
Justice 
 
 (i) Inadequate notice of an intention to 
prosecute 
  There has been, by the late 
constitution of the machinery of justice 
and legal system, inadequate advance 
notice given to Pitcairners that the 
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machinery to prosecute serious crimes 
under English law existed, and thus an 
intention to prosecute English criminal 
law plainly demonstrated. This further 
compounded the deficiency created by 
the failure to publish English law and 
provide a British police presence.  
 
 (ii) Compromising the appearance of 
even-handed justice 
  The effect of the late constitution of the 
machinery of justice, including the 
passing of a large number of 
Ordinances to accommodate these 
trials, extradition procedures to 
Papakura, New Zealand, and the 
construction of a prison by Islanders on 
the Island, during the currency of these 
proceedings has compromised the 
appearance of even-handed justice, 
and/or some legislative acts were in 
the nature of legislative judgments.  
 
 (iii) Delay 
  There has been an unacceptable delay 
between the dates upon which the 
Appellants were given notice that they 
were being seriously investigated and 
that immediate consideration was 
being given to the possibility of a 
prosecution, and the disposal of these 
proceedings that violate Article 6(1).  
The substance of the complaint is the 
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serious length of time that elapsed 
between the date the Public Prosecutor 
had determined on charges to the time 
he laid those charges.  This was a 
period of approximately 14 months 
during which, for most of that time, the 
Appellants were aware that the Public 
Prosecutor had determined that 
prosecutions would be initiated. He 
would not say who would be charged 
or what charges were to be laid until 
procedures were finalised for venue 
and other steps associated with the 
implementation of a legal system were 
taken.  This delay is not attributable to 
the conduct of the Appellants, but 
attributable to admitted systemic 
deficiencies in the administration of 
criminal justice on Pitcairn Island over 
many years.   
 
  The Appellants submission is that they 
have been under scrutiny, investigation 
and prosecution since the arrival of 
Kent Police in about 1996.  The focus 
has been intense given the popular 
mystique that surrounds the Pitcairn 
Islands, the small size of the Island 
with its inter-related and close knit 
population and community, and in 
respect of some of the Appellants the 
leading roles or positions they have 
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held on the Island at the time of the 
investigation and prosecution. 
 
(d) The invalidity of the importation of the 
machinery of justice and a legal system that in 
substance was taken from New Zealand 
 It is submitted that the steps taken by the 
Governor to import substantially the 
machinery of prosecution and adjudication 
from New Zealand, supported by a large 
number of Ordinances incorporating New 
Zealand criminal procedures such as the 
Sentencing Ordinance was an abuse of 
powers of governance. In substance, it is 
submitted that there was a delegation of 
responsibility for prosecution, trial and 
adjudication to a New Zealand legal system. It 
is submitted this was an abdication of judicial 
responsibility by a sovereign authority to 
whom arguably Pitcairners had submitted in 
1838.   
 
FURTHER LEAVE 
 
Further leave is sought on behalf of the First Appellant; 
Stevens Raymond Christian: 
 
 Definition of Rape: 
 Prior to its amendment in 1976 did the prosecution 
under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential 
ingredient of the offence of rape, that the defendant 
used force or threatened force and, in the absence of 
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this, that the complainant demonstrated resistance?  
Alternatively was it sufficient that the prosecution 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
complainant had not consented and the defendant 
had no honest belief that she was consenting? 
 
PART II - BACKGROUND 
 
Geography 
 
1. The Pitcairn Islands ("Pitcairn") comprise Pitcairn 
Island and three uninhabited atolls, Henderson, 
Ducie and Oeno. They lie in the Pacific Ocean 
approximately half way between the Panama Canal 
and New Zealand.  The nearest inhabited island is 
Mangareva, which is part of French Polynesia, 
approximately 300 miles (480 kilometres) away.    
 
2. Pitcairn is a small rugged volcanic island 2 miles long 
by 1 mile wide with an area of 1120 acres (450 
hectares) approximately two and a half times the size 
of Hyde Park.  The highest point rises to over a 
thousand feet and only 8% (90 acres) of the total 
surface is flat or flattish.   Most of the Island is for 
practical purposes inaccessible. Pitcairn's coast is 
cliff-lined nearly the entire perimeter making access 
precipitous and difficult.  The only established 
landing is Bounty Bay. 
 
Mutiny 
 
3. On 23 December 1787 the HMAV Bounty under the  
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command of William Bligh left Spithead for Tahiti with 
instructions to collect breadfruit seedlings to take to 
the West Indies for the cultivation as food for slaves.  
On 26 October 1788, the HMAV Bounty after a 
difficult voyage finally arrived off Tahiti.  On 28 April 
1789, three weeks after leaving Tahiti, Fletcher 
Christian and some of the ship's crew mutinied 
setting Bligh and 18 of his loyal crew adrift in an 
open boat.  Bligh and most of his men made it back 
to England. Fletcher Christian, after unsuccessfully 
attempting to settle on the island of Tubuai, near 
Tahiti, returned to Tahiti.  Sixteen of the crew 
remained in Tahiti and eight decided to stay with 
Fletcher Christian in their search for an uninhabited 
island.  Eventually, 6 Polynesian men and 12 
Polynesian women accompanied the mutineers to 
Pitcairn.  The mutineers sighted Pitcairn on 15 
January 1790.  The HMAV Bounty was anchored off 
what is now known as Bounty Bay and the livestock 
and goods were shipped to shore.  On 23 January 
1790, the ship was run ashore, burned and sank.  
That day is still celebrated as Bounty Day with the 
symbolic burning of a model ship. 
 
Population 
 
4. The population of Pitcairn has fluctuated.  In 1808, 
when Captain Folger of the American sealing ship 
Topaz rediscovered Pitcairn, the population was 35.  
By March 1831 when the Pitcairners moved to Tahiti 
for a short time, the population had risen to 86.  At 
the time of the visit of Captain Eliott in HMS Fly in 
1838, the population was 99.  In 1856, the entire 
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population of 194 was relocated to Norfolk Island.  In 
1859, the first group of 16 Pitcairners returned.  From 
then the population grew to a peak of 200 in 1936 
and since has been in steady decline. This century 
the permanent population has not exceeded 50.   
 
Shipping 
 
5. The history of Pitcairn may be chartered by the visits 
of ships.  Initially, these visits were whalers and 
merchant ships, with occasional visits from the Royal 
Navy.  Regular Naval visits ceased at the turn of the 
20th Century.  Since the opening of the Panama 
Canal in 1914, Pitcairn has been on the shipping 
route to New Zealand.  Merchant ships and later, 
container ships used to stop en route to trade 
supplies for curios, fresh fruit and fish.  More 
recently, liners and cruise ships have called.  Until 
cruise ships made Pitcairn a destination, the visits 
were unscheduled and subject to weather.  The visits 
were normally a matter of hours and, in most cases, 
nobody left the ship. There has never been a regular 
shipping service to the Island although there have 
been supply visits 3 or 4 times a year. Often the ship 
could not stop because of weather and the supplies 
would have to have been sent on a later voyage.   
 
6. The Island has no deepwater harbour.  Visiting 
vessels anchor off Pitcairn and access is by Island 
longboat.  After gifts of whaleboats in 1819 and 
1880, Pitcairners built their own longboats.  Motors 
began to replace oarsman in the late 1930s.  The 
little Pitcairn fleet has ranged from a high of six boats 
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in the 1920s to rare occasions when only one boat 
was operating.  At present, there are two.  The first of 
the Islands' aluminium boats arrived in 1983. 
Traditionally, working on the longboats has been a 
rite of passage for young men on the Island and 
even today, the launching of a longboat is a 
significant event. There have been a number of 
serious accidents and a number of acts of valour 
associated with them.  
 
Transportation 
 
7. Prior to 1964, there were no vehicles on the Island.  
The only form of transport was the traditional 
wheelbarrow which had been developed for Pitcairn 
conditions in the 19th century.  In 1965, two tractors 
were introduced and the Islanders used them to 
convert the narrow tracks into small dirt roads.  In 
1966, two Islanders purchased Honda 90 trail bikes.  
By the mid 1970's, there were a number of like 
motorcycles and 3 Minimokes in use.  In 1983, a 
bulldozer was air dropped onto Pitcairn.  By 2000, 
most of the two wheel bikes had been replaced by 3 
and then 4-wheel bikes which are now the standard 
transport on the Island. In 2005, work began 
concreting the steep road leading from The Landing 
to The Edge, known as “The Hill of Difficulty”.  The 
road is now being extended from The Edge to the 
village of Adamstown.   There is no landing strip on 
Pitcairn. 
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Communications 
 
8. Until 1921, visual communication with passing ships 
was by lamp.  A donation was made of a crystal 
receiver to the Island in 1922. In 1952, short wave 
facilities were introduced and the station was re-built 
in 1962.  Until April 1969, regular telegraphic 
schedules were handled twice daily (except 
Saturdays) with Rarotonga and between 1969 and 
mid 1985 through Suva.  In June 1985, overseas 
telephone service was introduced for the first time to 
Pitcairn.  This was by way of radio-telephone service 
via Wellington and operated on twice daily schedules 
only.  In June 1992, satellite telephone and facsimile 
communication was introduced.  The cost of phone 
calls increased from NZ$0.70 per minute to NZ$15 
per minute.  In 1998, a new system was installed at 
the cost of NZ$7.50 per minute.  Communications 
throughout the Island are by ship radio.  Pitcairn 
receives no newspaper, radio or television services. 
 
Education 
 
9. Historically education began on Island when one of 
the mutineers, John Adams, began teaching the first 
generation of children to read in the 1800's.  This 
tradition was carried on by others until the last 
decade of the century when the school came under 
the guidance of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.  
Between 1917 and 1938, education was left to the 
Islanders. In 1948, the Government formally 
assumed responsibility, although education had 
been compulsory since 1838.  A school house and 
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teacher's residence was completed in 1950 and 
since then, visiting teachers have been appointed 
usually on a 2 year contract. 
 
Medical 
 
10. There was no resident doctor on the Island until 
2000, nor was there a nurse until 1944 when a 
Seventh Day Adventist trained nurse became the 
first resident nurse.  It then became the usual 
practice for the wife of the resident pastor to be a 
trained nurse, or in some cases the pastor himself.  
Occasionally, the assistance of medical officers or 
dental surgeons on passing ships has been sought. 
 
Criminal Legal System 
 
11. The history and development of the criminal legal 
system is contained in the submissions and material 
before the Court.  With the notable exception of the 
murder trial and subsequent hanging of Harry 
Christian in 1898, there appears to have been no 
prosecution for criminal offences under English law 
prior to this investigation.   
 
12. The first record of local written laws was by 
Waldegrave in 1829.  The community developed, 
with the assistance of various visiting Royal Naval 
Officers, over the 19th Century, a system of other 
laws.  In the 20th Century, other local laws have 
been re-written and introduced.  Prior to 1999, the 
last recorded criminal case prosecuted on Pitcairn 
under Island law appears to be in 1971 or 1972 and 
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the last recorded sexual offence prosecution under 
Island law appears to be in 1962.   
 
13. The Supreme Court found that until 1997 when a set 
of Halsbury's Laws of England was sent to the 
Island, there had never been a copy of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 on Pitcairn.  There is no record of 
any English statute or English criminal textbook 
being on the Island before that date.  There is no 
record of a Judge, independent lawyer or off-island 
police officer visiting Pitcairn until 1997.  The last visit 
by a Pitcairn legal adviser was Mr McLoughlin in 
1958.  His successor, Mr Paul Treadwell, who was 
appointed in 1979, has never visited the Island.  
 
Operation Unique 
 
14. In 1996, there was a complaint of an alleged 
attempted rape by an Islander.  The Kent Police 
were instructed to investigate and sent 
Superintendent Dennis McGookin and Detective 
Inspector Peter George to the Island.  They were 
appointed as Pitcairn police officers.  Ultimately, 
there was no prosecution.  
 
15. In 1997, following arrangements between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Kent 
Police, Constable Gail Cox of the Kent Police was 
appointed a Pitcairn police officer. In December 
1999, while Constable Cox was on the Island, the 
education officer reported possible incidents of rape.  
This lead ultimately to the present investigation.  This 
was named "Operation Unique".  It was aptly named.   
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16. The investigation was conducted by Detective 
Inspector Rob Vinson and Detective Inspector 
George of the Kent Police with later assistance from 
Senior Constable Karen Vaughan from New 
Zealand.  The Appellants were interviewed between 
April 2000 and March 2001.  In April 2002, the Public 
Prosecutor advised the Pitcairners that he had 
decided what charges to lay, but could not do so 
because the question of venue had not been 
finalised.  Charges were ultimately laid in April 2003 
and trials commenced on 29 September 2004.  
Special Leave was granted on 11 October 2004. 
 
17. In a separate incident in December 1999, Ricky 
Quinn, a visitor to the Island, was investigated and 
subsequently charged under Island law with unlawful 
carnal knowledge and indecent behaviour.  He 
pleaded guilty to the unlawful canal knowledge 
charge and the other charge was withdrawn.  He was 
convicted and sentenced to 100 days imprisonment, 
and deported shortly after conviction.  Subsequently, 
documentation disclosed that the Administration had 
doubts about whether Quinn had in fact committed 
an offence.  This was ultimately resolved in 2006 
when the Governor pardoned Quinn.  
 
Developments since Operation Unique 
 
18. There have been a number of developments since 
the commencement of Operation Unique.  The most 
salient being: 
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(a) Ordinances 
 
Prior: The first Ordinance was introduced at the time 
of the Pitcairn Order in Council 1952.  There 
were subsequently Judicature Ordinances in 
1961 and 1970, a Justice Ordinance in 1966 
and four amending Ordinances in 1968, 1970, 
1971 and 1972.   
 
Post: Since 1999 there have been over 50 
Ordinances passed which have effectively 
introduced the machinery of justice relating to 
criminal trials, covering topics from 
appointment of personnel and court procedure 
to care of children. 
 
(b) Judges and Magistrates 
 
Prior: There were no Judges or off-island 
Magistrates appointed. 
 
Post: There are now a Chief Justice, Court of 
Appeal Judges, Supreme Court Judges and 
Magistrates appointed. 
 
(c) Lawyers 
 
Prior: There were no Pitcairn lawyers. 
 
Post: Now there are 16 lawyers admitted to the 
Pitcairn Bar. 
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(d) Statutes and Legal Texts 
 
Prior: There were no copies of any English criminal 
statutes or textbooks on the Island. 
 
Post: There is now a copy of Halsbury's 4th Edition 
(without updates). 
 
(e) Policing 
  
 Prior: There were only unqualified and untrained 
local police officers.  There is no evidence 
that any local police officer since the 1960s 
had any training (two of the last three Pitcairn 
police officers have been charged in the 
course of this enquiry). 
  
 Post: Since 1999, there have been visits by the 
Kent Constabulary.  Since 2001, two Ministry 
of Defence police officers from Scotland have 
been stationed on the Island on a 3-month 
rotation. 
 
(f) Governor's Representative 
  
 Prior: Since 1951, the overseas based 
schoolteachers had been appointed as part of 
their duties, the "Governor's Adviser".  They 
had no executive function on the Island on 
behalf of the British government but reported 
directly to the Governor on council meetings, 
public meetings and other matters which may 
have been of interest to him. 
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 Post: Since 1999 there has been a permanent 
Governor's representation from the Foreign 
Commonwealth Office who is a career 
diplomat.   
 
(g) Social Workers 
 
 Prior: There were no social workers. 
 
 Post: Two social workers are now permanently on 
the Island on rotation. 
 
(h) Medical 
 
 Prior: There was no doctor. Since the 1960s, the 
Pastor or his wife had nursing qualifications. 
 
 Post: There is now a permanent doctor on rotation.  
 
(i) Shipping 
 
 Prior: There was no scheduled shipping.  
 
 Post: There are now regular charter ships bringing 
supplies from Auckland and transporting 
officials and occasionally locals to and from 
French Polynesia so that they can fly to their 
destinations. 
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PART III - JURISDICTION  
 
GROUND I - PURPORTED APPLICATION OF THE 
BRITISH SETTLEMENTS ACTS 1887 & 1945 
 
PROPOSITION 
 
19. Central to the Public Prosecutor’s submissions on 
jurisdiction in the Courts below was the British 
Settlements Act 1887, later amended by the British 
Settlements Act 1945 ("the British Settlements Act") 
(Tab     ).  The basis of constitutional authority upon 
which the Public Prosecutor claimed jurisdiction was 
the fact that Pitcairn was a British settlement within 
the definition of the Act and it was lawful therefore, 
for the Crown to pass Orders in Council and 
Ordinances for the peace, order and good 
government of Pitcairn pursuant to the British 
Settlements Act.  
 
20. The Appellants submit to the contrary that Pitcairn 
was not a British settlement as defined by the British 
Settlements Act.  
 
THE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS ACT 
 
21. The British Settlements Act enabled the Crown to 
provide for the government of territories in which 
British subjects had settled but which were not under 
the authority of a civilized government. That much is 
gained from the preamble.  
 
22. The principal purpose and effect of the 1843 Act was 
to alter the common law rule that, in a colony 
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acquired by settlement, the Crown can set up a 
constitution but cannot enact legislation of other 
kinds.   
 
23. The British Settlements Act 1887 repealed the Acts 
of 1843 and 1860 and re-enacted them, with 
amendments which made little change of substance. 
The British Settlements Act 1945 amended the Act 
of 1887 so as to overcome difficulties which arose 
under section 3 of that Act.  The amendments were 
in two respects.  First, the reference to an instrument 
under the Great Seal included a reference to an 
Order in Council and secondly, for the reference to 
any three or more persons within the settlement, 
there is substituted a reference to any specified 
person or persons or authority: Sir Kenneth Roberts-
Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, London, 
Stevens & Son 1966 at p166-168 (Tab       ). 
 
24. Section 2 of the British Settlements Act empowers 
the Queen in Council: 
 
 To establish all such laws and institutions and constitute 
such courts and officers, and make such provisions and 
regulations for the proceedings in the said courts for the 
administration of justice, as may appear to Her Majesty in 
Council to be necessary for the peace, order, and good 
government of Her Majesty's subjects and others within 
any British settlement.  
 
25. Critical to the jurisdiction argument was the statutory 
definition of a British settlement under the Act. This 
was defined in Section 6 as being (Tab    ): 
 
… any British possession which has not been acquired by 
cession or conquest, and is not for the time being within 
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the jurisdiction of the Legislature, constituted otherwise 
than by virtue of this Act, or of any Act repealed by this 
Act of any British possession.   
 
26. There was no specific legislation passed by the 
Imperial Parliament providing for the governance of 
Pitcairn. 
 
27. The Appellants accept that the Court of Appeal 
correctly identified the Public Defender’s 
submissions:  
 
 (a) The British Settlements Acts 1887 and 1945 
had no application to Pitcairn. 
 
 (b) Because the Orders in Council purported to 
be made under those Acts as subordinate 
legislation, they had no lawful basis, with the 
consequence that all Ordinances made under 
them were also invalid. 
 
 (c) The inclusion in 1898 of Pitcairn Island in the 
earlier 1893 Pacific Order in Council was 
invalid for the same reason.  
   
28. The Appellants submit that the Court of Appeal erred 
in finding:  
 
 (a) On the facts, Pitcairn was a British 
possession acquired by settlement.  
 
 (b) The Orders in Council 1952 and 1970 were 
acts of State that were immune from any 
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judicial review and conclusive as to the status 
of Pitcairn. 
 
 (c)   Categorisation of a colony cannot be 
disturbed once made by practice. 
 
29. The Supreme Court had agreed with the Public 
Prosecutor’s argument that Pitcairn was a British 
settlement under the Acts for the following reasons:  
 
We consider there to be several ways in which Pitcairn 
Island could be recognised as a British settlement or 
possession: it was not acquired by cession or conquest; it 
was not for the time being within the jurisdiction of the 
Legislature; there were no indigenous Islanders; 
settlement was by British subjects; a chain of British 
connection existed over time; and there was expressed 
and actual loyalty to the British Crown.  There is yet 
another reason, which is that Pitcairn is a British 
settlement or possession because the Executive has by 
Orders in Council told us so. 
 
30. This view was subsequently upheld in the Court of 
Appeal.  
 
31. At the hearing before the Supreme Court, the Public 
Defender, conceded that cession as at 1838 was not 
in issue. This concession is now withdrawn.  
 
32. The primary argument for the Appellants in this Court 
is that, if Pitcairn did become a British possession in 
1838 with the arrival and involvement of Captain 
Eliott of the HMS Fly, which on any view of the 
history of Pitcairn would seem to be an important 
date, then possession was derived by voluntary 
cession of the inhabitants of Pitcairn to the British 
Sovereign.  Accordingly, it is submitted that Pitcairn 
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could not be a British settlement as defined by the 
British Settlements Act.  Such statutory instruments 
and Ordinances that purport to have been made 
under the powers delegated under these Acts are 
invalid, and more particularly, so are those Orders in 
Council and Ordinances that govern these 
proceedings. 
 
33. The concession was made without appropriate 
consideration of Sammut v Strickland  [1938] AC 678 
at p699 (Tab     ) and the opinion of the Privy Council 
that cession could include not only a formal cession 
by a government of part of its territory to another, but 
a voluntary cession of the inhabitants of a territory to 
another: 
 
 … the word "cession" is employed by the respondent in 
this connection in a limited sense so as to exclude a 
voluntary cession by the general consent of the people.  
This involves the division of ceded territories into two 
classes, those acquired by an act of cession from some 
sovereign power and those ceded by the general consent 
or desire of the inhabitants. Their Lordships must observe 
that there seems to be no authority in any case or 
recognised text-book on constitutional law for this 
distinction.   
 
The issue of voluntary cession is further developed in 
later argument. 
 
34. The submission is made that consistently with the 
view Pitcairners have of their own history, there was 
in 1838 a submission to the British sovereign by the 
leading inhabitants of Pitcairn which amounted to a 
voluntary cession in law. By that time, Pitcairn was it 
is submitted a community of independent minded 
persons largely made up of descendants of the 
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mutineers and Tahitian women and a community of 
whom the inhabitants for the most part owed no 
allegiance to Great Britain. 
 
35. In a draft letter to the Pitcairn Public Prosecutor 
dated October 2000, Governor Williams described 
the relationship between the United Kingdom and 
Pitcairn: 
 
 The island has been a UK dependent territory since 1839, 
although the precise relationship has been redefined 
several times.  In all that time, there has never been a 
resident Governor or other figure representing the UK's 
governmental authority.   
 
ACT OF STATE  
 
36. The Public Prosecutor contended in the Supreme 
Court that the categorisation of Pitcairn as a British 
settlement was immune from legal challenge.  His 
principal argument was that the chain of authority for 
all laws in Pitcairn derived ultimately from the British 
Settlements Act. There was simply no need to 
examine history or to trace the development of the 
Island community.  The statutes were the starting 
point followed by the Orders in Council and ultimately 
the local Pitcairn Ordinances.  
 
 Two different types of act of State were examined.  First, 
the acts of the British in settling Pitcairn as a colony.  
Secondly, the acts of State, in a literal sense, enacted by 
the Sovereign for the governance of Pitcairn.  The Orders 
of 1952 & 1970 were contended to be in the latter 
category and, as such, beyond challenge by the courts.  
The former type of act of State, it was conceded orally, 
can in some circumstances be challenged, but the 
concept of Parliamentary supremacy makes the 
legislative type beyond reproach.  
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37. If this argument is correct, then an historical analysis 
of the relationship of Pitcairn and Britain from the 
arrival of the mutineers in 1790 to 1952 is 
unnecessary.  The Appellants however, submit that 
immunity from review derived from act of State is not 
applicable to the circumstances of this case and that 
legal issues of jurisdiction upon which the validity of 
Orders in Council are founded are for the Courts to 
determine.   
 
38. The Public Prosecutor also submitted consequently 
that all Pitcairn Ordinances were valid, being made 
pursuant to the Orders in Council of 1952 and 1970, 
and submitted that the test for validity of subordinate 
legislation passed under a general power to legislate 
for the "peace, order and good government" of a 
territory affords considerable deference to the 
legislator.   
 
39. It was said in R v Burah (1878) 3 AC 889 at p904-
905 (Tab     ): 
 
The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises 
whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must 
of necessity determine that question; and the only way in 
which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms 
of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative 
powers were created, and by which, negatively, they are 
restricted.  If what has been done is legislation, within the 
general scope of the affirmative words which give the 
power, and if it violates no express condition or restriction 
by which that power is limited … it is not for any Court of 
Justice to inquire further, or to enlarge constructively 
those conditions and restrictions. 
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40. Reference was made by the Public Prosecutor to a 
number of other decisions on the act of State 
doctrine.  The doctrine was applied in the High Court 
of Australia in Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 24 ALR 
118 (Tab       ), by Gibbs J, who said: 
 
The annexation of the east coast of Australia by Captain 
Cook in 1770, and the subsequent acts by which the 
whole of the Australian continent became part of the 
dominions of the Crown, were acts of state whose validity 
cannot be challenged. 
 
41. In Sobhuza v Miller [1926] AC 518 at p523 and 525 
(Tab       ), the Privy Council said: 
 
In South Africa the extension of British jurisdiction by 
Order in Council has at times been carried very far.  Such 
extension may be referred to [as] an exercise of power by 
an act of State, unchallengeable in any British Court, or it 
may be attributed to statutory powers given by the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 … 
 
In the Southern Rhodesia case Lord Sumner … held that 
a manifestation by Orders in Council of the intention of the 
Crown to exercise full dominion over lands which are 
unallotted is sufficient for the establishment of complete 
power.  [This implies] that what is done may be 
unchallengeable on the footing that the Order in Council, 
or the proclamation made under it, is an act of State.  This 
method of peacefully extending British dominion may well 
be … in law unquestionable.  
 
42. In Nyali v Attorney-General [1956] 1 QB 1 at p15 
(Tab      ), Denning LJ observed: 
 
The courts rely on the representatives of the Crown to 
know the limits of its jurisdiction and to keep within it.  
Once jurisdiction is exercised by the Crown the courts will 
not permit it to be challenged.  Thus if an Order in Council 
is made affecting the protectorate, the courts will accept 
its validity without question: see Sobhuza II v Miller and 
others.  If follows, therefore, that in this case we must look 
not at the agreement with the Sultan, but at the Orders in 
Council and other acts of the Crown so as to see what 
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jurisdiction the Crown has in fact exercised; because they 
are the best guide, indeed they are conclusive, as to the 
extent of the Crown's jurisdiction.  I turn, therefore, to 
consider them. 
 
In the first place there is an Order in Council of 1920, 
which has brought the Kenya Protectorate very much 
within the orbit of Kenya Colony.  The governor of the 
colony is also the governor of the protectorate and is 
entitled to all the powers of the Crown therein.  The 
executive council of the colony is also the executive 
council of the protectorate.  The legislative council of the 
colony legislates, not only for the colony, but also for 
peace, order and good government of the protectorate.  
And so forth.  None of those provisions can be challenged 
in the courts.  
 
43. Lord Justice Atkin, in The Fagernes [1927] at p311 
(Tab       ), observed: 
 
What is the territory of the Crown is a matter of which the 
Court takes judicial notice … Any definite statement from 
the proper representative of the Crown as to the territory 
of the Crown must be treated as conclusive.  A conflict is 
not to be contemplated between the Courts and the 
Executive on such a matter, where foreign interests may 
be concerned, and where responsibility for protection and 
administration is of paramount importance to the 
Government of the country. 
 
44. In Post Office v Estuary Radio [1968] 2 QB 740 at 
755 (Tab     ), Lord Diplock said:  
 
It still lies within the prerogative power of the Crown to 
extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction to areas of land or 
sea over which it has not previously claimed or exercised 
sovereignty or jurisdiction. For such extension the 
authority of Parliament is not required. The Queen's 
courts, upon being informed by Order in Council or by the 
appropriate Minister or Law Officer of the Crown's claim to 
sovereignty or jurisdiction over any place, must give effect 
to it and are bound by it:   
 
45. The Supreme Court observed having considered 
these authorities there could be no doubt that the 
Orders in Council made in 1952 and 1970 were acts 
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of State in their own right.  It was said that it was 
likely also, as contemplated by Nyali v Attorney-
General, that there were other acts of the Crown at 
various times in Pitcairn’s history which can be called 
acts of State, going back to Captain Eliott and the 
HMS Fly in 1838, having similar effect.  
 
46. The Supreme Court observed:   
 
We are further entitled to consider this same question on 
legal bases other than matters historical.  The weight of 
precedent enjoins us not to conduct a review of history as 
a suitable path to decision, but to accept obediently the 
acts of the Crown (known as acts of State) of both an 
Executive and Legislative kind which claim Pitcairn to be 
a British territory, and its population as British subjects or 
persons subject to British laws …  Based on the reality of 
the longstanding legislation, Orders in Council and 
Executive acts done for over a century, we reach the 
same conclusion.  
 
47. The Court of Appeal made as a primary finding of law 
that the assertion by the Crown of jurisdiction over a 
territory is an act of State that was not susceptible to 
challenge.   
 
48. Halsbury 4th Ed, para 613 (Tab         ) defines act of 
State as: 
 
An act of state is a prerogative act of policy in the field of 
foreign affairs performed by the Crown in the course of its 
relationship with another state or its subjects.  Typical 
acts of state are the making and performance of treaties, 
the annexation of foreign territory, the seizure of lands or 
goods in right of conquest, declarations of war, and of 
blockade. The detention of an enemy alien in wartime or 
his deportation may be regarded as an act of state. 
 
 
49. Further, Halsbury at para 618 (Tab     ) asserts that: 
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In general there can be no act of state with respect to a 
British subject. 
 
50. It is submitted that the Pitcairn Orders 1952 and 
1970 are not acts of State. They are merely 
instruments reciting the Crown’s powers to make 
laws for the governance of Pitcairn.  They do not 
seek to assert sovereignty over Pitcairn as a foreign 
entity. They purport to govern people who already 
owe allegiance to the Crown.  If Pitcairn became a 
British possession in 1838, then it must also follow 
that Pitcairners were British subjects and thus acts of 
State cannot be pleaded by the Public Prosecutor as 
leading to immunity from judicial review.   
 
51. The Law Advisers in relation to Harry Christian and 
the procedure that could be adopted for his trial for 
murder on Pitcairn in 1898 were of the opinion that 
he could be tried for murder if taken to England with 
witnesses under the provisions of section 9 of 24 and 
25 Vict. Cap 100. 
 
52. This could only have occurred if Harry Christian was 
a British subject because section 9 (Tab     ) 
provided: 
 
 Where any Murder or Manslaughter shall be committed 
on Land out of the United Kingdom, whether within the 
Queen's Dominions or without, and whether the Person 
killed were a Subject of Her Majesty or not, every Offence 
committed by any Subject of Her Majesty, in respect of 
any such Case, whether the same shall amount to the 
Offence of Murder or of Manslaughter, or of being 
accessory to Murder or Manslaughter, may be dealt with, 
inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in any County 
or Place in England or Ireland in which such Person shall 
be apprehended or be in Custody, in the same Manner in 
all respects as if such Offence had been actually 
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committed in that County or Place; provided that nothing 
herein contained shall prevent any Person from being 
tried in any Place out of England or Ireland for any Murder 
or Manslaughter committed out of England or Ireland, in 
the same Manner as such Person might have been tried 
before the passing of this Act. 
 
53. The Appellants in any event submit that the issue of 
whether Pitcairn was a British settlement under the 
British Settlements Act and the powers of 
governance were justiciable issues. Unless Pitcairn 
came within the definition of a British settlement 
under the Act, no Orders in Council could be validly 
passed on the basis of this premise.  It is submitted, 
in this regard, that it is for the courts to determine 
whether the statutory grounds were satisfied which 
founded a basis for the Pitcairn Orders 1952 and 
1970.  The act of State doctrine (however widely 
viewed) cannot preclude the courts examining 
whether the conditions precedent to and upon which 
the executive asserts its powers to act have been 
satisfied.  
 
54. It is submitted that modern administrative law would 
sanction judicial review of issues such as these 
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission 
[1969] 2 AC 147 (Tab       ); The Queen on the 
Application of Louis Olivier Bancoult v The Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2006] EWHC 1038 (Tab     ); C.C.SU v Minister for 
Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 (Tab      ). 
 
55. The Appellants' submission is that the jurisdictional 
basis upon which Orders in Council such as the 
present are made is a justiciable issue.  This point is 
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made in Sammut v Strickland where the Privy 
Council embarked on a consideration as to whether 
Malta had been ceded to Britain or was settled under 
the provisions of the British Settlements Act because 
certain legal consequences flowed from such a 
finding.   
 
56. In R (Bancoult) v Secretary for State for Sovereign 
and Commonwealth Affairs [2001] QB 1067 (Tab       
), similarly the Court of Appeal embarked on a 
consideration of whether a certain Ordinance 
purporting to relocate the people of the Chagos 
Islands  made under the British Indian Ocean 
Territory Order 1965 was a valid exercise of power. 
This review could not have been undertaken if the 
delegation and or the order had been regarded as an 
act of State and immune from review. Indeed, the 
orders were purportedly passed for the good 
government of the people in question, similarly with 
the ordinances made in relation to the Pitcairn.   
 
57. If in fact, the foundation is not met then the Crown 
has acted beyond its powers, and to that extent it is 
submitted that the validity of Orders in Council of the 
kind in issue here may be reviewed in the courts.  It 
may be otherwise where the Order in Council is not 
based upon the existence of a jurisdictional fact that 
gives rise to a power under enabling legislation, and 
is an assertion as to sovereignty.  In that case, an 
assertion to sovereignty by Order in Council may 
amount to a non-justiciable act of State: Post Office v 
Estuary Radio Ltd. 
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CATEGORISATION, PRACTICE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
58. Associated with the issue of act of State and 
immunity from judicial review, is the issue of 
categorisation in practice. The Court of Appeal 
considered this as a further reason for not acceding 
to the Public Defender's submission that it could not 
be contended that Pitcairn was a British settlement 
under the British Settlements Act. The Court 
observed:  
 
As Halsbury notes categorisation of a colony cannot be 
disturbed once made by practice. The “practice” of 
categorising Pitcairn as a settled colony goes back at 
least to the 1898 Instruction issued under the 1893 Order 
in Council.  It was restated in different forms many times 
subsequently, as we have earlier discussed.  There was 
ample evidence of the “practice”. 
 
 
59. It is submitted that, contrary to the approach asserted 
by Halsbury, as to categorisation, the issue of 
whether Pitcairn was a British settlement within the 
definition of the British Settlements Act was a matter 
that was justiciable.  It has never, in an English court, 
been judicially determined that Pitcairn was in fact a 
British settlement, and as a consequence the Crown 
had powers to govern pursuant to that Act. 
 
WAS PITCAIRN A BRITISH SETTLEMENT? 
 
60. This question involves two issues.  First, was Pitcairn 
a settlement derived from the British nationality of the 
mutineers, that is a settlement at common law? 
Secondly, if not, was it a settlement within the 
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definition of British settlement under the British 
Settlements Act?  
 
61. Before considering these issues, it is important to 
explore Pitcairn history between the arrival of the 
HMAV Bounty and the arrival of Captain Eliott of 
HMS Fly in 1838.  (Crown Chronology paras 1-20) 
 
A BRITISH SETTLEMENT DERIVED FROM THE 
NATIONALITY OF THE MUTINEERS/COMMON LAW 
SETTLEMENT  
 
62. Up to the arrival of the HMS Fly in 1838, the 
Appellants submit that Pitcairn was not a British 
settlement in the Blackstone or common law sense of 
a settlement derived from the nationality of its 
settlers. See Blackstone, Commentaries, The Laws 
of England, (1 Comm.107), cited by Lord Watson in 
Cooper v Stuart 14 HL 286 at 287 (Tab      ). 
Blackstone wrote: 
 
 It hath been held that if an uninhabited country be 
discovered and planted by English subjects, all the 
English laws then in being, which are the birthright of 
every English subject, are immediately there in force ( 
Salk, 411, 666) But this must be understood with very 
many and very great restrictions. 
 
63. In Halsbury, 2nd Ed, 1933 vol xi   para 11 (Tab      ), it 
was said that: 
 
 Settlement may take various forms. Occupation of the 
territory may be authorised by the Crown, possession 
taken in the King’s name, and settlers introduced. Such is 
the case with Australian colonies, British North America 
excluding Ontario, Quebec, Newfoundland, and in the 
West Indies, the Leeward Islands, Bahamas, Barbados 
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and Bermuda. The Falkland Islands and the Gold Coast, 
Sierra Leone, and even the Gambia may fall into this 
category. Secondly, the Crown may recognise as a British 
territory settlements made by British subjects without 
previous authority. British Honduras, Pitcairn Island and 
Tristan da Cunha are examples and there was a 
considerable settlement in New Zealand before it was 
annexed to the Crown. Lastly, islands which are 
uninhabited, or arctic areas unfit for habitation, may be 
formally declared to be annexed, as in the case of many 
small islets in the Pacific, the islands north of Canada, the 
dependencies of the Falkland Islands and the Ross 
dependency of New Zealand. In such cases annexation is 
effected by a formal declaration of taking possession, 
authorised or ratified by the Crown, and the hoisting of the 
British flag. 
 
 
64. The mutineers, whilst owing allegiance to England by 
reason of their nationality which they could not divest 
themselves of: Joyce v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [1946] AC 347 (Tab       ), did not travel 
alone to Pitcairn but were accompanied by both 
Polynesian men and women. It was manifestly not 
their intention to create a British settlement.  They 
sought a refuge away from capture and prosecution 
for their actions. To assert that this small community 
of people of mixed race constituted a British 
settlement in these circumstances, it is submitted, is 
a fiction.  
 
65. The women, the mutineers co-habited with, were 
Tahitian and from these relationships, children were 
born. The children were not English.  They were 
illegitimate children in the eyes of English law.  
 
66. The submission is that the settlement of Pitcairn was 
anomalous in 1790. It did not fit into the concept of a 
common law British settlement in any true sense, 
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that is where British settlers go out from their native 
country either with consent or without, to found a 
place to live. It was exceptional because it was the 
product of both British and Tahitian settlement with 
the British men being felons seeking to avoid contact 
with Britain.  
  
67. The relationship of citizen and Sovereign is one of 
reciprocity of obligation: Joyce v DPP, p370 (Tab       
). It is submitted the treasonous acts of the mutineers 
had to this extent absolved the Crown of any 
obligation to extend its protection to the mutineers in 
any new land. If that is the case then the Blackstone 
thesis of nationality following a British settler cannot 
extend to Pitcairn.   
 
68. It is submitted the common law as defined by 
Blackstone applies only to the importation of English 
law as applicable to settlements that have been 
created by English settlers exclusively, that is British 
subjects and not in circumstances where there was 
mixed settlement, as here.  
 
69. In any event, Blackstone’s thesis is based on an 
obiter dictum found in 2 Salk 356, at 357 (Tab     ) 
and   there did not seem to be any lengthy argument 
on point: 
 
 1st, In case of an uninhabited country newly found out by 
English subjects, all laws in force in England are in force 
there; so it seemed to be agreed. 
 
70. That was as much as seemed to be considered in 
the case 2 Salk 356 on English law and settlement.  
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That case in fact turned on conquest and the 
application of English law in a conquered country, 
Jamaica.  It is submitted it is a very significant step to 
argue from the proposition that English law followed 
English men to an uninhabited territory to a 
proposition that English law governed a settlement 
created by both English men and in this case 
Polynesian men and women and defined the status 
of that settlement as a British settlement at common 
law.  An even greater step, it is submitted is to 
suggest this where the English men were seeking a 
refuge from the arm of English law.   
 
71. Neither Blackstone’s thesis nor the foundation for his 
proposition contained in 2 Salk 356, 357 extended to 
a mixed settlement such as this still less one that had 
been formed in circumstances of mutiny and overt 
rejection of English authority. In this sense, the 
settlement of Pitcairn can be truly described as 
unique. 
 
NATIONALITY ISSUES 
 
72. An issue of preliminary importance to the status of 
Pitcairn as at 1838 with the visit of HMS Fly is the 
composition of the population as at that date.  The 
Supreme Court observed:  
 
 The Defender's contention that, when John Adams died in 
1829, any link with the British Crown ceased, overlooks 
that by that date other British subjects - namely Buffett, 
Evans and Nobbs - had already taken up residence on 
the Island.  They were British subjects and remained so 
throughout their lives.  Accordingly, notwithstanding the 
birth of illegitimate children, the death of John Adams did 
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not achieve complete severance of the Islanders from the 
British Crown.  This aspect renders it unnecessary for us 
to declare the nationality status of the illegitimate children.  
The argument relates to whether there was a break in 
British settlement on the death of John Adams.  The 
arrival of British subjects Buffett, Evans and Nobbs to 
form a significant numerical membership of this tiny 
community ensured there was no such break. 
 
73. The Appellants submit of importance so far as the 
issue of settlement is concerned is the status of the 
24 children born to the mutineers and their Tahitian 
partners.  No children were born of the union of any 
of the Polynesian men and Tahitian women on 
Pitcairn Island, it seems.  These 24 children who 
survived the death of their fathers within a few years 
of the mutineers arrival in Pitcairn, formed the 
nucleus and genesis of all native-born Pitcairners 
thereafter. 
 
74. Children born of unions between the mutineers and 
Tahitian women were not British subjects.  They 
were illegitimate.  Illegitimate children took the 
domicile of their mothers.  Halsbury, 1st Ed, para 742 
(Tab   ) until the child attained the age of 16 or 
acquired a settlement of his or her own.   In any 
event, these children were the natural born children 
of men who were liable to be punished for having 
committed felonies under the law of the land in force 
at that time.  By virtue of the statute of 4 Geo.2 c.21 
s2 (Tab     ) these children lost all the rights, 
privileges and status as British subjects by birth 
because their fathers “were or shall be liable to the 
penalties of high treason or felony”.  Plainly, the 
mutineers were liable for such acts arising out of the 
mutiny and subsequent burning of the HMAV Bounty.  
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It is submitted that the arrival of three settlers of 
British descent, Buffet, Nobbs and Evans could not 
convert Pitcairn into a British settlement at common 
law either since their arrival was after the date of the 
settlement of Pitcairn by the mutineers and the 
Polynesians.  
 
75. The reality is that by 1838 and the arrival of HMS Fly, 
an independent Pitcairn community existed which, 
albeit small in number, probably according to Eliott 
about 99 people had existed for almost 40 years and 
was very much a mixed blood community. Although 
that there are indications that Pitcairners had turned 
to British sources for assistance such as in relocating 
to Tahiti and sought to be recognised as a British 
possession, it is submitted that this does not mean 
that Pitcairn attained the status of British settlement 
on the arrival of the mutineers in 1790.  Rather as 
time progressed, and after the death of Adams in 
1829, events such as famine, the arrival of whalers in 
greater numbers, and perhaps the arrival of an 
uninvited opportunist Joshua Hill motivated the 
community to seek protection of the British 
Sovereign.  Certainly, Captain Eliott did not view 
Pitcairn as anything other than an independent 
community when he visited in 1838.  
 
76. Indeed, he expressed diffidence about extending the 
protection that Islanders had sought from the British 
Sovereign to Pitcairn. It was in 1838 at the initiative 
of the leading inhabitants of Pitcairn that the 
protection was sought by them of the Sovereign.  
That protection it is submitted had not extended to 
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Pitcairn by the mere fact of the arrival of the 
mutineers on Pitcairn in 1790. Captain Eliott’s 
dispatch records the concerns of the Pitcairn 
community at the actions of whalers and seeking 
protection for the 99 inhabitants. It was precisely 
because they had been victimised by American 
vessels denying that they were under the protection 
of Great Britain, as they had neither colours, or 
written authority that Eliott decided to offer them the 
protection they desired and supplied them with the 
flag. This is further considered below.  
 
THE ARRIVAL OF HMS FLY 
 
77. Again it is important to consider history. The visit of 
HMS Fly followed the intervention of the Royal Navy, 
when a public enquiry was held abroad HMS 
Actaeon in 1837 into abusive exercise of self-
proclaimed authority over other Islanders by a recent 
settler, Joshua Hill and his removal to Valparaiso by 
Captain Bruce of HMS Imogene in 1838.  
 
 
78. The Pitcairn Island Register recorded the visit of 
Captain Eliott with the following entry:  
 
 1838 
  November 29th  Arrived H.M.S. Fly Russel Elliot 
Esq. with a present from the Revnd Mr. Rowlandson and 
congregation Valparaiso.   
  Captain Elliots proposal for electing a chief Magistrate 
proceeded upon and Edward Quintal chosen and sworn 
in. 
 
79. Brodie’s published version of the Register, taken 
from his visit in 1850, contained the additional words: 
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 This island was taken possession of by Capt. Elliot, on 
behalf of the Crown of Great Britain, on the 29th of 
November. 
 
80. Captain Eliott’s despatch records:  
 
 After a long passage I arrived at Pitcairn Island on the 29th 
of November, where I found this interesting community 
preserving their deservedly high character for exemplary 
morality, innocence and integrity, but they very earnestly 
represented to me the immediate necessity for their [sic] 
being some chief or head to their increasing community, 
amounting now to 99 souls, for their internal regulation 
and Government, but more especially to meet the 
difficulties and dangers which they had already 
experienced and been again threatened with by lawless 
strangers in Whale Ships, there having been cases of 
recent occurrence, where half the ruffian crew of a Whale 
Ship were on shore for a fortnight, during which they 
offered every insult to the inhabitants and threatened to 
violate any woman whose protectors they could overcome 
by force, occasioning the necessary concentration of the 
men’s strength for the personal protection of the females, 
and thereby great damage to their Crops, which 
demanded their constant attention, taunting them that 
they had no laws, no country, no authority that they were 
to respect.  American vessels denying they were under 
the protection of Great Britain, as they had neither colors, 
or written authority; I found them however with a Merchant 
Union Jack flying, procured from an English ship. 
 Apprehending that my duty required some decisive step in 
this unlooked for contingency I considered I should best 
afford protection to these people, and least involve my 
Government of whose intentions in respect to the Pitcairn 
Islanders I am ignorant, by conferring the stamp of 
Authority on their election of a Magistrate or Elder to be 
periodically chosen from amongst themselves [on the 1st 
of January each year], and answerable for his 
proceedings to Her Majesty’s Government for whose 
information he is to keep a Journal. 
 I accordingly drew out a few hasty regulations to be 
observed, under my Authority in the election of this Officer 
marked No 6, which with a formal attestation of his being 
sworn in before me, and an [sic] Union Jack which I 
supplied them with, will I trust insure them against any 
renewed insults from Foreigners. By their unanimous 
voice, they selected for the situation Edward Quintal a 
much able and superior Senior of their number. 
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 I trust, Sir, you will consider my assumption of the power 
to confer this Authority was warranted by the urgency of 
circumstances and the difficulty of reference, and that you 
will be able to approve of the view I have taken of my 
duty; delaying only one day at Pitcairn, I hastened to 
Cobija [Bolivia] where I only arrived after a very protracted 
passage from easterly winds and calms, on the 10th 
January. 
  
81. Captain Eliott duly drew up a Constitution and 
sanctioned a code of ten laws for the Island, dealing 
with such matters as a rudimentary legal system, the 
control of animals, trading with ships, landmarks and 
an enlightened law for compulsory education up to 
the age of 16. These original 10 laws appear to be 
those recorded by Walter Brodie in 1850.  
 
82. In affording women the vote, Pitcairn may have been 
the first country in the world to provide for universal 
suffrage:  
 
 An elder or magistrate is to be elected by the free votes of 
every native born on the island, male or female, who shall 
have attained the age of eighteen years; or, of persons 
who have resided five years upon the island. 
 
83. The Regulations also stipulated the form of oath the 
Magistrate was to take:   
 
 I solemnly swear that I will execute the duties of 
Magistrate and Chief Ruler of Pitcairn’s Island, to which I 
am this day called on the Election of the Inhabitants, by 
dispensing justice, and settling any differences that may 
arise, zealously, fearlessly & impartially, and that I will 
keep a Register of my proceedings, and hold myself 
accountable for the due exercise of my Office, to Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain or her 
representatives;-  so help me God. 
 
84. The HMS Fly’s visit to Pitcairn had been in 
furtherance of instructions given by the Admiralty to 
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Rear-Admiral Ross, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 
in the Pacific, in 1838 to send a ship to the Society, 
Friendly and Pitcairn Islands at least once a year.  
 
85. In forwarding on Eliott’s report to the Admiralty, Ross 
wrote:   
 
 I feel it my duty to express to their Lordships, my entire 
approbation of the judicious and masterly way Captain 
Eliott has carried those orders into execution; … 
 
86. Across the bottom left-hand corner of the second 
page of Ross’ letter, the notation appears:  
 
 30 Sept.   
 Their Lordships are pleased with the very satisfactory 
manner in which Capt. Elliot [sic] has conducted this 
service. 
 
87. An extract from Captain Eliott’s report was forwarded 
on to the Colonial Office, where the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State James Stephen 
commented:  
 
 I confess I know not how anything can be done for the 
inhabitants of Pitcairns Island. It is impossible to establish 
an independent Govt. or Colony there, nor do I know how 
the Island could with any propriety be annexed to the 
Govt. of New South Wales, which has no sort of 
connection with it. Yet if neither of these measures be 
practicable, we are I believe at the end of all our 
resources. 
 
88. There does not appear to have followed any formal 
pronouncement of the status of Pitcairn. The advice 
of the Law Officers on the trial of Harry Christian 
described the events surrounding the arrival of the 
HMS Fly:  
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 That in 1838 Captain Elliott R.N. visited the Island in her 
Majesty’s ship "Fly” and, on the representation of the 
leading inhabitants – who had been much harassed by 
American whalers – drew up certain regulations for the 
election of a Chief Magistrate and supplied the Islanders 
with a Union Jack, which was hoisted under his authority, 
in token of their submission to Her Majesty’s sovereignty. 
 
89. It was said by Mr McLoughlin, a former Legal Adviser 
to Pitcairn Laws of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and 
Oeno Islands, Revised Edition 1971, p21 (Tab      ): 
 
 By that brief document the people of Pitcairn Island, with 
the ready assistance of Captain Elliott [sic], formally 
acknowledged their status as a British possession and, as 
a natural consequence, placed themselves under the 
protection of the British Crown. 
 
THE STATUS OF PITCAIRN AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF 
HMS FLY 
 
90. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal 
identified 1838 as being the year when Pitcairn was 
probably acquired as a British possession. This was 
said to have occurred upon the arrival of HMS Fly.  
 
91. The Court of Appeal observed:     
 
 It was not suggested that an unauthorised settlement by 
British subjects could prevent the territory concerned from 
later becoming a British possession. The available 
material establishes acquisition as a British possession, 
probably as far back as 1838. The provision and 
acceptance then of the Union Jack and the establishment 
of a Chief Magistrate required to take an oath of loyalty 
and to be accountable to the Queen, are significant 
factors. Traditionally, this date has long been regarded as 
the time when Pitcairn Island had its definitive origin as a 
British possession.  
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92. The Appellants submit that Pitcairn did not become a 
settlement within the meaning of the British 
Settlement Act because, as has earlier been 
submitted, it was acquired by cession.  
 
93. By 1838 the leading inhabitants of Pitcairn were 
happy to seemingly submit to the Sovereign, and 
appear from that point on to have regarded 
themselves as British subjects. 
 
 
94. It is submitted that where there is an issue as to 
whether a territory was ceded or settled, that issue is 
to be determined as at the time the territory becomes 
subject to the Queen's dominion. Sammut v 
Strickland. R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State of 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at 1102. 
 
95. Halsbury's:  
 
  … the classification is one of law, and once made by 
practice or judicial decision will not be disturbed by 
historical research.  The basis of distinction is the stage of 
civilisation considered to have existed in the territory at 
the time of acquisition: if there was no population or no 
form of government considered civilised and recognised 
in international law, possession was obtained by 
settlement; where there was an organised society to 
which international personality was attributable, 
acquisition rested on cession or conquest. 
 
96. The Court of Appeal went on to say touching on the 
issue of cession:  
 
 As we have discussed, we agree with the Supreme Court 
that, on the facts, Pitcairn was a British possession 
acquired by settlement.  There was at the time of 
acquisition no organised society to which international 
personality could have been attributed.  Pitcairn was 
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hardly in the same situation as Malta, which was 
peacefully ceded to the British Crown in circumstances 
described in the Privy Council judgment of Sammut v 
Strickland [1938] AC 678. 
 
 
97. The Court added:  
 
 For the above reasons, which essentially are the same as 
those expressed in the Supreme Court, on the whole of 
the material made available and drawn to our attention, 
we find it impossible to conclude other than Pitcairn Island 
was a British settlement within the meaning of the 1887 
Act when the Orders in Council of 1952 and 1970 were 
made. To contend that Pitcairn Island is independent, that 
it is not a British possession, and that the United Kingdom 
does not have sovereignty over it, is palpably unreal. 
Sovereignty was acquired by settlement or occupation 
and that sovereignty pertains today. 
 
 
98. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal took an overly 
narrow view of what cession meant in the light of 
Sammut v Strickland.  That case decided some 40 
years after the Advisory Opinion on Harry Christian in 
1897 asserted that there did not have to be a formal 
cession by a sovereign power, and that there could 
be cession by a native tribe or a voluntary cession of 
authority of a less formal kind than an organised 
society to which international personality could have 
been attributed. In Sammut v Strickland at pp699 
(Tab      ), it was said by Lord Maugham:  
 
 What, then, was the true nature of the title of the Crown to 
the sovereignty of Malta? In answering this question it is 
important to bear in mind that we are considering a matter 
of substance rather than one of names or labels. The 
contention of the respondent on this part of the Case is 
founded on the proposition that the prerogative of the 
Crown to legislate by Orders in Council and Letters Patent 
for the Government of a possession (using the word in the 
widest sense) is restricted to cases where the possession 
was acquired either by conquest or by cession, but the 
word “cession” is employed by the Respondent in this 
connection in a limited sense so as to exclude a voluntary 
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cession by the general consent of the people. This 
involves the division of ceded territories into two classes, 
those acquired by an act of cession from some sovereign 
power and those ceded by the general consent or desire 
of the inhabitants. Their Lordships must observe that 
there seems to be no authority in any case or recognised 
text - book on constitutional law for this distinction.  
 
99. Indeed, it is submitted that the Law Officers Opinion 
relating to Harry Christian cited above, accurately 
encapsulates a view of the relationship between 
Pitcairners to the British Sovereign in 1838 that 
reflects the wider concept of cession that the Privy 
Council later approved, in Sammut v Strickland at 
p700 (Tab     ): 
 
 If the contention as to the limited meaning of the word 
"cession" is correct, it would seem to follow that British 
possession acquired by voluntary cession being therefore 
"British Settlements" are in several respects in a less 
advantageous position as between themselves and the 
Crown than possessions acquired by formal cession by 
some independent sovereign with or without the consent 
of the people.  It seems clear to their Lordships that in 
both these Acts the Legislature is using the word 
"cession" as including cases of voluntary cession …  
 
 In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol 1 xi., tit 
Dominions, Colonies, Possessions, etc., p.ii, will be found 
a list of 18 possessions of the Crown acquired by cession, 
including cases of cession by tribal chiefs. 
 
100. It is submitted that the actions of Pitcairners more 
appositely reflects the concept of voluntary cession 
than the actions of the inhabitants of Malta whom 
seem more to have acquiesced or approbated the 
actions of the British in proclaiming Malta to be 
subject to the British Crown. In the case of Sammut v 
Strickland, there seems to have been no initiation of 
cession by the Maltese.  What occurred was in 
response to British action, where as here, the 
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request for British assistance and protection was 
initiated by the inhabitants of Pitcairn. It seems the 
population was reasonably sizable as Captain Eliott 
mentioned about 99 people.  Pitcairn had existed as 
a community for 48 years.  
 
101. It is submitted it was a case of voluntary cession, and 
not dissimilar in motivation to the people of Malta 
who sought the protection of the Crown also. The 
Privy Council noted at page 698 (Tab   ): 
 
 It must be born in mind that the population of the Island was 
only that of a moderate town in England, that its size is about 
that of the Isle of Wight, and that its people, however brave, 
could not have hoped to resist without assistance the attack of 
a first- rate power.  
 
102. In this regard, it is submitted that the contention of 
the Court of Appeal that Pitcairn did not fall within 
Sammut v Strickland because unlike Malta, Pitcairn 
lacked international personality was to adopt an 
overly narrow approach. On this point, the Privy 
Council said at p701 (Tab       ): 
 
 It seems to their Lordships to be reasonably plain that the 
principle which excluded cases of settlement from the Royal 
Prerogative has no application to cases where there has been a 
cession in the popular sense, whether with or without the assent 
of the inhabitants, and that there is no valid ground for the 
distinction suggested between the case of Malta and other 
cases of cession. 
 
103. The Appellants submit that any steps taken by British 
authorities to govern Pitcairn on the basis that it was 
a British settlement under the British Settlements Act 
was ultra vires. This includes the inclusion of Pitcairn 
under the umbrella of the Pacific Order in Council 
1893, in 1898 by instrument signed by Secretary of 
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State Chamberlain, and the subsequent acceptance 
of powers to govern Pitcairn by authority of a 
Governor under the Pitcairn Orders 1952 and 1970.  
 
THE PREROGATIVE 
 
104. The Crown has plenary prerogative legislative 
powers with respect to a ceded colony, subject to the 
rule in Campbell v Hall, 1 Cowp. 204 (Tab      ).  That 
rule is that if the Crown grants a representative 
legislature to the colony, it cannot derogate from that 
grant and thus loses that prerogative power unless 
(as is usually the case), it has expressly reserved the 
power when granting the constitution. If the 
prerogative power has been lost, but representative 
institutions are later revoked by statutory authority, 
the prerogative revives.  
 
105. Reference is made to para 16 of Halsbury, 2nd Ed, 
1933, Vol 11, (Tab ): 
 
 As regards colonies conquered or ceded, the King 
possesses absolute power to establish such executive, 
legislative, and judicial arrangements as he thinks fit, 
subject only to the condition that they do not contravene 
any Act of parliament extending to all British possessions 
or to that possession. But this right is lost by the grant of a 
representative legislature unless it is expressly retained in 
whole or in part. If not so retained, power to legislate as to 
the constitution or generally can only be recovered under 
this authority of an Act of parliament. Power to legislate 
generally is regularly retained in instruments now passed.  
 
 
106. The definition of "Representative Legislation" in the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 is one in which at 
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least half the members of one house are elected by 
the inhabitants of the colony. 
 
107. If the correct position is that there was a voluntary 
cession of authority by Pitcairn in 1838 to the British 
Sovereign then, it would follow that the Sovereign 
had prerogative power to govern Pitcairn, after 1838.  
It is to be noted that in the Pitcairn Orders of 1952, 
and 1970, there is a residual provision, expressed as 
“or otherwise in Her Majesty vested”.  If by this 
phrase it is meant that it was intended to preserve a 
claim to have prerogative power to govern Pitcairn, 
this is at odds with the various assertions the Crown 
has made since 1898 that Pitcairn was a British 
settlement under the Act. It is noted also that the 
Pitcairn Order in Council 1952 is headed "British 
Settlements" and the preamble relies on the British 
Settlements Acts 1887 and 1945 (Tab    ). 
 
108. If the Crown had prerogative power to govern 
Pitcairn by virtue of its voluntary cession in 1838, it 
has not purported to exercise that power, opting 
instead to consistently since 1898 govern under the 
British Settlements Act.  
 
109. Further, the Crown has, it is submitted, by its agents, 
Captain Eliott of HMS Fly in 1838, Captain Rookes of 
the Champion in 1892, and by officers acting under 
the authority of the Western Pacific Commission 
such as Mr Simons in 1904, and Deputy 
Commissioner Maude in 1940 recommended 
systems of representative governance in domestic 
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matters for Pitcairn which were adopted by 
Pitcairners.  
 
110. It is submitted accordingly that the Crown could not 
by way of prerogative have imposed a new system of 
legislature by office of Governor for Pitcairn under 
the Pitcairn Orders in the face of the representative 
legislature that existed on the Island.   Campbell v 
Hall (Tab ), de Smith Constitutional and 
Administration Law, 2nd ed, Penguin 1973 at p647 
and fns 51-53 (Tab      ) 
 
111. The only way to superimpose a legislature upon 
Pitcairn by way of Governor was by Act of 
Westminster Parliament, analogist to the way it is 
submitted that Jersey has been governed.  See de 
Smith and Brazier, Constitutional and Administration 
Law, 6th ed, Penguin at p59-60 and further fn 63 in 
relation to the constitution of the Court of Appeal 
(Tab      ).  The Court of Appeal of Jersey was 
established in reliance on the prerogative in 1944 but 
never came into operation.  Appeal Courts were 
finally set up in 1961 after legislation had been 
passed in the usual way.  See de Smith and Brazier 
above at fn 63. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO CONSULT 
 
112. BY analogy with Jersey also, it is submitted that 
constitutional convention requires, in respect of 
legislative instruments purporting to impose taxation 
or to regulate matters of purely domestic concern, 
that first consultation with the insular legislative body 
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should take place with the purpose of reaching an 
accommodation: see de Smith and Brazier, 6th ed, 
at p60 (Tab     ).  
 
113. Matters regarding the prosecution of offences and 
the organization and structure of Pitcairn Courts, the 
machinery of justice and venue required to prosecute 
indictable crime fall squarely within the category of 
domestic affairs. 
 
114. There is no record of any form of consultation having 
taken place between the Governor and the insular 
Pitcairn legislative body over such serious domestic 
issues.  It is submitted that these should have taken 
place in a timely manner after it was decided to place 
Pitcairn beyond the province of the Western Pacific 
Commission.  Instead, there has been a flurry of 
legislative activity between the Foreign Office and 
the Governor in order to at least in substantial part 
accommodate these prosecutions.  
 
115. It is submitted that the British Government was in 
breach of this constitutional convention and that such 
legislative arrangements and actions that have taken 
place in recent times to establish "a workable legal 
system" are invalid.   
 
116. It is submitted that governance of Pitcairn today must 
be regularised by act of Westminster Parliament. 
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PART IV - THE PROMULGATION, LATE CONSITUTION 
OF THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE AND  
RELATED ISSUES 
 
GROUND II - WHETHER THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 
1956 WAS INCORPORATED INTO PITCAIRN LAW? 
 
Introduction 
 
117. The relevant Judicature Ordinances provided for the 
importation of English law into Pitcairn in various 
ways.    
 
118. The Judicature Ordinance, 1961, ss7 and 8 provided 
that: 
 
 S. 7 Subject to the provisions of section 8 of this 
Ordinance the substance of the law for the time being in 
force in and for England shall be in force in the Islands.  
 
 S. 8 All the laws of England extended to the Islands by 
this Ordinance shall be in force therein so far only as the 
local circumstances and the limits of local jurisdiction 
permit and subject to any existing or future ordinance and 
for the purpose of facilitating the application of the said 
laws it shall be lawful to construe the same with such 
formal alterations not affecting the substance as to 
names, localities, courts, offices, persons, moneys, 
penalties, and otherwise as may be necessary to render 
the same applicable to the circumstances. 
 
 This Ordinance came into force on the 8th of 
October 1961.  
 
119. The later Ordinance, the Judicature Ordinance 1970 
provides: 
 
 S 14 (1) Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding 
subsection the common law, the rules of equity and the 
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statutes of general application as in force in and for 
England at the commencement of this Ordinance shall be 
in force in the Islands.  
 
 S 14 (2) All the laws of England extended to the Islands 
by the last proceeding subsection shall be in force therein 
so far only as the local circumstances and the limits of 
local jurisdiction permit and subject to any existing or 
future ordinance and for the purpose of facilitating the 
application of the said laws it shall be lawful to construe  
the same with such formal alterations not affecting the 
substance as to names, localities, courts, offices, 
persons, moneys, penalties, and otherwise, as may be 
necessary to render the same applicable to the 
circumstances. 
 
 
 This Ordinance came into force on 27 of October 
1970.  
 
120. The Judicature (Amendment) Ordinance 1983 
provided that the law then in force in England as at 1 
January 1983 applied to Pitcairn, an advance in time 
from the law as it was on 27 October 1970.  
 
121. The Pitcairn Order 1970, s5(3) provided:  
 
 All laws made by the Governor in exercise of the powers 
conferred by this Order shall be published in the manner 
and at such place or places in the Islands as the 
Governor may direct.  
 
122. It was further provided in s5(4) that: 
 
 Every such law shall come into operation on the date on 
which it is published in accordance with the provisions of 
subsection (3) of this section, unless it is provided, either 
in such law or in some other enactment, that it shall come 
into operation on some other date, in which case it will 
come into operation on that date.  
 
123. Before the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor 
presented evidence, which established that there 
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had been promulgation of the relevant Ordinances, 
and this is accepted under both the Pitcairn Orders 
1952 and 1970. The Supreme Court found however 
there had been no publication of the Sexual Offences 
Act 1956 on the Island.  
 
An inadequate phrase to communicate the fact of the 
incorporation of English Penal Law to Pitcairners 
 
124.     It is submitted that the phrases "substance of law" 
and "statutes of general application" did not 
communicate to Pitcairners that English penal law 
applied, whatever may be the merit of the phrases as 
instruments of incorporation of English law otherwise. 
It is submitted at the very least Pitcairners should 
have been directed to the fact that English criminal 
law applied to them. The Pacific Order in Council 
1893 (Tab     ) for example, had made express 
provision for its application. There, it was provided: 
 
20.  Subject to the provisions of this order, the civil and 
criminal jurisdiction exercisable under this order 
shall, so far as circumstances admit, be exercised 
upon the principles of and in conformity with the 
substance of the law for the time being in force 
and for England, and with the powers vested in 
and according to the course of procedure and 
practice observed by and before the Courts of 
Justice and Justices of the Peace of England, 
according to their respective jurisdictions and 
authorities. 
 
21. Except as to crimes or offences made or declared 
such by this order, or by any regulation or rule 
made under it-  
 Any act other than an act that would by a Court of 
Justice having criminal jurisdiction in England be 
deemed a crime or offence, making the person 
doing such act liable to punishment in England, 
shall not, in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
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under this order, be deemed a crime or offence, 
making the person doing such act liable to 
punishment. 
 
23.  Crimes, offences, wrongs and breaches of 
contract against or affecting the person, property, 
or rights of natives or foreigners committed by 
persons subject to this Order are, subject to the 
provisions of this Order, punishable or otherwise 
cognisable, in the same manner as if they were 
committed against or affected the person, 
property, or rights of British subjects.  
 
Uncertainty in the Phrases of Importation 
 
125. It is submitted the phrases “the substance of the law 
for the time being in force“ and “statutes of general 
application” are inadequate phrases by which to 
import English penal law. 
 
126. Roberts–Wray, “Commonwealth and Colonial law”, 
Stevens and Sons, London 1966 asserts of the 
phrase statutes of general application, at p545 (Tab     
): 
 
If that phrase were offered as a novelty to a legislative 
draftsman today, he would disclaim responsibility for its 
consequences unless it were defined. But it has been in 
use for many decades, it has been the subject of judicial 
interpretation, it does not appear to have given the Courts 
serious trouble, and it has much the same effect as the 
common law rule. So a change of formula might do more 
harm than good. 
 
 
127. Of colonial practice he comments at p548: 
 
 There have also been a few - surprisingly few - legislative 
interventions to reduce the uncertainty as to which 
English statutes apply and which do not. 
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128. He then lists various examples, and concludes after 
discussion of Nigeria:  
 
 The expression “statutes of general application" has 
consequently ceased to be a burden on the law of 
Western Nigeria. The phrase remains elsewhere, but 
fortunately its native obscurity has been enlightened. 
 
  He gives no examples, of enlightenment. 
 
129. Roberts-Wray provides some cases on the 
importation of English criminal law to colonies at 
p551: 
 
 
(a) Rum Coonloov Chandar Canto Mookerjie 
(1876) 2 App Cas 186 (Tab     ).  There, 
specific English laws relating to champerty 
and maintenance directed against abuses 
prevalent in early times in England some of 
which had fallen into comparative desuetude 
were not imported into Indian law upon the 
general introduction of English laws.  
 
(b) Ruddick v Weathered (1889) 7 NZLR 491 
(Tab     ). English statutes constituting an 
affirmance of the common law in relating to 
gaming offence in force in New Zealand.  
 
 (c) R v Baun (1901) 3 WALR 1 (Tab     ).  Imperial 
statutes applying to lotteries of a general 
nature is a public nuisance and punishable 
and was in force in West Australia.  
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 (b) Quan Yick v Hinds (1905) 2 CLR 345 (Tab     
).  The issue of whether unauthorised lottery 
Imperial legislation could be imported into 
New South Wales and considerations of the 
absence of appeal provisions.  Importation 
was rejected by the High Court of Australia. 
 
130. It is to be noted that the most recent case cited by 
Roberts-Wray on criminal law was at the turn of last 
century. None of these cases involved offences of 
the seriousness with which this Court is concerned.  
 
131. The Appellants submit also, contrary to the view of 
the Court of Appeal, that until there was a judicial 
declaration or pronouncement on Pitcairn of the fact 
that a statute formed part of the substance of English 
law applicable to Pitcairn or was of general 
application and applicable to Pitcairn there was no 
sure foundation for Islanders to intelligibly know in 
advance that the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was 
incorporated into Pitcairn law. A pronouncement 
could not it is submitted have retrospective effect.   
 
132. Aside from judicial declaration, the other means of 
recording with certainty which English statutes 
applied to Pitcairn was for the legislature to proscribe 
them expressly. Roberts-Wray at p548 (Tab     ), 
gives examples of territories, that had adopted this 
approach. 
 
133. The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument on the 
ground:  
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… that such an approach would really be tantamount to 
denying the provision any efficacy and requiring the 
specific adoption of each and every law it is intended 
should apply before it could be  applied. That would seem 
to be contrary to the plain words of subsection (1). 
 
134. Professor Tony Angelo and Fran Wright, Pitcairn: 
sunset on the Empire? (2004) NZLJ 431 (Tab     ) 
opined that until there was a declaration that a 
relevant English Act applied, an English penal statute 
could not have effect on Pitcairn.  In their study of the 
usage of the phrase "statutes of general application" 
in a sample of 35 cases taken from New Zealand and 
Pacific countries assert that the usage did not reveal 
any cases relating to the application of criminal law.  
They state: 
 
The finding of applicability of such a statute can surely 
only be prospective - which probably is to say that an 
English penal statute could not apply in Pitcairn without 
being legislated to apply.   
 
135. Jennifer Care in Colonial Legacies A Study of 
Received and Adopted Legislation Applying in the 
University of the South Pacific Region, (1997) 21 
Journal of Pacific Studies, 33 (Tab        ) records an 
unreported judgment of Donne CJ In re the 
Constitution of Tuvalu and the Laws of Tuvalu Act 
1987 (unreported, High Court, Tuvalu No. 4/1989) to 
the effect that: 
 
…unless an imperial law has been either expressly 
adopted by the Parliament of Tuvalu or the Court has 
applied as such by declaring it, it does not have effect as 
part of the law of Tuvalu ... 
 
(It has not been possible to obtain a copy of this 
judgment). 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
The Absence of an Appeal Right  
 
136. It is submitted that the incorporation of English 
criminal law failed under both the 1961 Judicature 
Ordinance and the 1971 Judicature Ordinance 
because there was no provision for a general appeal 
from a conviction of the Supreme Court included in 
either Ordinance. Thus, it is submitted that local 
circumstances pertaining to Pitcairn did not allow for 
the prosecution of English indictable crime on the 
Island at the relevant dates namely the introduction 
of the Judicature Ordinances 1961 and 1970 on the 
8th of October 1961 and the 27th of October 1970 
respectively.   
 
137. The date for assessing the issue of incorporation of 
English law was the date at which the Ordinances 
came into effect.  General appeal provisions were 
first introduced for Pitcairn by the Pitcairn Court of 
Appeal Order in Council 2000, on the 15th of June 
2000 (Tab    ). By comparison, there was a general 
right of appeal given in criminal cases as the Court of 
Appeal observed from convictions under 
prosecutions governed by the Western Pacific Order, 
under the Pacific (Amendment) Order in Council 
1955 (Tab    ).  The right of appeal was given under 
Replacement Article 88 of Pacific Order in Council 
1893 (1955, No 551) from the jurisdiction of a 
Judicial Commissioner in any civil or criminal cause 
or matter to the Fiji Court of Appeal in accordance 
with the rules, which may be made by the High 
Commissioner under the provisions of the Order. 
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138. There was a general right of appeal given from an 
indictable conviction to the English Court of Appeal 
under the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 (Tab    ) and 
under the provisions of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 
(Tab      ).  The omission of a general appeal 
provision under both Judicature Ordinances for 
Pitcairn 1961 and 1970, meant that an Islander as at 
the date of the enactment of the relevant Ordinances 
was in a worse position, if convicted, than a person 
convicted of an indictable criminal offence in England 
because he or she would not have any general right 
of appeal.  
 
139. This is a similar argument as one that was raised for 
the successful Appellant in Quan Yick v Hinds at 348 
(Tab     ), albeit that the machinery for an appeal to 
the Court of Quarter Sessions in that case was 
included within the English statute. There, the High 
Court of Australia upheld an appeal that English 
lotteries legislation could not apply because inter alia 
there was no Court of Quarter Sessions in New 
South Wales to consider appeals at the relevant time 
when the issue of whether the application of the 
English legislation fell to be considered: albeit, that 
prior to the offence occurring, Courts of Quarter 
Sessions had been constituted in New South Wales.  
 
140.  On this point, the judgment of Sir Samuel Griffiths CJ 
at pp364-5 is of relevance. See also the judgments 
of Barton J at pp373-374; O'Connor J at p382. 
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141. The Court of Appeal however distinguished Yick on 
the ground that the legislation in that case 
incorporated internally an appeal right from 
conviction for lotteries offences to Quarter Sessions. 
The Lotteries Act contained a provision that upon 
conviction a defendant was to be released pending 
an appeal to Quarter Sessions. It is submitted 
however, that there is justification for the same 
approach where the consequences of conviction 
heavy penalties of imprisonment, albeit that the 
appeal right is provided independently under 
separate legislation. Those responsible for the 
introduction of the Ordinances of 1961 and 1970 
should have included a provision for a general 
appeal as there was had been under the Pacific 
(Amendment) Order in Council 1955.  This is an 
illustration of one aspect of the Appellant’s complaint 
of late constitution of the machinery of justice: that is 
a failure to give careful consideration for the 
machinery for the administration of criminal justice 
on Pitcairn when responsibility for it was taken from 
the Western Pacific Commission.  
 
142. The Ordinances expressly provide that the 
importation of English law is subject to the local 
circumstances and the limits of local jurisdiction, and 
it is submitted that the failure to provide a general 
appeal meant that English penal provisions could not 
be enforced on Pitcairn. 
 
143. In Quan Yick v Hinds at 365 (Tab    ), Griffiths CJ 
observed that the relevant time for considering the 
issue of application of the law to New South Wales 
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was the date, if they came into existence at all, of the 
law’s existence. His Honour said: 
 
In the interval before the passing of this Act, which was in 
fact short but might have been of indefinite duration, 
offenders convicted under secs 21 and 4 of the Act of 5 
Geo IV would have been deprived of any right of appeal. 
That is, in my judgment, of itself sufficient to show that the 
provisions of sec 21 applying the penal provisions of the 
Act to offences created under other Statutes were not 
suitable to the circumstances of the Colony. 
 
144. Nor, it is submitted does the fact that the Pitcairn 
Appeals Order 2000 was passed on 15 May 2000 
affect matters. That would arrest human rights 
objections as to any deficiency in the machinery of 
justice at the time of trial. The relevant date for the 
consideration of whether the English Act was 
incorporated into Pitcairn law were the dates on 
which the respective Ordinances came into force.  
 
145. The Court of Appeal considered that the Governor 
could legislate for a system of criminal justice that 
was less advantageous for Islanders than the 
position of people in England, and this was an 
answer to the argument that Pitcairners would be 
placed in an inferior position. The omission to provide 
for an appeal right was it is submitted a very serious 
apparent oversight, especially since one had been 
provided in 1955 from a Judicial Commissioner to the 
Fiji Court of Appeal. It is submitted that the provision 
of a general appeal to the Fiji Court of Appeal was a 
clear indication of the value placed upon a general 
right of appeal by colonial administrators by that 
date.  It is submitted the issue of the importation of 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956 fell in any case to be 
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judged under the Ordinances which expressly 
provided that the application of English law was 
subject to local circumstances and the limits of local 
jurisdiction. This is not to undermine the wide powers 
of the Governor under the peace, order and good 
government powers, it is to judge the matter by resort 
to the relevant provisions of the Ordinances, and the 
circumstances that existed on Pitcairn at the date of 
their commencement. 
 
146. Nor, it is submitted is the fact that, (as the Public 
Prosecutor submitted and the Court of Appeal 
accepted), the existence of an appeal under the 
prerogative to Her Majesty in Council a sufficient 
appeal provision to dispense with the need for the 
inclusion of a general right of appeal. As this Board 
has repeatedly advised the circumstances in which it 
will grant special leave are for good reason very 
limited.  The approach of the Board was emphasised 
in R (for the Colony of New South Wales) v Bertrand 
(1867) 1 LR 520 at 529-530 (Tab     ) where it was 
said that intervention either on behalf of the Crown or 
by individuals will be "very rare".  The Board also 
observed at p530 that applications for appeal labour 
under "a great preliminary difficulty - a difficulty not 
always overcome by the mere suggestion of 
hardship in the circumstances of the case".  The 
Board added "yet the difficulty is not invincible".   
 
147. It is submitted that there would not have been any 
need to have amended the Pacific Order in Council 
1955 had it not been considered that in the modern 
age a general right of appeal was required as an 
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essential aspect of the machinery of justice.  The 
significance of a general right of appeal has been 
recognised by the provision of such a general appeal 
under the Pitcairn Appeals Order 2000. 
 
148. Finally, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal were 
wrong to defend the importation of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 into Pitcairn law for the additional 
reason, that because there had been no appeal until 
the year 2000, the Appellant’s argument if correct 
meant that:   
 
If the lack of a right of appeal prevented English laws from 
being imported into Pitcairn, it would mean that at least 
during the time that statutory provision had been made in 
respect of rape in England, there had been no similar 
offence in Pitcairn. The same would apply to the offences 
of indecent assault and incest.  
 
149. The failure to have included appeal machinery in the 
Ordinance must mean it is submitted that the Sexual 
Offences Act, 1956 was not enforceable on Pitcairn, 
at the relevant time of offending.  
 
GROUND III - ABUSE OF PROCESS 
 
150. The Courts have the power to restrain executive 
action and stay prosecutions for an abuse of 
process. There have been many situations where 
abuse of process has been argued and the courts 
have said that general guidance as to how the 
discretion should be exercised in particular cases will 
not be useful. In R v Latif (1996) 1 WLR 105 (Tab    ), 
Lord Steyn observed at p112: 
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In this case the issue is whether, despite the fact that a 
fair trial was possible, the judge ought to have stayed the 
criminal proceedings on broader considerations of the 
integrity of the criminal justice system. The law is settled. 
Weighing countervailing considerations of policy and 
justice, it is for the judge in the exercise of his discretion 
to decide whether there has been an abuse of process, 
which amounts to an affront to the public conscience and 
requires the criminal proceedings to be stayed: … 
 
 
151. It is submitted that failure or neglect to provide 
Pitcairn with intelligible publication of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956, accompanied by other 
deficiencies in governance such as the lack of 
provision of any warning that the criminal law would 
be enforced in modern times by the presence of 
British police officers on the Island, and the absence 
of any machinery of justice for the trial of indictable 
offences, constitute one of those other non-defined 
instances where to use the words of Lord Bingham in 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2004] 
2 AC 72 at p90, para 25 (Tab    ), ”they will be 
recognised when they appear”. It is submitted that it 
was unfair to try the Appellants at all for crimes under 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956 until the deficiencies 
were rectified.  
 
 152. The Appellants submit that the deficiencies in the 
system of criminal justice and the administration of 
English penal law on the Island were well known to 
the Governor and that it constituted an abuse of 
process to commence these prosecutions in those 
circumstances. The Appellants in particular refer to 
correspondence between the Governor of the day, 
Governor Williams, his Deputy, Mrs Wolstenholme, 
and the Foreign Office concerning the serious state 
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of neglect of the legal system on Pitcairn Island.  
These documents and others are itemised in the next 
paragraph. 
 
153. Reference is made to the following documentary 
evidence, which is referred to in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court:  
 
[98] In particular, the Public Defender relied on the 
following documents:  
 
[a] In 1996, Leon Salt, Pitcairn Commissioner, had 
suggested to the Governor that a case could be 
made to the Overseas Development Agency 
(ODA) for support to conduct a complete revision 
of Pitcairn’s judicial system.  
 
[b] Governor Williams commented on the inadequacy 
of the current Pitcairn legal system to deal with 
cases involving sex and underage girls in a letter 
to Mr C J B White of the ODA dated 16 December 
1999.  
 
[c] Mrs K S Wolstenholme, the Deputy Governor, in a 
letter dated 6 January 2000 to Commissioner Salt, 
informed him that the Governor was very 
concerned to have a workable legal system in 
place as soon as possible and that the age of 
consent question be settled.   
 
[d] Mrs Wolstenholme’s letter (as Acting Governor) to 
Mr Stephen Evans of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) dated 1 May 2000, 
acknowledges that the situation was partly of the 
Administration’s making and that it was “not 
altogether surprising if the community does not 
see the laws as applicable to them.”  
 
[e] Governor Williams, in a letter to Mr Evans dated 
24 October 2000, expressed concern that if the 
prosecutions were to fail because the law was so 
obscure it could not reasonably be enforced, or the 
widespread nature of the offences, and the total 
absence over many years of any attempt by Her 
Majesty’s Government to apply the law, meant that 
it could not reasonably be applied now without 
further warning.  
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[f] A memorandum dated 30 October 2000 
Mr C J B White to Baroness Scotland, copied to 
others, noted that the National Institute for Social 
Work commented that with hindsight the structure 
of governance on Pitcairn had failed the 
community.   
 
 [g] Reference was also made to a letter from 
Commissioner Leon Salt to Constable Cox to 
proceed cautiously with an inquiry into 
complainant A because the legal system was not 
in place to deal with such matters.   
 
154. Other documents of relevance are: 
 
(a) The report of Eva Learner, (NISW) Associate 
entitled "Summary Report on Pitcairn Island" 
dated 20th September 2000 together with 
Memorandum dated 2nd October 2000 from 
Mr Mike Evans to Stephen Paul Evans (Tab     
). 
 
(b) Proposed report on Pitcairn to be sent by 
Governor Williams to the Public Prosecutor for 
Pitcairn briefing him on public policy matters 
dated 20th October 2000 and Governor 
Williams' further response to Mr White of the 
Foreign Office dated 27th October 2000. 
 
155. The Appellants' submissions on the issue of 
publication and issues that relate to the fairness of 
prosecuting Islanders in the face of the perceived 
deficiencies were summarised by the Supreme Court 
as: 
  
The Public Defender submits that apart from an oblique 
reference to the English general statutes applying to 
Pitcairn in the Judicature Ordinances, the substance of 
English criminal offences and penalties were not set out 
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so as to inform Pitcairn Islanders clearly in advance of 
prosecution of the seriousness of offending under English 
law.  Documents relied on by the Public Defender reveal a 
process of consultation with the Governor, generally after 
an incident had occurred, in an ad hoc and occasional 
way.  The fact that advice was sought from time to time 
could have heralded to the Administrators that there was 
a need to confront this issue directly and provide Pitcairn 
with a clear and meaningful summary of the relevant laws 
and penalties under English law.  Had the Pitcairn 
Islanders been properly advised of the consequences of 
serious offending and – young men in particular – 
educated on the threat to their liberty if they engaged in 
serious criminal misconduct, these crimes may never 
have happened. 
 
THE FAILURE TO PUBLISH THE SEXUAL OFFENCES 
ACT 1956 ON PITCAIRN 
 
Publication of Penal law and Good Governance 
 
156. As the Supreme Court found after the disclosure 
procedure had been completed for the purpose of 
the "generic argument", there was no evidence of the 
Sexual Offences Act 1956 ever being published on 
Pitcairn or legal texts, or Halsbury’s Laws made 
available in any way to Pitcairners prior to 1997. The 
first time English criminal law was available in any 
published form on Pitcairn was after Constable Cox 
of the Kent Police imported a copy of Halsbury’s 
Laws to the Island in 1997.  In that sense, it is 
submitted that those responsible for the governance 
of Pitcairn failed in their duty to adequately forewarn 
Pitcairners of their obligations to abide by the 
provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, what 
those offences were, and most importantly also the 
condign penalties they could incur if they chose to 
break the law.  By comparison with published Island 
law incorporated in the Justice Ordinances where 
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offending such as indecent behaviour in a public 
place or carnal knowledge with a child carried 
maximum sentences of 100 days imprisonment, 
offences such as rape carried maximum sentences 
of life imprisonment.   
 
157. Mr Treadwell gave evidence:  
 
(a) He described his role as like the Attorney-
General for Pitcairn.  He accepted that he was 
not simply a person who was giving some 
legal advice to the Governor but had the 
responsibilities to the community and 
functions which should be there to benefit the 
community.   
 
(b) He admitted that during his period as legal 
adviser he had not visited the Island and 
although he had been offered the opportunity 
to go to the Island by Governor O'Leary, the 
length of that visit had coincided with 
commitments to his legal practice.  He also 
said that he had requested permission to visit 
some years ago after 1987 but he was not 
given permission to visit.   
 
(c) On the topic of Pitcairners' access to the law 
he said that access to the internet started 3 
years ago and that prior to the internet, the 
access Pitcairners had to English law was free 
access to the various persons in the 
administration including himself.   
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(d) When asked how could a New Zealander 
advise on English law when there was no 
copy of the English law on the Island, his 
answer was "perhaps not very well".   
 
(e) He said that Mr Harraway or Mr Salt, previous 
Commissioners, asked him about English law 
if they did not know the answer, "they would 
have referred it to me and often did".   
 
(f) He did not know, apart from Halsbury, which 
he had sent to the Island of any other source 
of English law being sent to the Island other 
than access to the internet.  
 
(g) He said that it was the Commissioner's job to 
make sure that the law was properly applied 
on the Island, that legal procedures were 
followed, that the law was intelligible to those 
on the Island.  When asked if it was not his 
responsibility, then whose it was, he said he 
would pick the Commissioner.   
 
(h) When asked did he ever consider that a code 
or a summary of English crimes should be 
properly set out and made accessible to 
Pitcairn Islanders on Pitcairn, he said "yes, it 
was going to be done in the process of 
reforming the legal system".  He had opened a 
file in the late 1990s and that particular project 
was overtaken by many other obligations.   
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(i) He agreed with the proposition that in a 
modern society, good administration required 
that the criminal law be set out clearly and 
intelligibly.  He said that he believed it was 
and referred to the provisions of the revised 
laws in 1970, 1985 and later in 2001, which 
specifically applied to the territory, the 
provisions of the law in force, the statutes of 
general application, the doctrines of equity 
and the common law.   
 
(j) In his view, that was "not at all an uncommon 
situation in colonial practice".   
 
(k) He said that he had no information to suggest 
that prior to the arrival of Halsbury on the 
Island there was ever a copy of any English 
laws on the Island.   
 
(l) In answer to the question whether he had ever 
turned his mind to whether potential penalties 
for serious crimes, English crime had ever 
been made clear and plain to Pitcairners, he 
said he did not know about that but he 
expressed the view that he would have 
thought that they are worldly wise to the extent 
that they travel, they have access to news of 
world affairs through various media.  They 
would know that serious crimes of murder and 
rape would attract a substantial punishment 
but he added when asked did he ever turn his 
mind to the fact that the law relating to serious 
crime should be spelt out on the Island that he 
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thought it would be fair to say that he had no 
inkling that it might necessary. 
 
158. It is submitted it was a pre-condition to the legality of 
the enforcement of the English statute on the Island 
that it was published on the Island.  
 
159. The attention of the Court is drawn to the provisions 
of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 
1949 in occupied territories and in particular Article 
65 (Tab    ):  
 
The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power 
shall not come into force before they have been published 
and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their 
own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall 
not be retroactive. 
 
160. The publication notes state: 
 
 1. “Publication”  
 It may seem surprising that a whole Article of the 
Convention should be devoted to stating such an obvious 
principle, but the experience of two World Wars has 
shown that principle is not always observed. Article 65 
was adopted with a view to ensuring its observance in the 
future. 
 
 The Occupying Power must not, for example, rest content 
with merely broadcasting the information, for the 
broadcast may only be heard by a portion of the 
population. The full text of the legislation must be 
published. The Convention does not prescribe the mode 
of publication, which may be through the medium of the 
local press, in an “official Gazette” specially issued for the 
purpose, or by posting notices in places specially set 
aside and known to the Public. The Occupying Power will 
sometimes resort to all three methods simultaneously. 
The language used will of course be the official language 
of the country concerned, that is to say the language in 
which the laws of the State are published. 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
161. Likewise, it is submitted at least in modern post-war 
colonial government practice, the importance of the 
Rule of Law and plain publication of imported penal 
law should not have been lost on administrators.  Mr 
Treadwell gave evidence that he recognised the 
value of a code. 
 
The Obligation to Communicate Penal Law  
 
162. It is submitted at the heart of a legal system lies the 
need to communicate clearly and intelligibly the law 
that those subject to it are expected to observe. 
Professor Lon Fuller The Morality of Law New Haven 
and London, Yale University Press, 2nd ed, p209 
(Tab   ) writes "of the existence of a relatively stable 
reciprocity of expectations between lawgiver and 
subject is part of the very idea of a functioning legal 
order".  Publication of the criminal law together with 
the provision of the machinery to ensure compliance 
with the law are it is submitted fundamental 
requirements of a proper functioning legal system, in 
a civilised modern society. It is submitted in the 
modern age the criminal law must be promulgated or 
published with sufficient clarity and precision to 
inform citizens prospectively of the crimes and 
penalties for which they are at risk. Likewise, it is 
submitted, the criminal law of the governor must in 
the modern world, be clearly communicated to the 
governed in the sense that the offences and 
penalties are intelligibly published in that community. 
Not only should this be a fundamental proposition of 
justice and the Rule of Law, but also it represents a 
fundamental rule of good, enlightened and fair 
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administration of criminal justice, in the context of 
colonial administration. The more remote the 
possession or territory that is being governed, the 
greater must be the steps taken to ensure 
meaningful publication of the penal law to its 
inhabitants. Those who are expected to comply with 
imported penal law should not have to divine that 
law.  
 
163. It may be inconvenient and appear perhaps 
unnecessary amongst people commonly believed to 
be harmonious and law abiding in small communities 
to take such steps. However, it is submitted that the 
Rule of Law is all encompassing. It should not in the 
modern world of communications, and an increased 
awareness of human rights mean that any distinction 
should be drawn for the purpose of the 
administration and application of the criminal law 
between the governor and the governed.  Before 
there can be prosecution of criminal offences, there 
must be compliance with the Rule of Law, the most 
important aspect of which is publication of the penal 
law in the community of the governed.  
 
164. Professor Fuller wrote at p209-210 (Tab     ): 
 
           Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in 
acting upon the citizen (by putting him in jail, for example, 
or declaring invalid a deed under which he claims title to 
property) a government will faithfully apply rules 
previously declared as those to be followed by the citizen 
and as being determinative of his rights and duties. If the 
Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing.  
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165. It is submitted that the omission to promulgate or 
advertise in an intelligible form the nature of the 
offences and penalties under the Act deprived the 
Pitcairn community of both the legal and moral force 
or authority that the publication of the criminal law 
means for a community. It is notice to the community 
at large of the lawful standards of conduct expected 
of members of the community.  It embodies the 
metes and bounds of the moral values of that society 
that are enshrined in the law and will be protected by 
it. It provides the community with definite rules about 
the standards of conduct to which it must aspire, and 
by which they must live together. This is born out in 
the writings of legal theorists from the time of St 
Thomas Acquinas referred to below. In relation, to 
this issue of morality, it was promulgation, which 
Professor Lon Fuller saw as embodying one aspect 
of the “inner morality of law” that could be treated as 
indicative of a morality associated with duty or 
obligation rather than of aspiration.  He wrote at p43 
(Tab    ): 
 
To these observations there is one important 
exception. This relates to the desideratum of making 
those laws known, or at least making them available to 
those affected by them. Here we have a demand that 
lends itself with unusual readiness to formalization. …. A 
formalization of the desideratum of publicity has obvious 
advantages over uncanalized efforts, even when they are 
intelligently and conscientiously pursued. A formalized 
standard of promulgation not only tells the lawmaker 
where to publish his laws; it also lets the subject - or a 
lawyer representing his interests- know where to go to 
learn what the law is. 
 
166. The place of the Rule of Law as an educative 
instrument for the better regulation of society can be 
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traced back at least to the philosopher St Thomas 
Acquinas who in his Summa Theologiae I-II defined 
law as "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for 
the common good, made by him who has care of the 
community and promulgated" (Tab     ).  Dr Shirley 
Letwin in her History of the Idea of Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, at p70 (Tab    ) wrote of 
Acquinas having referred to the above statement 
that: 
 
 This "ordinance of reason" provides a "directive principle" 
for human actions because, by being promulgated, law 
"imprints" on those subject to it a rule that provides for 
them a "principle of action". Law thus satisfies the natural 
need of rational mortals for direction by a rational 
principle.  
 
That is, it provides a standard to which men can 
aspire to live and by which the general community 
can productively and harmoniously exist.  
 
167. The concept of the Rule of Law and promulgation as 
a guiding principle for human behaviour is also seen 
in the writings of Simester and Sullivan, Criminal 
Law, Theory and Doctrine, 2nd Edition, Oxford- 
Portland Oregon 2003, (citing Professors Raz and 
Colvin).  They write at p37 (Tab     ): 
 
Central to the protection of those rights and expectations 
is the Rule of Law, which demands that those under the 
State’s control should be dealt with by fixed and knowable 
law, and not according to the discretion of the State 
(including judicial) officials. As such, the Rule of Law 
embodies a cluster of legal values, including certainty, 
clarity and prospectivity; which have at their heart not 
merely the constitutional premise that government should 
operate under the law, but also the ideal that citizens 
should be able successfully to live within the law, by 
deriving guidance from the law itself. This in turn requires 
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that the criminal law must be organised, ascertainable, 
system of legal rules – and not ad hoc responses to the 
conduct of individuals. 
 
 
168. As Professor Fuller wrote at p210 (Tab     ): 
 
The twin principles of generality and of faithful 
adherence by government to its own declared rules 
cannot be viewed as offering mere counsels of 
expediency. This follows from the basic difference 
between law and managerial direction; law is not like 
management, a matter of directing other persons how to 
accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is basically a 
matter of providing the citizenry with a sound and stable 
framework for their interactions with one another, the role 
of government being that of standing as a guardian of the 
integrity of this system. 
 
169. Professor Joseph Raz wrote in his The Authority of 
Law, OUP, 1979, in a chapter entitled the "Rule of 
Law and its Virtue" at p214 (Tab     ): 
 
The law must be open and adequately publicised. If it is to 
guide people they must be able to find out what it is. For 
the same reason its meaning must be clear. An 
unambiguous, vague, obscure, or imprecise law is likely 
to mislead or confuse at least some of those   who desire 
to be guided by it.  
 
 
170. Professor Eric Colvin in Crime Justice & Codification 
(edit P Fitzgerald), 1986 Casswell writes in Chapter 9 
"Criminal Law and the Rule of Law" at p137 (Tab      
): 
 
In the context of criminal law, the term “principle of 
legality” is often substituted for “ideal of the rule of law”. 
The term” ideal of the rule of law” will, however, be used 
here. Both expressions signify that the institutional design 
for the criminal law should maximise its capacity to shape 
a voluntary social order. They are therefore linked to the 
general communicative or educative function of criminal 
law. Criminal law is viewed as a device for communicating 
standards of conduct for the guidance of persons from 
whom voluntary compliance can be anticipated. Criminal 
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law has functions other than this. There are, however, 
good reasons for asserting a measure of primacy for its 
general communicative or educative function. 
 
171. In the penultimate paragraph to this chapter, he 
says, perhaps drawing from Fuller’s concepts of the 
morality of aspiration and that of duty at p42-43 (Tab     
) and it is submitted, apposite for Pitcairn: 
 
The ideal of the Rule of Law speaks to both aspiration 
and duty in the imposition of criminal liability.  At the level 
of aspiration, it can be taken to present a model of good 
institutional design which law-makers should seek to 
attain, even thought the deficiencies do not affect the 
scope of criminal liability. At the level of duty, it can be 
taken to present a set of general conditions for the 
imposition of criminal liability. Conviction and punishment 
under circumstances, which would violate these 
conditions should be excluded.  
 
172. Finally, he adds:  
 
Attachment to the ideal means seeking to advance it in all 
aspects of the drafting and promulgation of criminal law.  
 
 
173. The writings of other jurisprudential authors Finnis 
and Rawls, referring to the arguments of 
promulgation are mentioned in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court.   
 
174. It has been submitted that the minimum requirement 
for Pitcairn was the publication of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 on the Island so Pitcairners had 
access to it. Good governance would it is submitted 
in a more practical sense also require that its 
existence and importance was communicated plainly 
to Islanders perhaps by public meeting or other 
means of advertisement, and updated on a regular 
basis. Publication in a popular sense was also the 
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aim of the Geneva provisions cited above. Jeremy 
Bentham in his writings Of Promulgation of the Laws 
and Promulgation of the Reasons Thereof (Tab      ) 
said: 
 
 Let us suppose the general code completed, and that the 
seal of the sovereign has been set to it.  What remains to 
be done? 
 
 That a law may be obeyed, it is necessary that it should 
be known: that it may be known, it is necessary that it be 
promulgated.  But to promulgate a law, it is not only 
necessary that it should be published with the sound of 
trumpet in the streets; not only that it should be read to 
the people; not only that it should be printed: all these 
means may be good, but they may be all employed 
without accomplishing the essential object.  They may 
possess more of the appearance than the reality of 
promulgation.  To promulgate a law, is to present it to the 
minds of those who are to be governed by it in such 
manner as they have it habitually in their memories and 
may possess every facility for consulting it, if they have 
any doubts respecting what it prescribes. 
 
175. In her report, Evan Learner a NISW Associate, on 
her visit to Pitcairn in or about the year 2000 (Tab   ), 
wrote of the dysfunctional state of the Island in 
relation to child abuse and observed that Islanders 
were confused about the age of consent, some being 
of the opinion it was 12.  Others talking of the fact 
that in years past, the "Rule Book" (that is Island 
penal law) was read out at public meetings twice at 
year.  Learner reported that she was informed that in 
those days people knew what the law said. She 
added that on many levels, there was confusion 
about the age of consent. This report is educative 
generally about perceived attitudes towards sexual 
behaviour and cultural aspects on the Island.   
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176. It is submitted that whilst publication of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 on the Island was a pre-requisite 
to prosecution, the point made by Bentham is that 
good governance would have reinforced the fact of 
publication by further regular communication with 
Islanders the importance of abiding by English law. 
 
Accessibility and the Approach of the Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeal 
 
177. On the issue of accessibility, the Public Prosecutor, 
as he had in the Supreme Court, accepted before the 
Court of Appeal there was a need for the law to be 
accessible. In this regard, reference was made to 
Lord Evershed who said in Lim Chin Aik v The 
Queen (1963) AC 160 at 171 (Tab  ) of promulgation:  
 
In their Lordships’ opinion, even if the making of the order 
by the minister be regarded as an exercise of the 
legislative as distinct from the executive or administrative 
function (as they do not concede) the maxim cannot apply 
to such a case as the present where it appears that there 
is in the State of Singapore no provision, corresponding, 
for example, to that contained in s3(2) of the English 
Statutory instruments Act of 1946, for the publication of an 
order of the kind made in the present case or any other 
provision designed to enable  man by appropriate inquiry 
to find out "what the law is".  
 
178. Further, Lord Philips in the Court of Appeal more 
recently in R (on the application of L and another) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 
All ER 1062 observed at 1069 (Tab    ) that: 
 
It is an aspect of the rule of law that individuals and those 
advising them, since they will be presumed to know the 
law, should have access to it in authentic form. 
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179. Lord Diplock had also emphasised this point in 
Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke 
Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 (HL) at 
638 (Tab    ), where he stated: 
 
The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional 
principle requires that a citizen, before committing himself 
to any course of action, should be able to know in 
advance what are the legal consequences that will flow 
from it. 
 
 
180. Further Lord Bingham in R v Rimmington [2006] 1 Cr 
App R 17, noted Lord Diplock's statement in Black-
Clawson and further Lord Diplock's statement in 
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 at 
279 (Tab      ): 
 
 Elementary justice, or to use the concept often cited by 
the European court, the need for legal certainty demands 
that the rules by which the citizen is to be bound should 
be assertainable by him (or more realistically by a 
competent lawyer advising him" by reference to 
identifiable sources that are publicly accessible. 
 
181. The Public Prosecutor however submitted before the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal that the law 
was accessible to Islanders. They could have 
ascertained from the Administration what the law was 
and thus it was reasonably accessible to them.  The 
Supreme Court observed:  
 
On the basis of these principles, we conclude that the law 
demands not that citizens have express awareness of the 
content of the law, nor that the law is promulgated to that 
extent, but that the law needs to be accessible in order 
that people can regulate their conduct by it.  Where it is so 
accessible, people are deemed to know of it.   
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182. The Supreme Court accepted the Public Prosecutor's 
submission that publication of English law on Pitcairn 
was not mandatory so long as the law was otherwise 
accessible, and in the view of the Supreme Court, 
Pitcairners had access to it through the 
administration although there was no evidence of the 
publication of the Act on the Island. The instances of 
this are documented below. 
  
183. These were: 
 
 (a) Captain Eliott of HMS Fly in 1838, was 
responsible for drawing up a form of 
constitution and a series of laws, which were 
adopted by the Islanders.  Under them, it was 
noted that serious crimes were to be referred 
to the captain of the next visiting warship.  
 
(b) In 1893 Captain Rookes of HMS Champion 
drew up a comprehensive new set of laws and 
regulations, which were adopted by the 
Islanders.  
 
(c) Later amendments to the laws by visiting 
Naval captains, including in 1906 Captain 
Gaunt:  
 
It having been pointed out to me that there is no 
authority for the detention of an accused persons 
in serious cases which have to be reported to the 
High Commissioner’s Court it is my direction the 
Chief Magistrate and Assessors is authorised to 
ensure the necessary confinement.  
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  (d) In 1898, Pitcairn was brought under the 
umbrella of Pacific Order in Council 1893.  
Under that umbrella, in 1904 revised laws 
were laid down by the Deputy High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Under 
those provisions, civil and criminal matters of 
a serious nature, for which punishment was 
not provided in the local rules and regulations, 
were to be dealt with by the High 
Commissioner’s Court for the Western Pacific 
in Pitcairn. The 1904 Regulations specifically 
referred to the crimes of adultery and rape 
being dealt with by the High Commissioner’s 
Court: 
 
 The question of Adultery and Rape (Violation by 
force) cannot be dealt with by the local Court.  
Such matters must be referred to the High 
Commissioner’s Court for the Western Pacific 
 
 (e) In 1940, Instructions in the form of regulations 
were promulgated under the authority of the 
High Commissioner. These regulations 
included provisions that criminal proceedings 
were to be taken in the name of the King, and 
that all cases not within the jurisdiction of the 
Island Court were to be heard and determined 
in the High Commissioner’s Court for the 
Western Pacific. The 1940 Regulations were 
issued in the form of “Instructions for the 
Guidance of the Local Government of Pitcairn 
Island” and were assented to by a General 
Assembly of all Pitcairn Islanders over the age 
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of 17 years on 7 October 1940.  Attention was 
drawn to: 
 
(i) Regulation 15:  Jurisdiction of the Local 
Court.  
  
(ii) Regulation 16:  Jurisdiction of the High 
Commissioner’s Court.  
 
(iii) Regulation 21:  Review of Judgments 
by the Court of Appeal.  
 
 (f) The 1952 and 1970 Orders in Council then 
followed, with a large number of Ordinances 
being enacted under each, including the 
establishment of a separate Court system. 
See 1952, 1970 Pitcairn Orders.  
 
(g) An extract from the Pitcairn Island 
Administration Report circa 1959, recorded a 
request by the Island Police Officer, Floyd 
McCoy, for direct assistance from Suva when 
investigating offences such as rape and 
abortion: 
 
FLOYD MCCOY RE CORRESPONDENCE  
Although this is a chestnut of some maturity, he 
has found one more to discuss.  He requests if he 
may address Suva direct where the matter is 
outside the jurisdiction of the Island Court -- e.g. 
rape, abortion etc.  He was apparently told to 
investigate such matters by very quiet methods by 
McCloughlin [sic] and feels that should the Chief 
Magistrate’s family be involved he is in a difficult 
position. 
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(h) On 6 January 1965, the Pitcairn 
Commissioner, Reid Cowell, was in London 
awaiting departure for Pitcairn.  While in 
London, he was sent drafts of the Justice 
Ordinance and the Local Government 
Regulations, and told that 15 copies of each 
were on their way to the Island Council on 
Pitcairn to be there before his arrival on the 
Island. Commissioner Cowell prepared a set 
of notes “for Island Council discussion 4 
March 1965”.  In particular:  
 
(a) Limits on local court’s jurisdiction: 
From time to time cases may arise over 
which the Court has no jurisdiction. We 
have provided, in this section, for 
jurisdiction to be extended if a need arises.  
The procedure to follow is to let SPO 
[“South Pacific Office”, Suva] know by radio 
the broad outlines of the offence when we 
can advise the Court how to proceed.  Do 
not hesitate for one moment to seek such 
advice. 
 
(i) Commissioner Cowell travelled to Pitcairn, 
and met with the Island Council.  He reported 
on his discussions with the Council on 5 
March 1965 and commented on the "carnal 
knowledge" section and its relationship with 
the law of rape: 
 
s69 This is an extremely controversial provision 
and, after much discussion, it was decided to 
change only the penalty, to 100 days’ 
imprisonment.  There was a strong feeling, 
however, that sexual relations with a girl under 12 
years should carry a heavier penalty and the 
Council wondered whether it, like rape, could be 
dealt with under s.6 if a need arose.  
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(j) Following his return to Suva, Cowell wrote to 
the Island Magistrate on Pitcairn enclosing a 
revised text of the Ordinance taking into 
account the Island Council’s comments: 
 
Reference to s 5: “The Court decides whether a 
case is within its jurisdiction or not.  If there is any 
doubt South Pacific Office can be consulted by 
radio.” 
 
Reference to application of English law: 
 
s 6. From time to time cases may arise over which 
the Court has no jurisdiction.  We have provided in 
this section for jurisdiction to be extended if a need 
arises.  The procedure to follow is to let South 
Pacific Office know by radio the outline of the 
offence when we can advise the Court how to 
proceed.  It should be remembered that in addition 
to the local law of Pitcairn as enacted in the 
Ordinance, certain parts of the law of England 
apply by virtue of s 7 of the Judicature Ordinance 
No 1 of 1961.  
 
Reference to murder and treason. These are 
offences under English law -- there is no local law 
against murder or treason. 
 
Reference to application of English law:  
 
Reference to “Carnal knowledge” offence, and 
specific reminder that the law of rape applies in 
Pitcairn: 
 
s.88 We have left the wording of this provision as 
the Council last March wanted it.  Remember, 
however, that the English law also applies and that 
if any male person should have carnal knowledge 
of a female child under the age of 12 years, that 
male person would be liable to be prosecuted 
under the English law of rape.  In such a 
circumstance it would be proper for the Court to 
hold a preliminary inquiry under part vii of the 
Ordinance. 
 
Serious cases of theft covered by English law:  
 
If the value of the property stolen or received 
exceeds one hundred pounds s.6 may be invoked 
or a preliminary inquiry may be held under Part 
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VII.  It would be best to consult South Pacific 
Office if such a cause were to arise.”  
 
After this process, on 10 December 1965, the 
Magistrate sent a telegram: “Justice 
Ordinance No. 1 of 1966 approved in full by 
Council".  
 
(k) S 5(b) of the Justice Ordinance 1966 provided 
for the jurisdiction of the Island Court:  
 
 “5. Subject to the provisions of this or any other 
Ordinance, the Court shall have jurisdiction-- … 
(b) in criminal cases over all offences committed 
within the Islands or in the territorial waters thereof 
against the provisions of this or any other 
Ordinance except in so far as the jurisdiction of the 
Court is therein expressly excluded: 
Provided that-- 
… (iii) except to the extent provided in Part VII of 
this Ordinance the Court shall not exercise 
jurisdiction in respect of any offence arising only 
by virtue of the provisions of section 7 of the 
Judicature Ordinance, 1961 …” 
 
Section 7 of the Judicature Ordinance 1961 
provided: 
“7. Subject to the provisions of section 8 of this 
Ordinance the substance of the law for the time 
being in force in and for England shall be in force 
in the Islands. 
 
Note also: 
 
Section 15 of Justice Ordinance:  criminal 
proceedings taken in the name of Her Majesty the 
Queen 
 
Section 16:  explicit reference to murder and 
treason 
 
Section 55:  committal for trial before Supreme 
Court 
 
Section 68:  power for Legal Adviser to review 
committal proceedings  
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(l) Minutes of Island Council meeting 9 
November 1970:  
 
PRESENT: All Council Members with Parents and 
children from age 10 years in attendance.  Pastor 
offered a prayer to open the meeting. 
PURPOSE: To warn the parents and children 
against the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge - Section 
88 of Pitcairn Ordinance of 1966. A complaint was 
made that raping or the illicit carnal knowledge of a 
girl aged 11 years without her consent was 
suspected to have been committed but owing to 
no definite proof nothing could be done other than 
a warning given in Council Meeting.  Anderson 
queried the modification of ages from 16 years to 
12 years.  The I.M. said it was modified when Mr 
Cowell was here.  G.A. and Tom said that if an 
offence is committed to a girl below the age of 12 
years the case will require higher Authorities to 
deal with the case.  Pastor stressed the 
importance of the parents guarding their young 
girls from acting free with the boys, especially 
running around with the boys on various places on 
the island.  After discussing different matters 
concerning Carnal Knowledge the parents were 
dismissed and Council Meeting open for Monthly 
Government Business. 
 
 
184. The Public Prosecutor also drew the Court to a 
number of other instances of English law being 
applied or considered on Pitcairn: 
 
(a) Harry Christian trial for murder in 1898.   
 
(b) Coffin attempted murder cases 1936. Two 
cases of possible attempted murder were 
referred to the Western Pacific High 
Commissioner in 1936, and the suspects were 
held in confinement pending word from the 
High Commissioner.  Mr J.S. Neill was 
appointed as a Judicial Commissioner to deal 
with the matter, and travelled to Pitcairn (on a 
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previously-planned trip).  He formed the view 
that no prosecutions were appropriate.   
 
(c) Edward Christian domestic violence case 
1905.  Chief Magistrate hears the case and 
finds the evidence against Christian “very 
strong, strong enough to convict [of a breach 
of Local Law 10]” but refers the case to 
Deputy Commissioner Simmons for his 
consideration because of its seriousness and 
Christian’s “past conduct”.  
 
(d) Abortion case 1940.  Charge of abortion 
against Laura Christian referred to Western 
Pacific High Commission by Chief Magistrate 
“seeing that this case is beyond my power to 
deal with”.  Having obtained a legal opinion, 
the Secretary, Western Pacific High 
Commission, replied by telegram:  “I am 
advised that the alleged confession is of very 
doubtful admissibility and it is doubtful whether 
a conviction could be obtained on the 
remainder of the evidence.  No further action 
should therefore be taken". 
 
(e) Maurice Christian recidivist thefts, 1940-41.  
Reference to Western Pacific High 
Commission for advice in dealing with Maurice 
Christian, a kleptomaniac.   
 
(f) Trespass case 1947.  Civil claim relating to 
the cutting down of six orange trees referred 
to Western Pacific High Commission as the 
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value of the trees is assessed as greater than 
£10, the limit of the court’s jurisdiction.   
 
(g) Clarence Young divorce case 1958.  Mr 
McLoughlin travelled to Pitcairn Island and sat 
as a Judicial Commissioner in the High 
Commissioner’s Court for the Western Pacific 
to hear the case.   
 
(h) Donald Young's intrusion into Tom and Betty 
Christian’s house in 1971.  This case of 
alleged burglary was referred to the 
administration for advice about possible 
offences under English law.  
 
185. The Public Prosecutor also referred to the evidence 
adduced at the trial of the "generic argument".  In 
particular, reference was made to:  
 
 (a) Betty Christian’s affidavit, sworn 27 October 
2004, which states at para 5.3: “… it has 
always been a matter of common sense that 
serious sexual offending, such as rape, incest, 
or indecent assault, would be prosecuted 
under English law”.  Mrs Christian was born 
on Pitcairn in 1942, and married Thomas 
Christian in 1966.  She has been Island 
Secretary since 1997. Evidence was also 
given at trial by Mrs Christian.  
 
(b) Thomas Christian’s affidavit, sworn 27 
October 2004, states at para 2.2: 
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I agree that it is common sense that English law 
has always applied in Pitcairn, if no local law 
applies.  I remember a provision in the Ordinances 
that English law applies here if no local law 
applies, and I would always have expected serious 
offending, including murder, rape, and serious 
sexual offending, to have been prosecuted under 
English law, with the assistance of the Governor’s 
office and the Administration Office. 
  
(c) Jay Warren's evidence was called for the 
defence.  He testified in cases of serious 
crime such as murder or rape he would have 
sought guidance from the Administration. His 
affidavit was also filed in evidence. 
 
186. The Court of Appeal summarised the approach of the 
Supreme Court and noted the Court had reached its 
conclusion that law was accessible: 
 
… by referring to a number of instances where Pitcairners 
had sought the advice of the authorities in all related 
matters and, in particular, the availability of the 
Government Adviser for that purpose. 
 
187. The Court of Appeal proceeded to add: 
 
It is unnecessary to repeat the factual findings, which, 
although significantly relevant to the issue, are not, in our 
view determinative of it. 
 
 
188. It is submitted that recourse to ad hoc official advice 
from time to time when problems arose is not 
publication of English penal law on Pitcairn sufficient 
to meet the requirements of the Rule of Law.  See 
Simester & Sullivan referred to above at para 169. 
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189. The Court of Appeal "in any event" indicated it had 
some reservations about such reasoning. The Court 
observed: 
 
We do, however, have some reservations as to whether 
accessibility in the way described could as a general 
proposition be an adequate safeguard and necessarily 
always answer a challenge to any law which is sought to 
be enforced. It seems to us that accessibility through a 
government agency may not always be sufficient to meet 
the tests described in the decisions. 
 
190. The inquiry according to the Court of Appeal:  
 
…is whether the appellants can legitimately claim lack of 
knowledge that they were liable to prosecution under 
English law for the offences of rape, indecent assault on a 
woman and incest. 
 
 
191. In this regard, the Court observed that there could be 
no doubt that the inhabitants were aware that for 
serious offending English law applied. The factors 
that were identified were:  
 
(a) The case of Harry Christian was well known to 
the inhabitants of Pitcairn. 
 
(b) The 1961 Ordinance and the 1970 Ordinance 
both expressly referred to the extension of 
English law to Pitcairn and were promulgated. 
 
(c) Various documentation concerning the 
introduction of the Justice Ordinance 1966 by 
Commissioner Reid Cowell, and 
communications thereto with the Island 
Council.  
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(d) As well there was reference to the opinions of 
Mr and Mrs Thomas Christian that it was a 
matter of commonsense that serious sexual 
offending such as rape, incest or indecent 
assault would be prosecuted under English 
law.  
 
192. On this issue, it was the view of the Court that: 
 
Faced with the factual situation it become unreal to 
contend that it was unfair or unjust to commence these 
prosecutions because the 1956 Act or a summary of its 
provisions had not been published locally. 
 
 
193. It is submitted however, that it is not unreal to require 
the relevant English indictable crimes and penalties 
that it is contended applies to Pitcairners in these 
prosecutions to have been published on Pitcairn. 
Promulgation today should not be regarded merely 
as a formal rule that can be dispensed with, if 
otherwise, it may be thought that the substance of 
the law is or may be commonly known, or it is 
contrary to moral standards to perform certain acts.  
It is submitted in the modern age, the Rule of Law 
required publication of imported penal law and in 
particular the Sexual Offences Act 1956 as a 
minimum pre-requisite to a lawful prosecution.  
 
194. In any event, as was pointed out to the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal in this case, such 
advices as were given were imparted years before 
most of these incidents arose, and Harry Christian 
the only case of an indictable prosecution on Pitcairn 
 
 
 
 
102 
well over half a century before, the time of the first 
offence.  Even if it is accepted that Pitcairners would 
know that it was wrong to rape, at least in the sense 
of violation by force according to Jay Warren (a view 
that was commonly held amongst English jurists until 
the 1970s), it is submitted that it is a condition 
precedent to prosecution under Pitcairn law that clear 
publication of the relevant English penal statute was 
required. There should be no burden on a defendant 
to demonstrate his or her ignorance of the law in 
circumstances where the law has not been published 
and the defendant has no access to it.    
 
195. Although as a general principle since the trial of Sir 
Christopher  Blunt and others for high treason arising 
out of the Essex conspiracy The Trial of Sir 
Christopher Blunt and Others, State Trials, 43 Eliz. 
1600, 1410 at 1450 per Popham CJ (Tab    ), it has 
been a principle of English law that ignorance of the 
law is no defence.  There is also old and respectable 
authority that there are limits to this principle.  
 
196. In R v Bailey (1800) R & R 1; 168 ER 651 (Tab    ), 
twelve Judges, on a case reserved by the trial Judge 
Lord Eldon, held that the prisoner ought to be 
admitted to a pardon on an indictment for wilfully and 
maliciously shooting where he could not have known 
that English law had extended the crime of malicious 
wounding to an act arising on the high seas. The 
prisoner, Bailey, was a captain of a ship the Langley 
that had encountered another vessel the Admiral 
Nelson that was not sailing with colours. There was 
an argument between Bailey and the captain of the 
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Admiral Nelson that had been boarded by Bailey, 
which led to Bailey, later firing on the Admiral Nelson 
and as a consequence  a man was seriously injured.  
 
197. It had been argued by Bailey that he could not be 
found guilty of the offence with which he was 
charged because the Act had only received the royal 
assent on 10 May 1799.  At the date of the offence, 
27 June 1799, Bailey could not know that any such 
act was unlawful on the high seas because his ship 
was, at that time, off the African coast. Although Lord 
Eldon had directed the jury that his ignorance on the 
act could not otherwise affect the case, he was of the 
view that it was a factor which might lead to merciful 
consideration should he be found guilty.  The Court 
of Crown Cases Reserved considered that it was 
proper to apply for a pardon on the ground that the 
act having been committed so short a time after it 
had become an offence, the prisoner could not have 
known of this. The head note to the English Reports 
states (Tab     ):  
 
 On case, the judges thought he could not have been tried 
if the 39 Geo.III. c 37 had not been passed , and as he 
could not have known of the Act, they thought it right he 
should have  a pardon. 
 
198. Professor Glanville Williams in his book Criminal 
Law, 2nd ed, 1961 Stevens & Sons Ltd in the "The 
General Part" at p260 (Tab    ), considered that this 
case was authority for the proposition that the plea of 
ignorance has been rejected even where it was 
thoroughly established, although ignorance of the 
law might be taken into account in mitigation of 
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punishment. It is submitted however that the ratio 
decidendi of the case is wider than this and that the 
Court of Crown Cases Reserved considered he 
should not have been tried at all, and it was for this 
reason he was admitted to a pardon. In otherwords, it 
is submitted there are limits to the principle that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
 
199. Andrew Ashworth in his Excusable  Mistake of Law, 
[1974] Crim.L.R. 652, at 654 (Tab     ) wrote: 
 
 A quite separate qualification of the ignorantia iuris 
principle is suggested by the decision of the Privy Council 
in Lim Chin Aik v R (1963).  In that case Lord Evershed 
held that the principle cannot apply if there is "no 
provision … for the publication" of a certain type of law or 
regulation, nor "any other provision designed to enable a 
man by appropriate enquiry to find out what 'the law' is".  
These remarks merely concern the lack of legislative 
provision for making laws known or knowable, but it is 
thought that the practical impossibility of discoverying the 
terms of a particular law might also justify an acception to 
the principle.  The recent industrial dispute which has 
caused delay in publishing some thirty-four statutes might 
provide an instance of this extension of Lim Chin Aik. 
 
He cited Thomas Hobbes: 
 
The want of means to know the law, totally excuseth. For 
the law whereof a man has no means to inform himself is 
not obligatory.  
 
Hobbes, Leviathan (ed, Oakeshott 1947), 196. 
 
200. It is submitted that the case of R v Bailey is important 
in the context of this case. There has been a finding 
of fact that the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was never 
published on Pitcairn, by the Supreme Court. Just as  
Bailey could not know of the application of the Act 
extending criminal jurisdiction to the high seas for his 
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acts, because he was at sea when the Act was 
assented to and the shooting took place, so here 
Islanders could not know of the provisions of the 
Sexual Offences Act, 1956 because there was never 
any copy of the Act published on Pitcairn. It is 
submitted that there was no burden on the 
Appellants to demonstrate ignorance of offences 
under the Act, where the Act had not been published 
on Pitcairn.  
 
201. Arguments such as the prosecution raised before the 
Courts below that crimes such as rape are inherently 
criminal or mala in se and could be prosecuted 
without publication of the Act on Pitcairn are it is 
submitted wrong. It is submitted in the modern age 
Pitcairners were entitled to publication of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 on the Island.   
 
The Court of Appeal and Lon Fuller 
 
 
202. The Court of Appeal did not dwell on the opinions of 
the legal theorists to any great extent and appeared 
to endorse what the Supreme Court had to say in 
relation to Professor Lon Fuller. The Court observed:  
 
At the outset, we note the comment of Lon Fuller in his 
book, The Morality of Law (revised ed, 1969) where at 
page 92, he said: 
 
… to the extent that the law merely brings to explicit 
expression conceptions of right and wrong widely shared 
in the community, the need that enacted law be publicised 
and clearly stated diminishes in importance.’  
 
203. The Court of Appeal appeared to view this passage, 
as did the Supreme Court, as Fuller suggesting there 
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was no need to publish offences that embodied 
common beliefs that conduct was wrongful. Thus, 
there was no requirement to publish the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 on Pitcairn because Islanders 
they considered knew that rape and other sexual 
offences constituted crimes for which they could be 
prosecuted under English law.  The Court of Appeal 
said: 
 
 Depending on the circumstances whether the person in 
question knows the law, the issues of accessibility may 
well lose it force.   
 
204. It is submitted in relation to these observations that it 
is unlikely that Fuller would have considered as part 
of his thesis that there was no need to promulgate 
serious crime. Indeed, the statements above would 
suggest that Fuller would think otherwise. Any model 
of the criminal law which values promulgation would 
be seriously deficient if it did not include such crimes 
as murder and rape, or theft merely because such 
conduct could be expected to be viewed as mala in 
se by the general community.  Indeed Fuller wrote in 
his book at p51 (Tab    ): 
 
 Why all this fuss about publishing them? Without reading 
the criminal code, the citizen knows he shouldn’t murder 
and steal.  
 
205. Fuller makes the point, albeit in the context of the 
criminal law and some undefined matter relating to 
the practice of a calling, that the citizen is entitled to 
know what the law is.  It is submitted that observation 
must apply generally. In the modern world, a legal 
system should provide as a matter of entitlement that 
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all criminal offences and penalties applicable to the 
citizen should be published.    
 
206. A further reason given by Fuller (Tab      ) is that laws 
should be published so that they might be subject to 
public criticism.  Another reason is that if laws are not 
readily available there is no check against a 
disregard of them by those charged with their 
application and enforcement. In the context of 
Pitcairn, that argument has some relevance. Had the 
Sexual Offences Act 1956 been published on 
Pitcairn, this may have given aggrieved Islanders the 
opportunity to make more timely complaint at least to 
the administration and perhaps steps to involve 
British police and more robust administration would 
have been taken earlier.  
 
207. To restrict or limit promulgation in this way would 
seriously devalue the educative influence it brings to 
a community, even where the behaviour may be 
popularly regarded as wrongful. It is argued that the 
more seriously harmful conduct is, the greater is the 
need to proscribe that offence and publish the 
penalty clearly so that the community (both the good 
and the bad) are plainly warned of the consequences 
of offending, and an individual has no basis for 
saying later he or she did not know what the 
consequences of engaging in such conduct could be.  
 
208. On the issue of mala in se the distinction between 
offences mala in se and mala prohibita is one that 
has drawn criticism from Bentham.  Bentham said 
(Tab       ): 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
 There are some laws which seem to have a natural 
notoriety: such as those which concern crimes against 
individuals; as theft, personal injuries, fraud, murder, &c.  
But this notoriety does not extend to the punishment, 
which, however, is the motive upon which the legislature 
relies for procuring obedience to the law.  It does not 
extend even to those circumstances, often so delicate, 
which must be noticed before the line of demarcation can 
be traced among so many crimes differently punished, nor 
even to those actions which are either innocent or 
meritorious. 
 
209. The distinction between offences mala in se and 
mala prohibita is one today it is submitted which has 
little support.  See Wolfe, Mala in se: A Disappearing 
Doctrine? (1981) 19 Criminology 131 (Tab     ). 
 
Promulgation of  Penalty 
 
210. It is submitted the Rule of Law not only proscribes 
conduct but also importantly it proscribes the 
consequences that may follow a failure to abide by 
the law.  This point was made by Bentham in the 
passage cited above.  Although the Rule of Law 
does not generally refer to consequences, it is 
submitted that sensibly promulgation requires both 
offence and penalty should be published. It is the 
penalty which reflects the importance to the 
community of the offending.  Professor Colvin at 
p140 (Tab    ) suggests that the Rule of Law includes 
penalty:   
 
A rule can present an effective standard for conduct 
without the penalty for its violation being prescribed. But 
unless some constraints are placed on sanctioning power, 
two dangers are heightened. The sanctions imposed for 
offences may be arbitrary and violate the principle of 
formal justice; they may also be at odds with the popular 
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sense of what is appropriate and created a disjunction 
between legal and cultural rationality. Either way, the law 
can appear irrational. Even the possible occurrence of 
such irrationality can threaten the law’s claim to 
legitimacy. The requirements of the rule of law ideal are 
therefore relevant to the imposition of penalties as well as 
to the proscription of conduct. The directions given to 
those who will decide sentences should meet these 
requirements. Moreover, the directions and their rationale 
should be made knowable to the general public. 
 
 
211. Further, it is submitted, in Professor Colvin’s words 
cited above, it is as a measure of primacy for its 
general communicative or educative function that 
penalty is an integral part of an offence. Publication 
of penalty carries with it a demonstration of the 
seriousness with which a failure to abide by the 
official standard will incur punishment.  Publication 
removes all doubt about the official response that 
might be visited upon an offender.  In Black-Clawson 
International Ltd, Lord Diplock at 638 (Tab    ) 
emphasised that it was the legal consequences that 
flowed from an Act that the citizen should be able to 
ascertain. 
 
212. The Court of Appeal however dismissed this point 
and observed that Islanders would expect to be 
severely punished for rape:  
 
It was self-evidence that for rape a substantial term of 
imprisonment would be available to the sentencer…. 
 
213. That might be so it is submitted in a world where 
prosecution could be expected and where there had 
been demonstrations of official intolerance and 
prosecution of rape and other sexual misconduct (as 
in England) and publicity, but that was not the case 
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on Pitcairn.  There had been no prosecution for an 
indictable offence since Harry Christian and no 
indictable prosecution for rape or other sexual 
offence. At no time had there either been any British 
police presence on the Island, which stands in 
contrast with the heightened British police presence 
since 1997. The reality is that Islanders in modern 
times had little if any guidance on what could be 
expected from offending of this kind. Nor did it have 
the benefit of any demonstration by authority that 
English penal law would be applied to them for many 
years. Since 1962 there is has been no recorded 
prosecution of carnal knowledge of a child under 
Island Law, and no Island prosecution of any kind 
since 1971. Criminal law seems not to have been 
enforced on Pitcairn for a lengthy period. Ricky 
Quinn was the first prosecution for many years. 
 
Promulgation and Arresting a Drift into Lawlessness 
 
214.  Professor Colvin wrote on this topic also (Tab      ): 
 
There is a third, crucially important reason for 
asserting that the "good person" is as much the object of 
the criminal law’s attention as is the “bad person”. It is 
that these persons are not separate entities. The 
criminological evidence suggests that most people break 
the law from time to time and that even distinctive 
patterns of criminal behaviour tend to be episodic and 
limited in scope. Criminality is more typically a product of 
drift than of commitment. The formulation and 
promulgation of the law can influence the direction of the 
drift. 
 
215. The documented evidence referred to above 
establishes that in the early 1970’s the Pitcairn 
Council voiced some concern about girls or young 
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women and young men and promiscuity. However, 
nothing seems to have been done to educate the 
community then, and in particular young Pitcairn 
men, of the very serious consequences that could 
befall them if they broke English law. Had the 
opportunity been taken to communicate to Islanders 
clearly by publication of the Sexual Offences Act 
1956 on Pitcairn accompanied by an official 
meaningful advertisement of its existence and 
importance, this drift, into a perceived state of 
promiscuity may have been arrested.   
 
216. Professor Douglas Husack, Ignorance of law and 
duties of citizenship (1994) 14 Legal Studies 105 
(Tab    ) has written:  
 
 Deciding how much blame persons deserve for being 
ignorant of the law without evaluating the quality of the 
state's effort to inform persons of their obligations is like 
deciding how much blame persons deserve for being 
illiterate without evaluating the quality of the state's 
schools.   Good citizens make an effort to learn the law of 
the state but duties inhere in both directions.  Good states 
make an effort to teach the citizens the law. 
  
  Indeed it seems to have been as a misguided 
attempt to impress upon Islanders the importance of 
respecting the law on carnal knowledge (which 
seems to have fallen into desuetude), that the Ricky 
Quinn prosecution was undertaken by Constable 
Cox. 
 
English Penal Law and Island Offences 
 
217. The Court of Appeal did not accept either that the 
fact that Island crimes such as carnal knowledge of a 
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child carried only a maximum of 100 days 
imprisonment under Island law had any bearing on 
the subject. The Court said that the latter is in no way 
indicative of a likely sentence of rape. With respect, 
however the point the Public Defender made was not 
that the sentence for carnal knowledge was 
indicative of what an Islander might expect for rape. 
The Public Defender submitted that it was ironic that 
the Pitcairn legislature had seen fit to publish 
offences and penalties for local crimes in the Island 
Justice Ordinances which were officially published in 
the Island law books popularly known as the Brown 
and Black books but, in over thirty years of 
administration, had not seen fit to publish serious 
English crimes and the substantial penalties 
Islanders were subject to under English penal law.  It 
is to be noted that that the Administration saw fit in 
the Firearms Offences (Prosecution and Punishment) 
Ordinance 2003 to set out clearly in a schedule the 
offences, the general nature of the offence, the mode 
of prosecution and the maximum punishment (Tab    
). 
 
Evidence from Pitcairners As to Awareness of English 
Penal Law  
 
218. Whilst there was some evidence called from Mr and 
Mrs Thomas Christian to which the Court of Appeal 
drew support for the view that it was known on 
Pitcairn that sexual offending as a matter of common 
sense was subject to prosecution under English law, 
another witness Jay Warren (the current Mayor of 
Pitcairn and Island Magistrate during the prosecution 
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of Ricky Quinn) testified he did not know whose law 
rape would be prosecuted under. He thought rape 
meant taking a woman by force and would be 
referred to the administration office for action.  
 
219. Mr and Mrs Thomas Christian, it should be observed, 
were amongst the older residents of Pitcairn. Indeed, 
Mr Christian was it would seem on the Island Council 
when such issues as higher crimes and prosecution 
was discussed by Commissioner Cowell in 1965. He 
himself seems to have given some advice on the 
matter to the Island Council in 1970 when they met 
and discussed concerns about young people and 
sexual promiscuity on the Island. He was appraised 
of aspects of the relationship of English and Pitcairn 
law on sexual crimes against a child under the age of 
12 again it seems by Commissioner Salt as the 
Supreme Court judgment evidences as late as 13th 
November 1997, suggesting even then that the law 
was not clear relating to sexual offending on Pitcairn.  
Further, Mr and Mrs Christians’ home was the 
subject of referral to the administration for possible 
prosecution for a burglary in 1971. However, beyond 
their opinion, there is little evidence that Islanders, 
either as a matter of commonsense or on the basis of 
any official instruction must have been aware that 
rape and other sexual crimes would be prosecuted 
under English law, still less the nature of the 
penalties they might be subject to.  
 
220. The last official instruction to the Island on such a 
matter as the inter-relationship of Island law and 
“higher authority” and rape in particular, seems to 
 
 
 
 
114 
have been the advices given by Commissioner Reid 
Cowell and Mr McLoughlin, Legal Adviser under Fiji's 
administration. Further, as is discussed below under 
policing even Island prosecutions had fallen it would 
seem into desuetude on Pitcairn. 
 
Foreseeability of Prosecution 
 
221. The Public Prosecution also accepted that under 
human rights law prosecution must be foreseeable.  
KHW v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 59 (Tab      ).  It is 
submitted that the issue of foresight of prosecution, 
can raise quite a separate issue from that of 
accessibility to the law.  Were the conditions such on 
Pitcairn that the Appellants in a practical sense must 
have foreseen that they would be prosecuted for 
rape or other sexual offence under English law? It is 
submitted that in the parlous state of the 
administration of criminal justice on Pitcairn, from at 
least 1970 on, if not before, it was not foreseeable 
that they would be prosecuted for sexual crimes 
under English law. The Court of Appeal observed:  
 
The concept of accessibility and foreseeability run 
together. If a person has no sensible access to the law 
then it is not foreseeable that the law will be applied to 
that person. That is where the injustice may lie.   
 
222. It is submitted accessibility to the law and 
foreseeability of prosecution are not necessarily the 
same.  They do not it is submitted always run 
together, although they commonly will. The 
circumstances surrounding the administration of 
justice on Pitcairn do not point to the conclusion that 
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it was foreseeable they would be prosecuted under 
English law for sexual crimes. 
 
223. Aside from the fact that the Sexual Offences Act 
1956 was not published on Pitcairn, there was a 
dearth of evidence that in modern times pointed to 
the fact that the Administration would prosecute 
Pitcairners for sexual crimes.  There was: 
 
(a) No evidence of any instruction on the subject 
of prosecution under English law for rape to 
Pitcairners since Commissioner Reid Cowell’s 
involvement with Pitcairn in 1965.  
 
(b) There had never been a prosecution for an 
indictable sexual offence on Pitcairn Island. 
 
(c) The only indictable offence prosecuted was 
that of Harry Christian for murder in 1898 by a 
Deputy Judicial Commissioner under the West 
Pacific Commission which was no longer in 
existence. What the Harry Christian case 
does, it is submitted, however clearly evidence 
in so far as the present argument is concerned 
that authorities since 1898 have been aware 
that serious crime could occur on Pitcairn and 
if it did this might involve difficult issues of law, 
and practice, so that care had to be taken to 
craft a legal system that would accommodate 
more serious offending. This point is further 
taken up under the late constitution of the 
machinery of justice submission. 
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 (d) Even the Island Court in cases of Island law 
and carnal knowledge or indecent behaviour 
offences seems to have been allowed to fall 
into desuetude by the administration. See the 
discussion under policing below. 
 
(e) There had never been any British police 
presence on Pitcairn until Kent Police arrived, 
in 1996-7.  
 
(f) There existed provision for a Supreme Court 
under the various Judicature Acts, but in no 
practical sense was there any machinery of 
justice for the prosecution of serious crime on 
Pitcairn.   
 
(g) Even, if murder might have been a crime that 
would occasion Islanders to expect reaction 
from the Governor and prosecution by some 
means, it not does follow that it was 
foreseeable that sexual crimes would be 
treated similarly.  Indeed, the reaction of 
Pitcairn Islanders to the investigation and 
possible prosecution seems to have been one 
of some general disbelief by women and men 
of the alleged abuse and the investigation.  
This point is made by Eva Learner in her 
social welfare report following a visit to the 
Island at p7 (Tab    ).  
 
224. Contrary to the opinion of the Supreme Court that 
there was a “wealth of historical material” evidencing 
the fact that English criminal law would be enforced, 
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on Pitcairn for serious crime, it is submitted there 
was not. Aside from the advice given by 
Commissioner Reid Cowell in 1965 there is little 
further record of advice being given about these 
kinds of matters from that time on until these 
allegations arose. These were only isolated or ad 
hoc instances of administrative advice being 
communicated to Islanders on the topic of 
prosecution under English law for serious sexual 
offending and as Simester and Sullivan say (Tab    ) 
”the criminal law must be organised, ascertainable, 
system of legal rules – and not ad hoc responses to 
the conduct of individuals”, or as Fuller might say 
“counsel of expediency”.  
 
225. The following submissions on the absence of a 
British police presence, deficiencies in the Island 
Court and local policing and the practical absence of 
the machinery of justice for prosecuting indictable 
crime, it is submitted compound the problem of the 
absence of publication of the Sexual Offences Act 
1956 on Pitcairn.  
 
THE INADEQUACY OF POLICING AND LOCAL JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
The Public Defender’s Submissions 
 
226. The Public Defender’s submissions on policing are 
recorded in the judgment of the Supreme Court:  
 
[111] The Public Defender, by way of further 
submission, contended that until recently there had been 
no Police or law enforcement personnel from Great Britain 
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purporting to uphold English law, especially criminal law, 
on Pitcairn.  The Public Defender argued that whereas 
Pitcairn had Island Police officers, in reality they were 
limited in their training and experience to enforcement of 
local laws administered by the Island Magistrates.  It was 
contended that Island Police officers had no experience in 
the English criminal law.  They could be no substitute for 
a properly trained and experienced British or overseas 
Police officer whose presence would serve to emphasise 
to the local population that Pitcairn was subject to English 
law, and would constitute a demonstration that in the 
event of breaches of that law, it would be enforced. 
 
[112] In similar vein, the Public Defender submitted that 
the absence of English Police officers until 1996 meant 
that there was little to reinforce in the minds of Pitcairn 
Islanders (particularly Pitcairn youth) an appreciation that 
English law could be invoked to prosecute serious sexual 
offending and that, indeed, the law would be enforced if 
such offending ever came to notice.  With no English 
Police presence, no indictable crime having been 
prosecuted on Pitcairn since 1898 and no accessible 
publication of the English criminal law, how could it be 
foreseeable, particularly to a young or youthful Islander 
that he was at risk of prosecution under English law?   
 
 
The Public Prosecutor’s Submissions on Policing  
 
 
227. The Public Prosecutor submitted in the Supreme 
Court that the evidence revealed that the roles of the 
Island Police officer and Island Magistrate have 
frequently been high profile and that the law has 
often loomed large on Pitcairn.  The Public 
Prosecutor cited a Western Pacific High Commission 
administrator who had observed in 1957:  
 
The function of government in Pitcairn is essentially the 
maintenance of law and order, and the smaller the 
community the larger looms the law… 
 
228. It is submitted the reality is very different. The 
evidence reveals at best a local system of justice that 
was rudimentary. 
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229. The Public Prosecutor submissions are recorded: 
 
[115] The Public Prosecutor responded that 
notwithstanding the points raised, given the seriousness 
of the charges, the nature of policing is not a factor that 
could immunise the accused from prosecution.  Once the 
requirements of accessibility and foreseeability have been 
met, it must be irrelevant whether particular offences have 
been detected and prosecuted in the past.  There is no 
concept of estoppel in the criminal law and even if there 
were such a concept, it could hardly apply to such serious 
sexual offending. 
 
[116] It was pointed out to us by the Public Prosecutor 
that the present prosecutions are being conducted in a 
Pitcairn Court under Pitcairn law following an investigation 
by Pitcairn Police officers.  English law provides the basis 
for the charges because Pitcairn law explicitly 
incorporates English law into local law.  It would be wrong 
to view these proceedings as directly involving “English 
Police” or “English authorities” in those capacities.  From 
the point of view of carrying out inquiries on the Island, 
personnel from the Kent County Constabulary have been 
appointed by the Governor as Pitcairn Police officers. 
 
Policing and the Supreme Court’s View    
 
 
230. The Supreme Court made the following findings:  
 
 
[113] We accept immediately that there was no 
professional English Police presence until the visit of Gail 
Cox in 1996.  In exchanges of correspondence and 
memoranda between officials [para 98] and the 
Commissioner’s office now produced, views have been 
expressed supporting the appointment of an outside 
Police officer on account of the fact that Pitcairners 
appear incapable of upholding or enforcing the law in their 
own community.  An “outside” Police presence would 
enable a new culture to be embedded. 
 
 [117] There is evidence before us to show that 
historically there has been an Island Police officer present 
on Pitcairn for at least 70 years.  That officer has, since 
1950, derived his or her authority from the High 
Commissioner/Governor.  The role has been to enforce all 
Pitcairn law, including the Pitcairn law that incorporates 
English criminal offences. 
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[118] We do not accept the suggestion that Pitcairn may 
in some way be an anarchic or lawless society.  Over the 
years the roles of the Island Police officer and the Island 
Magistrate have frequently been of high profile and the 
law, and enforcement of the law, has loomed large in 
Pitcairn affairs.  Before us were documents extending 
back 50 years and beyond relating to the duties and 
responsibilities of Island Police officers, the duties and 
responsibilities of, and the instructions for Magistrates, the 
charging of offenders and the conduct of Island Court 
hearings, the maintenance of records, the reporting to the 
Administration and matters incidental to the administration 
of justice. 
 
[119] In our view, although successive Commissioners 
and Governors have been concerned to promote and 
ensure the administration of justice on Pitcairn Island to 
an appropriate level, they have to take into account local 
circumstances, including what has been seen to be the 
desire of Pitcairn Islanders to participate in the 
management of their own affairs to the greatest extent 
possible.  As long ago as 1937, it was observed in a 
memorandum (nr 2334) of the Western Pacific High 
Commission (at para 10) that:  
 
The Pitcairners appear to be deeply attached to their 
present system of Government, and it is their desire that 
Pitcairners, under the High Commissioner, should rule 
Pitcairn.  This disposes of the often repeated 
recommendation that an officer should be permanently 
stationed on Pitcairn.  The islanders do not want an 
outsider and, after reading Mr. Neill’s report, I do not think 
the conditions demand it. 
 
[120] Evidence shows that initially Island Police officers 
were appointed by the Island community.  In the 
documentation produced are the following:   
 
[a]  A letter dated 30 June 1938 from Richard Edgar 
Christian, Chief Magistrate, to the Western Pacific 
High Commission advising that Calvert Warren 
had been appointed as Court Policeman. 
 
[b]  A note recording that on 1 January 1940 Henry 
Young was chosen as Policeman. 
 
[c]  A letter dated 10 January 1941 from the Chief 
Magistrate to the Secretary, Western Pacific High 
Commission, advising that Burnett S Christian and 
Calvert A Warren had been appointed Policemen. 
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[d]  A telegram dated 14 June 1941 from the 
Secretary, Western Pacific High Commission, to 
the Chief Magistrate as to Police salaries. 
 
These appointments demonstrate the desire of the 
Pitcairn Islanders to control their own internal affairs, as 
far as law enforcement was concerned.   
 
[121] The situation changed in May 1950 when an 
Inspector of Police and Prisons was appointed directly by 
the High Commissioner.  The Inspector was to have 
control over two Policemen appointed by the Island 
Council.  Mr Floyd McCoy, who was to gain a high profile 
with regard to policing during the 1950’s, was appointed 
as the first Inspector.  During his tenure he became 
involved in the investigation and prosecution of a number 
of cases heard before the Pitcairn Island Court, as is 
evidenced by his reports, and also reports from the on-
Island Government Adviser (Education Officer), to the 
Governor in Suva.  He sought guidance as to the 
approach to be taken with regard to particular offending, 
the nature and limits of punishment, whether the High 
Commissioner’s Court could be involved in cases of 
habitual offending and the imposition of more serious 
penalties. 
 
[122] Floyd McCoy was the prosecutor in 1955 during 
the trials of a number of Pitcairn Island men accused of 
carnal knowledge offences involving underage girls.  In 
the case of one accused, Clive Christian, whose offending 
was more serious, consideration was given to a trial 
before the High Commissioner’s Court on charges under 
the Offences Against the Persons Act (UK) where the 
penalty in such a case would be a maximum of “several 
years” as against three months allowed under Island 
Regulation 65.  This is an example of knowledge by 
Police on Pitcairn Island that in serious cases resort could 
be made to English law. 
 
[123] An extract from a Pitcairn Island Administration 
Report circa 1959 records a request by the Island Police 
officer, Floyd McCoy, for direct assistance from Suva 
when investigating offences such as rape and abortion:   
 
FLOYD McCOY RE CORRESPONDENCE 
Although this is a chest nut of some maturity, he has 
found one more point to discuss.  He requests if he may 
address Suva direct where the matter is outside the 
jurisdiction of the Island Court – e.g., rape, abortion, etc.  
He was apparently told to investigate such matters by 
very quiet methods by McCloughlin [sic] and feels that 
should the Chief Magistrate’s family be involved he is in a 
difficult position. 
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[124] We can see from reviewing the documentation 
that the standard of policing varied over the years.  
Nevertheless, successive Police officers were given 
instructions as to how to carry out their duties and 
responsibilities by Legal Advisers attached to the Pitcairn 
Island Administration, whether it was the Western Pacific 
High Commission or its successors, H E Maude, D 
McLoughlin and J B Claydon would be included.   
 
[125] A good example is contained in a memorandum to 
the Chief Magistrate dated 23 December 1953, when the 
Governor’s Representative, Mr Claydon, included the 
following observations under the heading Law 
Enforcement:  
 
During my stay I have been forced to the reluctant 
conclusion that the Island Council is either unable or 
unwilling to enforce the laws.  The Council is the body 
elected by the people as their local government and one 
of its first duties is to see that law and order is kept.  
When I make these statements I do not mean that I 
expect the Council now to turn round and institute a reign 
of terror on Pitcairn:  that would achieve nothing.  What I 
mean is that if a person flagrantly and wilfully breaks a 
law, he or she should be brought to account for it and 
suitably punished.  Nor do I wish to imply that from what I 
have seen on Pitcairn I consider a general state of 
lawlessness exists.  In fact I have found quite the 
opposite.  The people as a whole seem very happy and 
peaceful:  but even in a community of this size you will 
always get those few individuals who go too far and flout 
the law openly.  It is those individuals whom the Council 
should keep in check by a sensible and wise application 
of the laws – and the Governor expects them to do it. 
 
The Inspector of Police is the officer responsible for 
investigating offences and laying charges, if necessary 
after consultation with the Chief Magistrate.  I have 
instructed the Inspector of Police to make a full report to 
Suva in future when any charge is abandoned or not 
proceeded with in court, and to give reasons why. 
 
[126] It is apparent to us that throughout the 1950’s law 
and order and policing on Pitcairn Island was the subject 
of regular exchange between the Inspector of Police, the 
Island Secretary, the Schoolteacher/Administrator, and 
the British authorities in Fiji.  In many cases the cause for 
these exchanges was offending in respect of adultery, 
unlawful carnal knowledge, and teenage pregnancy.  
There were frequent trials before the Island Magistrate.  
The Inspector of Police was the prosecutor and, in some 
 
 
 
 
123 
instances, periods of imprisonment were imposed within 
the limits of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction.   
 
[127] After 1961, and the coming into effect of the new 
Judicature Ordinance, records relating to policing are not 
as extensive as in the 1950’s.  Nevertheless, there is 
evidence of continued regular visits to the Island by such 
administrative officials as R Cowell (1964), Dr Derek 
Jakeway (1967), Mr Bain (1968), F E Warner and Mr C E 
Dymond (both 1971).  Their reports indicate that during 
Island visits officials continued to be involved in the giving 
of legal advice, the explaining of existing laws, the need 
for new laws or amendments to laws, and the issuing of 
instructions to Island administrators, including the Police 
officer. 
 
[128] During the trials before us on Pitcairn Island in 
October 2004, no evidence was given or adduced that 
might have assisted us in assessing the effectiveness of 
Island Police officers during the periods covering the 
offending by the individual accused.   
 
[129] In a community the size of Pitcairn, issues of law 
and order and of punishment could not have escaped the 
notice of the community at large, including the youth as 
they grew up. 
 
The Appellants' Submissions  
 
231. The Appellants submit that the absence of any 
British police presence on Pitcairn further 
compounded the problems associated with the 
failure to publish English law intelligibly on the Island, 
and meant that there was a lack of a practical 
manifestation of an intention to prosecute English 
criminal law on the Island.  It is the Appellant’s 
submission before this Court also by reference to the 
items of evidence referred to below that, although, 
not a lawless society, contrary to the view of the 
Supreme Court and the proposition advanced by the 
Public Prosecutor, Pitcairn by any modern standards 
was the subject of a serious deficiency in local 
policing and in Island Court administration that 
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diminished the deterrent value policing had for 
civilian respect for the criminal law.  
 
The Poor Standard of Local Policing and Criminal 
Justice Administration on Pitcairn  
 
232. The evidence is that the state of policing and the 
quality of the Island Court was of concern to colonial 
administrators for many years. Below, reference is 
made to various documents that refer to difficulties 
with the Island’s local administration of justice and a 
need for an effective external law enforcement 
presence on the Island.  Whilst Pitcairn was given 
certain direction in such matters from time to time, it 
suffered from an absence of effective practical 
supervision on the Island, and the absence of a 
resident British police officer or legal officer, if not 
stationed on a permanent basis, at least visiting on a 
regular basis.  The relevant documents are: 
 
(a) Maude’s letter 23 December 1940 to Western 
Pacific High Commission “hints and 
Instructions” for the guidance of the local 
court.  In particular, the observation that "the 
standard of the local court is deplorably 
low…". 
 
  Maude further criticised record keeping on the 
Island. 
 
(b) Letter to High Commissioner, Western Pacific, 
Suva, Fiji from Mrs Edna Young, 9 September  
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1938 listing various complaints, including the 
prophetic statement: 
 
 … couldn't you send a man here from the outside 
to replace the native magistrate. Even on so small 
a place as Pitcairn it takes some education and 
intelligence to govern the people. 
 
 and continuing: 
 
 I simply am interested in seeing this Island 
bettered so that it will be a pride instead of a 
disgrace to the crown. 
 
 She also stated in her letter:  
 
 I have been in this place over a year and have 
given this an unbiased attention. I have no ill will to 
the people but they are such kind hospitable folk 
that it seems a pity for them to remain in such dire 
ignominy in such an enlightened world.  
 
(c) Letter to the Secretary, Western Pacific High 
Commission, Suva, Fiji from Frederick P 
Ward, 7 June 1942 listing various complaints, 
and stating: 
 
 … we can see no real improvement, in fact unless 
and until an officer from outside comes to 
supervise the affairs of the government on the 
Island. 
 
(d) Letter 14 November 1950 to Western Pacific 
from Floyd McCoy Inspector of Police 
(appointed by Western Pacific High 
Commission, 30 May 1950) to the Chief 
Secretary complaining of his conviction for 
disorderly behaviour. McCoy complained inter 
alia that it was undesirable that what has been 
set up as a British Court of justice should be 
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allowed to continue without active and 
personal supervision to ensure correctness of 
procedures and interpretation of the law.  
 
(e) Further, Floyd McCoy 14 November to Chief 
Secretary, Western Pacific High Commission 
alleged his trial was for a political purpose.  
 
(f) Letter for Advice, to Chief Secretary, Western 
Pacific High Commission, Suva, Fiji, from 
Inspector of Police 2 June 1951 who was 
seeking advice on procedures.  
 
(g) Reply letter of advice from Western Pacific 
High Commission Suva Fiji dated 8 November 
1951. 
 
(h) Further request from Floyd McCoy in these 
terms: (Report by Commissioner J W Deering) 
 
 He requests if he may address Suva direct where 
the matter is outside the jurisdiction of the Island 
Court – eg rape, abortion etc. He was apparently 
told to investigate such matters by very quiet 
methods by McLoughlin and feels that should the 
Chief Magistrate's family be involved he is in a 
difficult position.  
 
(i)  Real disquiet was expressed about the local 
quality of the administration of justice on 
Pitcairn (see bundle of documents 23 June 
1951 15 October 1951 of the Western Pacific 
Commission). There is reference to the local 
court dealing with matters that are 
“exceedingly parochial”, the returns are 
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“perfunctory and illiterate”, “normal court 
procedure is almost entirely absent and I 
should hesitate to bring in a court of the 
calibre of the Supreme Court of Fiji to deal 
with the kind of stuff that Pitcairn produces.” It 
was said:  
 
 We are of course entirely dependent on the Chief 
Magistrate there for what information on Court 
work we get and on his respect for the High 
Commissioner’s authority for the carrying out of 
any instructions that may be given to him. We 
have no means of enforcement.  
 
 There is mention of Pitcairn as being a small 
primitive community.   
 
(j) There is further reference to the fact that we 
should not have an elaborate structure but we 
must have a legal structure.  
 
(k) HAC Dobbs to Floyd McCoy, 12 December 
1951 inquiring as to whether when in New 
Zealand he would prepared to take a course 
of police training, or a course of radio training 
or both.  
 
(l) Roy Sanders to Mr Dobbs, 14 January 1952 
asking whether Floyd could receive training as 
a policeman, “some part of his course with 
some knowledgeable country policeman?” In 
the same letter, is a directive regarding 
Luxford’s Police law in New Zealand, and 
observations reference and guidance only, as 
this is certain to lead to further bewilderment. 
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The intention was to put it in the Courthouse. 
A direction was sought that it had no 
interpretation in relation to the Pitcairn Island 
Regulations 1940.  
 
(m) HAC Dobbs response to Sanders 9 February 
1952, affirming a directive relating to Luxford’s 
Police Law would be issued, and affirming he 
would take up the point about Floyd McCoy’s 
training with a country policeman in New 
Zealand.  
 
(n) Written memorandum of Western Pacific 
Commission relating to Floyd’s training as a 
policeman: "We have not heard his reactions. 
When we do we can approach New Zealand 
and ask whether he can be given the kind of 
training suggested 8 February 1952".  
 
(o) Commissioner Claydon’s memorandum for 
Chief Magistrate and Island Council 23 
December 1953. “During my stay I have been 
forced to the reluctant conclusion that the 
Island Council is either unable or unwilling to 
enforce the laws”.  
 
(p) Legal Adviser Mr McLoughlin in 1958, gave 
certain instructions as to the procedures to be 
followed in dealing with offences against the 
Pitcairn Island Government Regulations. 
These included instruction on police reporting 
and court hearings.  
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(q) A Mr Greenwood, Acting Attorney-General of 
Fiji, described the Island Court in a 
memorandum 6 June 1957, "as an Alice and 
Wonderland Court that under no 
circumstances should be able to lock people 
up to a year". He considered fines to be 
acceptable because they could be repaid in 
the event of error.  
 
(r) In recent times, the fiasco of the prosecution 
of Ricky Quinn, and the correspondence over 
this suggest that matters never improved.  
 
233. See Quinn correspondence:  
 
(a) Letter from Governor Williams to 
Commissioner Leon Salt 20 December 1999 
evidencing awareness that the complainant in 
the Quinn prosecution was of consent age 
under Pitcairn law, proceeding 
notwithstanding.  
 
(b) Report of conviction of Quinn, 21 December 
1999 Commissioner Leon Salt to Governor 
Williams.   
 
(c) Letter Deputy-Governor Wolstenholme to 
Commissioner Leon Salt 6 January 2000 
discussing Quinn's case, the observations on 
the need for a workable legal system and 
observations about confusion as to the age of 
consent.  
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(d) Commissioner Leon Salt to Meralda Warren, 
24 January 2000 critical of her performance as 
the Island police officer.  
 
(e) Letter by Meralda Warren to Commissioner 
Leon Salt 11 January 2000 defending her 
actions.  
 
(f) Letter indicating Mr Quinn has received a 
pardon from Governor Fell to the Public 
Defender.  
 
234. Pitcairn was substantially left to its own devices aside 
from occasional requisitions for advice and 
instructions given by colonial officers, it would seem 
from about 1971. The last record of the Island Court 
proceeding is 2 February 1971 at 7am. The last 
recorded prosecution of the Island Court until the 
Quinn case was that of Desmond Christian for carnal 
knowledge. He pleaded guilty on 24 September 1962 
(Tab     ).  
 
235. After Commissioner Reid Cowell’s involvement in 
Island affairs, there is little evidence of practical 
guidance being given on matters involving the 
application of English law, and serious sexual 
offending.  Mr Treadwell unlike his predecessor, Mr 
McLoughlin from Fiji did not visit the Island in his 
tenure of the position in almost thirty years. The 
Commissioner in recent times, Leon Salt was a 
schoolteacher, and seems to have given advice in 
the case of Ricky Quinn relating to carnal knowledge 
of a child as to age and majority which was incorrect 
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and contributed to Quinn's unlawful prosecution and 
deportation from the Island.  Mr Garth Harraway, a 
Commissioner before Mr Salt was also a 
schoolteacher. 
 
236. Mr Treadwell in his evidence stated: 
 
(a) He did not embark on the critical analysis of 
the existing position on Pitcairn when he took 
over.   
 
(b) He accepted the Island Magistrate had no 
training whatsoever in legal process before 
1987 or 1990.  There was he said in evidence, 
no attempt to legally educate the Island 
Magistrate during his term of office.   
 
(c) He supposed that Island records were kept. 
He did not request to examine these legal 
records to ascertain whether proper 
procedures were being carried out on the 
Island.  
 
(d) He said that the person who was responsible 
for making sure the proper legal process was 
being carried on Pitcairn Island during his 
tenure was the Government Adviser and there 
were frequent visits by the Commissioner.    
 
(e) He said he really knew nothing about the 
operation of the Island court.  On one 
occasion he saw a letter from the 
Commissioner saying to somebody else that 
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the Island court had only sat on one occasion 
since 1970. He said he did not think that was 
correct now.  He described the Magistrates 
court as only a petty jurisdiction.   
  
237. Despite attempts at trial made by the Public 
Prosecutor to defend the position, the absence of 
adequate policing on the Island is clear.   That this 
was so was readily perceived by Detective Inspector 
George:  
 
(a) In evidence he agreed that he had 
recommended the appointment of a 
community constable from Kent, for limited 
periods, after he had with Detective 
Superintendent McGookin in 1996 visited the 
Island.  Detective Inspector George gained the 
impression on his arrival on Pitcairn that the 
state of policing on Pitcairn was not good. He 
recommended the appointment of an 
independent trained police officer for Pitcairn.  
It was his view that there should be a retired 
police officer stationed for 12 months or so 
who would then be relieved.  The 
recommendation was partly taken up by the 
appointment of a community police officer for 
a shorter period.  
 
(b) He also gave the opinion when asked, under 
cross-examination, that the fact that there was 
no active role for the Police in the past 
probably 20 or so years probably reflected the 
kind of offending that took place.  He said that 
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in his view that the Island police officer was 
"definitely" deficient.  He agreed that if there 
was going to be any sensible improvement in 
relation to enforcement of English law on 
Pitcairn Island, that there required to be a 
British police presence.  
 
(c) He indicated also, that he was concerned 
about the possibility of serious crimes 
happening with guns because he was aware 
there was an assortment of guns on Pitcairn 
Island.   
 
(d) He also confirmed that aside from an 18 
month gap there had been some British police 
presence since the time of Gail Cox on 
Pitcairn Island. He agreed with the proposition 
that prior to the arrival of the British police in 
1996, they did not have the degree of 
forewarning that if they were to violate English 
law they stood a good chance of being 
prosecuted.  
 
238. Further, reference is made again to a draft report 
dated 2 October 2000 incorporating the findings and 
recommendations of Eva Learner (Tab      ) in which 
there was a recommendation that an independent 
police officer should be stationed on the Island in a 
permanent way.  She described at p4 of her report 
the nature of policing on Pitcairn as "wholly 
inadequate". 
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239. Community Constable Cox was the first such officer 
to hold this position and was responsible for 
conducting the prosecution of Quinn before the 
Island Magistrate. His prosecution for carnal 
knowledge was no doubt seen as an example to the 
community. She brought the first copies of Halsbury's 
Laws to be sent to the Island in 1997. 
 
240. The 9 November 1970 meeting of the Council over 
their concerns for girls and relationships with young 
males seems to have led to little if any action by 
administrators. Islanders perceived there to be a 
problem then. No action appears however to have 
been taken to warn young Pitcairners, or indeed, 
generally Islanders of the peril they were in if they 
engaged in sexual misconduct proscribed under 
English penal law, and the related penalties for 
breaking English law.  Indeed the report (Tab   ) of 
Eva Learner highlights the rather dysfunctional 
appearance of Pitcairn on matters relating to sexual 
behaviour. 
 
241. What the evidence reveals the Appellants submit is 
awareness at that time amongst concerned Islanders 
that there was a perceived laxness in sexual morality 
amongst the youth of Pitcairn, and that girls might be 
exposed to this. That was an opportune time to have 
published at least the English provisions relating to 
sexual offending on Pitcairn, and the penalties so 
that Island men and youths were made well aware 
that England would take the necessary steps to 
protect women and girls.  
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242. There seems to be little record of any administrative 
or police activity in recent years after Fiji ceased to 
be involved in the governance of Pitcairn until the 
arrival of the Kent Police in 1997. The Supreme 
Court referred to the absence of records allowing 
them to assess the effectiveness of Island police 
officers during the periods covering the offending.  
This suggests that there was no prosecution of Island 
laws on Pitcairn or, if there was, no record of those 
proceedings, since 1972. Either way, an 
unsatisfactory situation, and one that should have 
caused administrators to inquire. In this state of 
apparent law enforcement vacuum, there was no 
foundation it is submitted for the Supreme Court to 
find: 
 
 In a community the size of Pitcairn, issues of law and 
order and of punishment could not have escaped the 
community at large, including the youth as they grew up.  
 
 The reality it is submitted is quite different. 
 
The Absence of a Police Presence and Estoppel  
 
243. The Court of Appeal on the issue of the lack of a 
police presence referred with approval to the 
submission by the Public Prosecutor that the 
standard of policing on Pitcairn was not a factor 
which could render these prosecutions an abuse of 
process. There is no estoppel in criminal law. The 
Public Defender did not suggest, however, either in 
the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeal that 
estoppel was an issue. His submission was that 
together with other factors, the absence of any British 
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police presence was a matter, which could be taken 
into account on the issue of whether it was an abuse 
of process to prosecute in the face of the deficiencies 
in the administration of criminal justice. The point 
being made by the Public Defender was not as 
postulated by the Court of Appeal and referred to by 
the Court as a logical extension of the Public 
Defender's argument at all namely: 
 
 … the absence of a proper police presence on the island 
made it easier for serious offences, notably sexual 
offences, not to be detected/and or prosecuted.  
 
244. The argument is that a British police presence would 
have demonstrated plainly to Islanders the fact that 
they were liable to prosecution under English law. 
The practical effect also is that it would have 
improved the standards of the very deficient local 
police. This point was grasped by Inspector George 
and the Administration and led to the appointment of 
Constable Cox. There has been a British police 
presence on Pitcairn in some form ever since.   
 
245. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal incorrectly 
diminished the importance of a British police 
presence, on the issues of awareness of the 
importance of respecting English law in the 
statement that:  
 
 The presence of a professional police officer would not 
have any influence on the basic understanding about 
serious sexual crimes amongst what was essentially a 
law-abiding community. 
 
246. With respect, a British police presence would have at 
least heralded to Islanders in no uncertain terms that 
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their obligations under English law had to be 
respected or there could be serious consequences 
for them. It would have assisted to arrest the drift into 
promiscuity amongst Islanders, such as has been 
perceived to exist. 
 
Harry Christian and Lack of Police Presence  
 
247. Further, the Court of Appeal appeared also to fuse 
the issue of Harry Christian and the absence of a 
British police presence in a way, which was contrary 
to any submission made by the defence. The Court 
said:  
 
 Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Harry 
Christian murder case in 1898 should have provided a 
timely lesson for the administrators that serious crime 
could take place on Pitcairn and their practical steps to 
deal with the possibility, including an educated and 
effective police presence, should have been taken. On the 
contrary, in our view, the Harry Christian case, which 
must be etched into the Pitcairn race memory, clearly 
demonstrated that English law would apply to those who 
committed a serious crime. The presence of a 
professional police officer would not have any influence 
on the basic understanding about serious sexual crimes 
amongst what was essentially a law-abiding community. 
 
248. The submission was made by the Public Defender, 
as here, that Harry Christian was a reminder to 
administrators that serious crime could take place on 
Pitcairn as it could take place anywhere and steps 
should have been taken to put in place adequate 
procedures for dealing with this after the Western 
Pacific Commission ceased to exist. A legal system 
was not however put in place until after the offending 
had taken place. Whilst Harry Christian being the 
only indictable case prosecuted on Pitcairn was no 
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doubt a matter of importance to particularly the older 
generation of Islanders such as Mr and Mrs Tom 
Christian, it was a rather extravagant statement, it is 
submitted for the Court of Appeal to say it was 
“etched into the Pitcairn race memory”.  Indeed, Mr 
Treadwell said in his evidence that in 1987 he had 
informed the Foreign Office that steps should be put 
in place to constitute the legal machinery for 
prosecuting serious crime on Pitcairn Island and 
despite subsequent follow ups, nothing had been 
done until recent times. 
 
THE LATE CONSTITUTION OF THE MACHINERY OF 
JUSTICE  
 
Introduction 
 
249. Although there was provision for the constitution of a 
Supreme Court in the Judicature Ordinances 1961, 
and 1970, most if not all of the trial and adjudication 
machinery and procedures and laws such as 
Sentencing and Parole Ordinances have been 
enacted to accommodate these offences after the 
investigation commenced, and some Ordinances 
enacted after charge.  A list of the Ordinances that 
have been promulgated to effectively constitute the 
legal machinery and indeed the legal system to 
accommodate these trials is set out below. The 
Appellants submit that administrators should have 
put firmly in place the machinery of justice after the 
Western Pacific Commission procedures were 
repealed so that Islanders were aware not only that 
they were bound to respect English criminal law, but 
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that the legal machinery existed for prosecution if 
they did not and what that machinery was.   Further it 
is submitted they should have been consulted about 
any proposed legal system that was to be applied to 
them in relation to the prosecution of indictable 
crime. 
 
250. In his evidence, Mr Treadwell stated: 
 
(a) In retrospect as at December 1999, the legal 
system on Pitcairn Island was inadequate.  
 
(b) He admitted to being instructed to work on the 
legal system from the middle of the 1990s 
because it was inadequate. 
 
(c) He embarked on the revision of the criminal 
law in 1997 or 1998.   
 
(d) He admitted that until 1999 and thereafter, 
there was not really any machinery in place for 
an indictable trial on Pitcairn. He admitted he 
pretty well knew that shortly after his 
appointment. 
 
(e) He said he had made clear representations to 
the legal advisers at the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office in 1987 when he was 
called there to the fact that these deficiencies 
really needed to be corrected before there 
was any out break of serious crime on Pitcairn 
Island.  That was the first time he had 
approached them.  
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(f) He said there had been two further follow-ups 
to the Foreign Office from Deputy Governors, 
but he did not know if there had been a 
response.   
 
(g) He commenced to undertake a view of the 
legal system in 1998. 
  
251. In the present case, problems with venue or forum 
for trial had to be addressed. A treaty was entered 
into between New Zealand and England (Tab     ) 
and legislation passed in New Zealand to enable 
these trials to take place not only on Pitcairn but 
elsewhere (Tab     ). One defendant awaiting trial, 
Shawn Christian has been extradited to Papakura in 
New Zealand from New South Wales Australia.  He 
has been on bail awaiting trial since January 2005.  
He was declined a variation in bail to allow him to 
return to Australia where he had a job and a partner 
of some years. Mr Christian has no connection with 
New Zealand and the alleged crime took place on 
Pitcairn, where his parents reside.   
 
252. A prison has been constructed to house those who 
may be convicted and sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment.  It has six cells. It was constructed 
prior to charges being laid but after investigation had 
been commenced into these allegations by men on 
the Island. Since all the men on Pitcairn are engaged 
in construction it is not unreasonable to infer that 
some of the Appellants were engaged in the 
construction of the prison. 
 
 
 
 
141 
  
253. There have been a very considerable number of 
Ordinances and legislation passed to implement 
these series of trials.  A summary of the Ordinances 
is set out below: 
 
Table of Ordinances 
 
 
Year Short Title & Description How repealed or 
  otherwise dealt with 
 
1952 Interpretation and General Clauses Now CAP.1 
 Ordinance 
 
1961 Judicature Ordinance Repealed by CAP 2 
  of 1970 
 
1966 Justice Ordinance Repealed by CAP 3 
  of 1999 
 
1968 Judicature (Amendment) Ordinance Repealed by CAP 2 
  of 1999 
 
1970 Judicature Ordinance Repealed by CAP 2 
  of 1999 
 
 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Repealed by CAP 3 
  of 1999 
 
1971 Judicature (Amendment) Ordinance Repealed by CAP 2 
 Revised Edition of the Laws Ordinance of 1999 
  Spent 
 
1972 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Repealed by CAP 3 
  of 1999 
 
 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Repealed by CAP 3 
  of 1999 
 
1999 Judicature (Courts) Ordinance Now CAP 2 
 
 Justice Ordinance Now CAP 3 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Cases) Now CAP 4 
 Ordinance 
 
 Prisons Ordinance Now CAP 7 
 
2000 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Incorporated in 
  CAP 3 
 
 Judicature (Courts) (Amendment) Incorporated in CAP 2 
 Ordinance 
 
 Justice (Amendment) (No. 2) Incorporated in CAP 3 
 Ordinance 
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 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal  Incorporated in CAP 4 
 Cases) (Amendment) Ordinance 
 
 Justice (Amendment) (No. 3) Incorporated in CAP 3 
 Ordinance 
 
 Evidence (Proof of Written Laws) Now CAP 6 
 Ordinance 
 Provides for judicial notice to be taken 
 of written laws 
 
 Judicature (Courts) (Amendment) Incorporated in CAP 2 
 (No. 2) Ordinance 
 
 Justice (Amendment) (No. 4)  Incorporated in CAP 3 
 Ordinance 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Incorporated in CAP 4 
 Cases) (Amendment) (No. 2) 
 Ordinance 
 
 Summary Offences Ordinance Now CAP 5 
 Provides for summary offences in the 
 Magistrates Court 
 
 Justice (Amendment) (No. 5) 
 Ordinance 
 
2001 Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Now CAP 9 
 Ordinance 
 Makes provision in criminal cases for 
 the granting of legal aid 
 
 Legal Practitioners Ordinance Now CAP 10 
 Makes provision for the admission of 
 legal practitioners and in particular 
 provides that a legal practitioner can 
 hold the appropriate authority from 
 any Commonwealth country 
 
 Ordinance to Amend Certain Laws 
 for the purpose of the Revised 
 Edition of the Laws 2001 
 
 Judicature (Courts) (Amendment) Incorporated in CAP 2 
 Ordinance 
 Amended the Judicature Ordinance 
 to update the references to Courts in 
 England and Wales in Section 2 
 
 Evidence (Special Measures Now CAP 31 
 Directions) Ordinance 
 This provided for special measures 
 directions in evidence in criminal cases 
 for the protection or assistance of 
 disadvantaged witnesses, in line with 
 the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
 Act 1999 (UK) 
 
2002 Annual Revision of Laws Ordinance Now CAP 32 
  
 Sentencing (Offences against the Repealed 
 Person) Ordinance 
 This reproduces the provisions of section 
 3 to 10 of the Sentencing Act (NZ) as to 
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 the purposes and principles of  
 sentencing with reference to offences 
 against the person, including all sexual 
 offences 
 
 Public Defender in Criminal  
 Proceedings Ordinance 
 Provides for the establishment of the 
 office of Public Defender 
 
 Sentencing (Community-based Repealed 
 Sentences) Ordinance 
 This is modelled upon the Sentencing 
 Act (NZ) as to sentences of supervision 
 and community work 
 
 Parole Ordinance CAP 34 
 To reform the law relating to the release 
 from detention of offenders serving 
 sentences of imprisonment.  Closely 
 based on Parole Act (NZ) 
 
 Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Incorporate in CAP 9 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
 
 Victims of Offences (Ordinance) Repealed 
 To make provision for ensuring the 
 rights and protection of victims of  
 crime 
 
 Sentencing Ordinance Now CAP 35 
 To reform and consolidate the law 
 on sentencing. This is based on the  
 New Zealand Sentencing Act 
 
 Victims of Offences (No. 2) Ordinance Now CAP 36 
 
 Prisons (Amendment) Ordinance Incorporated in CAP 7 
 Authorises the Government to declare 
 prisons in other countries where a  
 Pitcairn Court is authorised to sit by 
 reason of the Pitcairn (Amendment) 
 Order 2002 
 
 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Incorporated in CAP3 
 This ordinance is intended to amend the 
 Justice Ordinance by (i) expanding 
 the language of s24(1) to allow for the 
 sitting of the Court in any place other  
 than the Islands; (ii) replacing s66 
 of the ordinance with a paper 
 committal; (iii) making necessary 
 provision for the validity of and 
 objections to certain counts in 
 informations filed in the Supreme  
 Court; (iv) prescribing procedure for 
 the preliminary determination of the 
 admissibility of evidence 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Cases Incorporated in CAP 4 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
 This ordinance is intended to amend 
 the Judicature (Appeals in Criminal 
 Cases) Ordinance by (i) providing a  
 right of appeal in various important 
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 preliminary matters arising before  
 trial; (ii) establishing a right of appeal 
 against sentence by the Public 
 Prosecutor; (iii) clarifying the degree 
 of miscarriage of justice to which  
 the provisor to s37(1) of the principal 
 ordinance applies 
 
 Judicature (Courts) (Amendment) Incorporated in CAP 
 Ordinance 
 Amends by (i) making provision for 
 the formal appointment of registries 
 of the Pitcairn Courts; (ii) prescribing 
 a procedure for seeking a change of 
 venue of any sitting of the Supreme 
 Court or Magistrate's Court; (iii) 
 providing that Court documents and 
 proceedings shall not be invalidated 
 only for a defect or form unless 
 substantial injustice has resulted 
 
 Bail Ordinance Now CAP 37 
 To make provision for bail in criminal 
 cases. This is based on the New Zealand 
 Bail Act 
 
 Victims of Offences (No. 2) Incorporated in CAP 36 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
 This ordinance makes provisions for 
 ensuring the rights and protection of 
 victims of crime. This is based on  
 New Zealand Legislation 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Incorporated in CAP 4 
 Cases) (No. 2) (Amendment)  
 Ordinance 
 
 Ordinance to amend the Legal Aid Now CAP 9 
 (Criminal Proceedings) Ordinance 
 By classifying as to experience and 
 skill 
 
2003 Judicature Amendment Ordinance Now CAP 38 
 To give effect in Pitcairn law to the  
 Agreement between the UK Government 
 and the New Zealand Government signed 
 at Wellington on 11 October 2002  
 concerning the holding of Pitcairn trials 
 in New Zealand and other related matters 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Cases) Incorporated in CAP 4 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
 This amended the ordinance by repealing 
 s35DD (4) 
 
 Justice (Amendment) Ordinance Incorporated in CAP 3 
 
 Pitcairn Court of Appeal (Registry) Now CAP 39 
 Ordinance 
 
 Justice (Amendment) (No. 2)  Incorporated in CAP 3 
 Ordinance 
 
 Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Incorporated in CAP 3 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
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 Children Ordinance Now CAP 41 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Cases) Incorporated in CAP 4 
 (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance 
 
 Judicature (Courts) (Amendment) Incorporated in CAP 2 
 Ordinance 
 
 Judicature Courts Amendment  Incorporated in CAP 4 
 (No. 2) 
 Enacted on or about 10 November  
 2003, which gives tenure to the  
 Magistrates and Judges 
 
2004 Justice Amendment Ordinance Now CAP 3 
 Enacted 2 September 2004 amending 
 the Justice Ordinance by inserting 
 s70CA, 70CB to empower the 
 Supreme Court to direct that  
 evidence be given in criminal 
 proceedings by way of live telephone 
 link.  The ordinance is based on s32 
 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) 
 and s51 of the Criminal Justice Act 
 2003 (UK), the latter of which is not 
 yet in force in the UK 
 
 Judicature (Appeals in Criminal Cases) Now CAP 4 
 (Amendment) Ordinance 
 Enacted 17 September 2004 this 
 amended the ordinance by repealing 
 s35DD (4) 
 
 The Local Government (Special 
 Electoral Provisions) Ordinance 2004  
 Enacted October 2004 - this ordinance 
 gave a special definition for "conviction" 
 and "convicted" and terminated the 
 current term of office of the Mayor and 
 the Chairman of the Internal Committee 
 
2005 Ordinance to amend Judicature Now CAP 2 
 (Courts) Ordinance 
 By amending s11(5) by omitting the 
 words "during Her Majesty's pleasure" 
  
254. It is submitted the constitution of a workable system 
of criminal justice to prosecute Pitcairners should 
have been implemented after the Western Pacific 
Commission was abolished and responsibility given 
to the Governor of Fiji pursuant to the Pacific Order 
1952 and the Judicature Ordinance 1961 was 
enacted. Instead, the instructions were that matters 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Island Court were to be 
the subject of communication with Fiji, and little more 
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was done to constitute the machinery of justice for 
the prosecution of indictable English crime. After Fiji 
became independent, and constitutional 
arrangements were altered under the Pitcairn Order 
1970 and the Judicature Ordinance 1971 was 
enacted, nothing more was done until the flurry of 
activity attendant upon the investigation and these 
prosecutions. It is submitted that had the machinery 
of justice and legal system been in place to 
prosecute indictable cases, that would have further 
heralded to Islanders the importance of English 
criminal law and abiding by it, and would have 
demonstrated that there was a means to enforce the 
law. 
 
The late Constitution of the Machinery of Justice and 
Even-Handed Justice 
 
255. On this point the defence argument was accurately 
summarised by the Court of Appeal:  
 
The Public defender submits that the absence of a 
workable machinery of justice diminished the rule of law 
on Pitcairn and gave an appearance of expediency and 
the lack of an even-handed approach to justice. Mr Cato 
submitted that the administration of criminal justice is a 
prime responsibility of government and that all the 
necessary machinery should have been properly in place 
before the investigations in this matter proceeded. Mr 
Cato submits that there is an appearance of pre-
determination in enacting these provisions during the 
course of the investigation and indeed, in some cases 
after charges had been laid. 
 
256. The Public Prosecutor cited Liyanage v The Queen 
[1967] AC 259 (PC) (Tab  ) a case involving 
“legislative judgments” and argued that this case was 
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not of that kind. The Public Prosecutor argued that 
there was nothing that infringed any constitutional 
limitation on the Pitcairn authorities, nor any Rule of 
Law. The Supreme Court held that all the Ordinances 
were of general application and were designed to 
establish a fair trial process that conformed to 
accepted human rights standards. They related only 
to structures and criminal procedure. They were not 
designed to secure the convictions of known 
individuals. The Public Prosecutor submitted that the 
operative principle is that a court system may well be 
changed. If it is changed, the only question is 
whether it remains a fair trial. A changed system is 
not precluded from inquiring into matters that 
occurred before the changes were made. It was 
submitted there was no bias, systemic or otherwise. 
The Supreme Court found that:  
 
  The post 2000 Ordinances are all of general application, 
are intended to endure indefinitely for all criminal cases 
and are designed to establish a fair trial process …  
 
257. The Supreme Court described them as neutral 
between the parties. The Court accepted there were 
no retrospectivity arguments; nor anything that put 
the accused at an unfair advantage, nor sought by 
legislation anything but a fair trial.  The Court of 
Appeal considered that it was significant that there 
had been no complaint concerning the fairness of the 
trials. Further, the Court added:  
 
 Nor can it be said that it placed them at any disadvantage 
in relation to their trials. The essentials of the judicial 
process were in place prior to the detection of the 
offences, in that there existed a Magistrate’s Court, a 
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Supreme Court and a prison.  The sheer extent of the 
alleged offending and the number of accused required 
steps to be taken to ensure that the justice system could 
adequately accommodate a lengthy trial involving a 
substantial number of accused, beyond anything which 
might reasonably have been contemplated in earlier 
years. 
 
258. The Public Defender did not advance retrospectivity 
as an objection nor suggest that most of the changes 
were other than procedural.  It was and is submitted, 
however that the steps taken to build a prison and 
the totality of the legislation passed to construct a 
workable system of justice, extradition, trial and 
sentence was such that the reality is that it had a 
crushing appearance. After many years according to 
Mr Treadwell of notice, that a system had to be put in 
place to accommodate indictable or serious crime on 
the Island, the measures taken were plainly directed 
at the trial of these Appellants, albeit that the system 
was in place for the future.  The Appellants submitted 
that the late constitution of the machinery of justice 
and legal system had the appearance that the 
Administration was determined to secure convictions 
of these men, and this had the unfortunate 
appearance of compromising the ethic of even-
handed justice.  Whilst not denying the need for a 
mechanism of prosecution and trial to be constituted 
to enable trials of serious matters in the future that 
might arise on Pitcairn, it is submitted that these 
Appellants should not have been put in jeopardy 
under these procedures enacted as they were in all 
cases after the allegations leading to charge had 
occurred, and in some instances even after charge.  
Indeed, it is submitted that on an issue as important 
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as the prosecution and trial of serious indictable 
crimes, Islanders were entitled to be consulted well in 
advance about the machinery of justice. 
 
259. Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeal, it 
is submitted the reality as Mr Treadwell admitted in 
his evidence, was that there was no legal system in 
existence for the trial of indictable matters.  The 
Court of Appeal said however that the essentials of 
the judicial process were in place prior to the 
detection of the offences, in that there existed a 
Magistrates Court, a Supreme Court and a prison.  
The reality is that the Magistrate's Court and 
Supreme Court existed in name only and the prison 
was a prison used it would seem in the past to 
accommodate persons convicted of Island crime and 
sentenced for short periods of imprisonment.  The 
reality is also as has been considered in the previous 
paragraphs on policing and local justice 
administration that local justice has fallen into 
desuetude for many years.  
 
260. The Appellants further complain that more particular 
examples set out below involved a direct involvement 
of the Governor in the trial process as it was 
developing.  
 
Stays 
 
261. In August 2003, the Judicature (Appeals in Criminal 
cases) Ordinance was passed providing for appeals 
against refusal to make orders for staying of 
proceedings on the grounds of abuse and appeals 
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against a refusal to give an interlocutory judgment 
which have the effect of bringing the proceedings to 
an end.  Subsection (4) provided that upon giving the 
decision which may be subject to appeal, the 
Supreme Court was to take no further steps for a 
period of 28 days and thereafter pending any appeal 
(Tab    ).  
 
262. This provision was amended on 17 September 2004 
by repealing subsection (4) of s35DD (Tab    ).  This 
effectively removed the stay provision.  That was the 
same day as the legal teams departed for Pitcairn for 
the trials. Under cross-examination, Mr Treadwell 
stated that the reason for this amendment was that 
he thought, if it were not repealed, defence counsel 
would avail themselves of it and stay the trial.  
 
263. The Court of Appeal addressed this issue asserting 
that the view of the legal adviser was understandable 
given the expense of setting up the trial process and 
the number of people that had to be taken to Pitcairn 
so that trials could take place. 
 
264. It is submitted though it may be understandable that 
the administration was anxious to avoid the 
possibility of trials being disrupted, the late 
amendment reflects the point that the Public 
Defender made more generally. The amendment 
was expedient, and only encouraged the belief that 
the system was designed to advance the trials to the 
detriment of the Appellants' rights that hitherto had 
existed.   
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The Tenure of Office  
 
265. After complaint had been made by the Public 
Defender in a pre-trial application but before the 
hearing of the complaint on 17 November 2003, the 
Judicature Courts (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance 
2003 was passed on or about 10 November 2003 to 
give the Judges and the Magistrate tenure of office. 
Formerly, they had been held at Her Majesty’s 
pleasure. The Magistrate was also the subject of 
tenure in this amendment.  Mr Treadwell explained 
simply that the matter had overlooked.  It did not 
really arise until the defence asked about it.  He said 
that the change was made in response to the 
defence objection. 
 
266. The Court of Appeal responded that the change did 
not affect the ability of the Judges to effect what had 
been procedural issues prior to the change when 
they had been carrying out essentially administrative 
functions. The issue of tenure however it is 
submitted, is fundamentally important as has been 
said in Millar v Dickson [2002] 3 All ER 1041 (Tab    
). What this amendment reflects it is submitted is the 
complaint of the timely absence of consideration of 
fundamental principles relating to the administration 
of criminal justice.  It is a further illustration of the 
pitfalls of creating or constituting a legal system in 
haste. In this regard, legislation was introduced as a 
consequence of a defence submission made on 
application to the Court in a pre-trial application and 
before that application had been adjudicated upon.  It 
had the effect of a legislative judgment. 
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267. In this regard, it is further submitted that the 
constitution of the office of the committing Magistrate 
was at Her Majesty's pleasure (Pitcairn Order 1970, 
Section 7).  It was not until after objection had been 
taken and written submissions filed by the Appellants 
at the pre-trial hearing to the status of the Supreme 
Court Judges that the Judicature (Courts) 
Amendment Ordinance No. 11/2003 (Tab       ) was 
enacted to provide that the appointment of the 
Magistrate also was tenured until the age of 65. 
 
268. It is submitted that not only was this a case of the 
legislature interfering in the Court process to frustrate 
arguments that the Appellants had before they had 
been adjudicated upon, but it was a plain recognition 
that the machinery of justice had been deficient 
legally in terms of its constitution. 
 
269. The objection had also been taken to the legality of 
the committal.  It was not suggested that there was 
anything unfair about the committal, but that 
Islanders were entitled to an independently 
constituted Magistrate.  The importance of an officer 
exercising judicial powers being independent had 
been emphasised by the Privy Council in Millar v 
Dickson and Starrs v Ruxton 2000 SLT 42 (Tab       ).  
In this case the Magistrate was plainly not 
independent in the sense of appearance that the law 
requires.  It was submitted that this fact tainted the 
committal process so fundamentally that the 
committal was irregular and a nullity.  It is submitted 
that the alteration in the terms of the Magistrates' 
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appointment to one of tenure could not operate 
retrospectively to validate what had been done.  The 
only alternative was to recommit and/or obtain the 
express approval of the Appellants to in effect waive 
the irregularity.  This was not done. 
 
270. The Court of Appeal considered this issue and ruled 
that the Magistrate was not in fact other than 
independent in the sense that there was any 
incentive for him to be influenced in his decisions by 
policy-driven wishes of the Governor.  The committal 
was not invalid.  It is submitted that the terms of his 
appointment plainly negated his independence from 
the executive in the way the law requires. There was 
no obligation upon the Appellants to show actual or 
potential influence.  It is the appearance of justice 
that was the central issue, and the fact that his 
appointment could be determined by the executive at 
any time was a deficient model for the new 
machinery of justice.  
 
The Deemed Conviction Ordinance 
 
271. Under the Local Government (Special Electoral 
Provisions) Ordinance 2004 (Tab     ) which was 
enacted within 2 days of the Supreme Court passing 
provisional sentences, an extended definition of 
conviction was enacted by the Governor.  This 
provided that those found by the Supreme Court to 
have charges of sexual offending proved beyond 
reasonable doubt were effectively deemed convicted. 
This was notwithstanding the careful distinction 
drawn by the Supreme Court between the finding of 
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charges factually proved and the entering of 
convictions. This distinction was recognised by the 
Supreme Court because the so-called "generic 
argument" which had been advanced by notice to the 
prosecution and Court in Tahiti shortly before the 
trials commenced, had not taken place.   
 
272. At the time the argument was first raised, there was a 
belief, but no substantial evidence, that aspects 
relating to the legal system were not in place on 
Pitcairn and the Appellants had grievances. This lead 
to the Petition for Special Leave being formulated on 
the basis that there was no evidence of publication of 
English law on the Island and the complaints in 
general about the late machinery of justice, and 
absence of British police presence.  However, copies 
of official documents were received, (and entirely 
unsolicited and unforeseen) by the defence from an 
unauthorised source the day before the defence 
team travelled to Tahiti that suggested otherwise.  
 
273. These documents suggested that the Governor and 
the Foreign Office were well aware of the 
deficiencies in the administration of criminal justice 
on Pitcairn prior to these prosecutions being initiated 
and that an amnesty had been suggested by Mr 
Treadwell prior to the decision of Baroness Scotland 
that there must be legal process. It transpires from 
the evidence heard before the Supreme Court on the 
"generic argument" that Mr Treadwell had informed 
the Foreign Office in 1987 that these deficiencies 
need to be corrected before there was any outbreak 
of serious crime on Pitcairn. Subsequently, the 
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Governor commenced legal action against the 
person responsible for leaking the documents and 
was successful in securing the originals. Those 
documents however, had been widely disseminated 
including the internet.  Some of those documents 
have been subsequently released by the Governor 
under disclosure provisions which followed the 
Judgment of the Board on the Special Leave 
Application, and have been referred to above.  There 
has been a claim for legal professional privilege for 
other documents. 
 
274. The Supreme Court granted an adjournment on the 
"generic argument" so that there could be full 
disclosure made of documentation pertaining to 
these issues.  The findings of fact and sentence 
indications that the Supreme Court gave were 
expressly left open as provisional and did not and 
could not amount to convictions until the issues 
relating to the "generic argument" had been heard.  
However, before the Public Defender had even left 
the Island, the legislation was passed to effectively 
remove Mr Stevens Christian and Mr Randall 
Christian from office.   This amounted to a "legislative 
judgment". 
 
275. Professor Tony Angelo, The Pitcairn Trials Act 2003 
(2003) 21 NZULR 486 (Tab  ) suggests that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional and ultra vires as it 
breached the Rule of Law and Separation of Powers. 
The complaint here is that it is a further example of 
legislative steps being taken before the trial process 
was completed.  The Governor was doing what the 
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Judges were at pains to stress their unusual 
procedure was not; that is a conviction of the 
Appellants. The significance is that if the "generic 
argument" succeeded the Appellants would have 
been found not guilty.  As it was, certain of the 
findings relating to offences of indecent assault 
particularised as sexual intercourse which the 
defence had indicated to the Court amounted to an 
abuse of process, were the subject of legal argument 
at the "generic" hearing and in the light of the finding 
of the House of Lords in R v J [2004] UKHL 43 (Tab    
) which was published after the defence team had 
left the Island, lead to those charges being 
dismissed.  
 
276. It is submitted that this shows a pattern of behaviour 
by the Governor of intervening in matters or issues 
raised by the defence in an ad hoc way as the 
proceedings were developing.  A similar involvement 
is seen in the case of Shawn Christian in relation to 
the issue of bail and the offer of a bond by the 
deletion of any reference to a bond being able to be 
ordered by the Magistrate in an amendment to the 
Bail Ordinance. Mr Treadwell stated that this was an 
oversight but it is to be noted that the amendment 
took place after the issue of bail and the possibility of 
a bond to enable Mr Christian to travel back to 
Australia to live and work had been argued before 
the Magistrate.  It is this, which distinguishes Pitcairn 
from a jurisdiction where procedures and machinery 
have been put in place prospectively, in a timely and 
considered way.  
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277. The Court of Appeal said in response that the 
Ordinance did not interfere with the trial process. 
That may be so, but it certainly illustrated how the 
Governor whose role it had been to substantially 
design and create a legal system was prepared to 
act as though he could anticipate that defence 
arguments would fail. It is the fact that substantially a 
legal system had to be created after many years of 
neglect, of which the Appellants complain. It was 
through no fault of the defendants that the "generic 
argument" was delayed and the trial adjourned.  
Whilst an adjournment may have been desirable and 
necessary in order to effect disclosure and fully 
ventilate what the Court of Appeal acknowledged 
were complex legal arguments, it is submitted the 
Governor should have been more respectful of due 
process.   
 
LATE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND   
SYSTEMIC DELAY 
 
278. Before the Court of Appeal it was accepted that the 
time of complaint of unacceptable delay was 
between the date upon which the Public Prosecutor 
formed the view that he would charge the Appellants 
which was on or about February 2002 and the date 
of charge April 2003, a period of about 13 months. 
   
279. In the case of the Appellants, the complaint is that 
they have been under scrutiny, investigation, and 
prosecution since investigations commenced with the 
arrival of Kent Police in or about 1996. The focus has 
been intense given the popular mystique that 
 
 
 
 
158 
surrounds Pitcairn, the small size of the Island with 
its inter-related and close knit population and 
community, and in respect of some of the Appellants 
the leading roles or positions they have held on the 
Island. The period of delay in charge was attributable 
to deficiencies of governance of a systemic kind 
namely the failure to put in place any machinery of 
justice after the abolition of the West Pacific 
Commission.  The report of Eva Learner NISW 
Adviser of the 20th of September 2000 at p6-8 (Tab     
) reflects the concern and anguish felt by some of the 
inhabitants of the Island.  Not only is it said "the 
perception was a general disbelief by the women and 
men of the community about the nature and extent of 
the alleged abuse and the investigation. The 
offenders were in a distinct state of shock and fear". 
She said, "they were having difficulty in 
communication, were very weepy, some appeared 
depressed and withdrawn, they appeared unable to 
think into the future in any personal sense.  One of 
them was certain he would receive a prison sentence 
and expressed his fear of being murdered in jail.  
Another's mother expressed a fear that her son 
would hang.  Others were expressing quiet concern 
about the number of men to be left on the Island how 
it would survive". 
 
280. The delays in the resolution of these proceedings 
have been occasioned in a significant way by the 
neglect of successive administrations to have 
implemented adequate machinery for the 
prosecution of serious criminal allegations arising out 
of English law. These delays the Appellants contend 
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were further caused by the decision to import a New 
Zealand legal system for prosecution and 
adjudication rather than have the matter prosecuted 
and judged by English authorities, and a trial take 
place, if at all, on Pitcairn where they were resident. 
It would seem the Administration experienced similar 
doubts as to how to proceed as had occupied the 
minds of those involved with Harry Christian many 
years before, and led to the Advice of the Law 
Officers in 1898.   
 
281. Mr Treadwell was also cross-examined about these 
matters.  In his evidence given before the Supreme 
Court on the "generic argument" he said that he was 
commissioned to undertake a review of the whole 
legal system in probably 1998.  He said that it was 
quickly apparent after the turn of the century what 
then seemed like the logistical impossibility of holding 
trials on the Island which he admitted had proved to 
be wrong that it seemed like the Supreme Court 
would have no jurisdiction to sit in New Zealand or 
anywhere else.  He agreed that as at April 2002, 
there could have been trials held on Pitcairn in 
theory.  He further said that it was part of his 
impression that it was impractical. At that stage, 
there was still a good deal that needed to be done to 
the legal provisions to allow for the practical holding 
of a preliminary enquiry and then always the issues 
of witnesses, necessary witnesses, who were 
unhappy or unwilling about returning to the Island, 
and the question of New Zealand being used and the 
question of live-link television facilities had not 
emerged, he thought, at that stage. 
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282. The delay in charge after it had been explained to 
the Appellants by the Public Prosecutor that he had 
formed the view to charge was a serious matter.  The 
delay argument as it manifested itself in the Court of 
Appeal turned more particularly on the delay in 
charging the Appellants in April 2003, albeit that the 
Public Prosecutor had made up his mind on the 
charges over a year earlier in February 2002.  It is 
submitted that the appropriate response for these 
delays that are attributable to a systemic failure of 
governance is to stay these proceedings, and look to 
the future. The Appellants submit that whereas proof 
of prejudice may be required to support a stay under 
English domestic law, where the issue, as here, 
involves the administration of criminal justice, and the 
prosecution of the inhabitants of another territory for 
serious offending under the laws of the governing 
country, and the delay in doing so is attributable to a 
systemic failure of governance, the appropriate 
response is one of stay. This approach is 
strengthened when the delay is associated with, as 
here, other serious deficiencies. 
 
283. Difficulties in logistics and administration should not 
be visited upon the Appellants. The delays were 
attributable to the ineffective justice administration for 
many years, and an attitude of administration, which 
could only be described as lethargic.  
 
284. In this case, it was made plain to Pitcairners that a 
major investigation was proceeding in 2000. All of 
the accused in this case were interviewed by 
 
 
 
 
161 
Detective Inspector Vinson and Detective Inspector 
George between the 12th April 2000, and the 16th 
November 2000. 
 
285. It was accepted in the Court of Appeal that the wide-
ranging nature of the investigation, which involved 
overseas inquiries, as well as investigation on 
Pitcairn meant that no complaint could be directed at 
the period up until the Public Prosecutor had made 
up his mind to charge in February 2002. 
 
286. The Public Prosecutor announced to the Island at a 
meeting on 22 October 2001 that his decision to 
prosecute would be made quite soon after he had 
returned to Auckland but that an announcement of 
that decision would be delayed because of other 
issues, particularly the uncertainty of where any trials 
might take place. Islanders were informed that if trials 
were to take place in New Zealand special laws 
would need to be passed by the New Zealand 
Parliament to allow that to happen. They were 
advised at that meeting that he would expect to have 
his decision on charges by the end of February 2002. 
He also advised that there were other factors (such 
as where any trial might be) which were outside his 
control and which could delay the making of an 
announcement. 
 
287. The Public Prosecutor informed Pitcairners by 
recorded video message later on 15 April 2002, that 
he had indeed made his decision before the end of 
February, but that he could not announce it, because 
the question of where trials would be held has still 
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not yet been finalised.  He advised that this required 
the passing of a special law by the New Zealand 
Government and was not anything he had control 
over. He added that senior Government officials in 
both New Zealand and the United Kingdom have 
been working hard since he returned from Pitcairn 
with a view to getting those laws passed. So no 
blame can be attached to anyone. This was a very 
complicated and unique situation and so, no one, 
anywhere in the world, had experience of anything 
similar. He informed Pitcairners there would be 
prosecutions, but could not inform them until it was 
certain where those charges would be heard. 
 
288. Various possibilities were outlined. One option, which 
was possible he said, was through video link for trials 
to take place with connections in both New Zealand 
and Pitcairn Island. In other words, some of the 
people involved in the trial might be able to stay on 
Pitcairn while the Judge and lawyers would be in 
New Zealand and all of them connected by video. 
There were other options and what would ultimately 
happen would be up to the Judge assuming the 
necessary laws were passed. 
 
289. The Public Prosecutor expressed the view that at 
least some of the earlier uncertainty and anxiety 
would   be reduced by what he had said. However he 
noted that he was aware that what he had said would 
give rise to other questions which they would have 
not all of which he could answer at that stage.  He 
advised that he would inform those affected first. 
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290. Charges were ultimately laid against the Appellants 
in April 2003, at Adamstown. The trials were held in 
September 2004 on Island and completed on 24 May 
2005 with the publication of the judgment of the 
Supreme Court on the promulgation and related 
issues.  
 
291. There has been an unacceptable delay between 
February 2002 when he had made up him mind on 
charges and charge in April 2003, at Adamstown. 
Contrary to the opinion expressed by the Public 
Prosecutor that nobody was at fault, the 
Administration plainly was. There had been a serious 
failure in governance to provide Pitcairn with a 
workable system of justice for many years, after the 
Western Pacific Commission had been abandoned. 
Although the investigations required travel and co-
ordination, it seems that they were completed by the 
time the Public Prosecutor spoke with the Island and 
further delays were systemic.  
 
292. In Howarth v United Kingdom 31 E.H.R.R. 861 (Tab      
), the European Court found that there was no 
indication that the Appellant was responsible for the 
time taken to deal with the appeal and that no 
convincing reasons had been given which would 
justify the delay.  It is submitted that this is one of 
those cases where a stay is in order because the 
delay in charging the Appellants came within either 
an exceptional category as referred to by Lord 
Bingham in Attorney-General’s Reference No 2 at 
paras 24-25 (Tab     ) or was an appropriate 
response to the delay following the approach of Lord 
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Hope In HM Advocate v R [2004] 1 AC 462 at para 
76 (Tab     ) because central to the problem was a 
systemic failure of governance. It is submitted that in 
the modern day, deficiencies of governance whereby 
the Appellants were left to contemplate their fate for 
at least 13 months on Pitcairn, an isolated Island in 
the eastern part of the South Pacific is unacceptable.  
 
293. The Court of Appeal preferred the submissions of the 
Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor had 
contended that the delay had occurred because of 
the number of accused and the unique 
circumstances, which resulted. The Public 
Prosecutor had contended that if there had been only 
one or two accused the charges could have been 
laid much earlier but given the circumstances it was 
appropriate to delay while options for trial venue 
were considered and in particular enabling a venue 
to be chosen so that all accused could be tried at the 
same time. The Public Prosecutor contended that the 
treaty saved massive delays, which would have 
occurred had there not been provision for procedural 
or substantive hearings to take place in New 
Zealand.  
 
294. The Appellants, however, contend that the 
communities interests must be balanced by the 
interests of the individual, HM Advocate v R at para 
76 (Tab      ).  In an ordinary case where adequate 
trial procedures and a competent legal system are in 
place; where the delays are attributable to a 
complete absence of administrative foresight, or 
inaction it should be otherwise. It is submitted that 
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once the Pacific Order procedures were abolished, 
then the system should have been put in place to 
accommodate indictable crime.  
 
295. It is accepted that there was no prejudice to the 
Appellants of the kind that prevented a fair trial being 
had. However there was a considerable prejudice of 
a wider kind as is submitted above. To live in a small 
Island community under a real threat of charge for so 
long is a serious issue. The Appellants should not 
have been left in this state of uncertainty for so long 
without charge, whilst decisions were being made 
about the venues for trials and related issues, by the 
Governor and Foreign Office. The timely constitution 
of the machinery of justice and a legal system would 
have avoided this and additionally, it would have 
provided Pitcairners with advance notice that English 
criminal law would and could be enforced if the need 
arose.  
 
296. A stay of these proceedings and the quashing of 
these convictions will forever be a powerful reminder 
down through the ages to those who in the future 
have the responsibility for the administration of 
criminal justice that it is a serious matter.   
 
297. Whilst in defence or by way of explanation or excuse 
for the absence of a more active involvement in the 
administration of criminal law on Pitcairn, it may be 
argued that Pitcairn was a sparsely populated and 
isolated territory, with at times little apparent demand 
for a more active presence than an Island Magistrate 
and Island police, the decision to prosecute for 
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English crimes in the face of these known serious 
deficiencies in the governance of Pitcairn in terms of 
law and order is not, it is submitted, defensible. The 
paucity of resources spent on law and order in past 
times is to be compared with the resources spent in 
recent times, and further demonstrates clearly what 
could have been done under more vigorous 
governance. 
 
The Delay in Appointing the Public Defender  
 
298. A facet of the late machinery of justice is also the fact 
that the Public Defender was appointed to office long 
after the appointment of the Public Prosecutor.  
During the course of the Governor and Foreign Office 
considering whether it should proceed by legal 
process or by some informal means such as an 
amnesty, there was no input into this decision by an 
officer responsible for the interests of potential 
accused and the wider Pitcairn community.  That an 
amnesty had in fact been adopted as a reasonable 
approach to the stealing of government property on 
Pitcairn appears in the report of Eva Learner at p3 
(Tab      ).  Mr Treadwell had in fact recommended 
such an approach as a result of a belief that 
offending was wide spread and culturally based.  It is 
submitted that had the Public Defender been 
appointed earlier, and been given access to 
information of the kind that has been evidenced in 
these proceedings, that he could have made a 
meaningful contribution to the decision as to whether 
in all the circumstances it was appropriate to 
prosecute men for indictable offences on Pitcairn. 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
THE LEGALITY OF THE  IMPORTATION  OF THE 
MACHINERY OF JUSTICE AND A LEGAL SYSTEM 
THAT WAS IN SUBSTANCE A NEW ZEALAND LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
 
299. It is submitted that the implementation by legislation 
and an Order in Council (UK) of a Treaty between 
England and New Zealand to create a Court of 
Pitcairn Island based in Papakura, New Zealand, and 
to provide a venue for the trials of Pitcairners 
resident in New Zealand, and elsewhere, and the 
extradition to Papakura from foreign countries and 
within New Zealand is exceptional in the domestic 
administration of criminal justice. The case did not 
involve war crimes or interstate crimes involving 
terrorism, such as Lockerbie. It is accepted in so far 
as this was achieved by legislative act of parliament, 
this cannot be challenged. However, it provides a 
unique background to further action, which is 
challenged as an abuse of power of governance 
namely the effective delegation for the machinery of 
justice from England to New Zealand.  
 
300. The Appellants submit in this respect that not only 
did they have no adequate notice of English criminal 
law, the penalties for violation of English laws, or 
sufficient general notice communicated to them of an 
English intention to prosecute such activity, but they 
also had no notice either that the law would be 
enforced by importing in “substance” a New Zealand 
legal system for their prosecution and trial of crimes 
under English law.  The Appellants submit that they 
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should have been prosecuted by English prosecuting 
officers and tried by English Judges competent to try 
such offences under English law and not by 
functionaries who were not English, but constituted 
as Pitcairn lawyers or Judges under subordinate 
legislation.  
 
301. It is submitted that these steps denied the Appellants 
access as British subjects to the British legal system 
in terms of their prosecution and the adjudication or 
trial of the offences under English law.   
 
302. If, as the Law Advice on Harry Christian stated in 
1838 the leading inhabitants of Pitcairn had 
submitted to Her Majesty’s Sovereignty, then there 
was, it is submitted, a reciprocity of expectation that 
indictable matters involving English crimes insofar as 
they were applicable to Pitcairn would be determined 
by English functionaries, or functionaries within the 
British sphere of influence and control, and they 
would not be answerable to functionaries appointed 
from a foreign country. It is submitted that analogous 
was the position of the Greater London Council viz a 
viz its rate payers described by Lord Wilberforce in 
Bromley LBC v Greater London Council, [1983] AC 
769 at p815 (Tab     ) as a fiduciary relationship.  In 
this case, although the Governor was English, many 
of the personnel constituting the administration were 
English, and those who investigated the cases were 
essentially police from Kent, the very important 
responsibility of prosecution and adjudication and for 
that matter their defence was effectively delegated to 
New Zealand. Even the lawyers selected to 
 
 
 
 
169 
represent the Appellants during police interviews 
were New Zealanders, later appointed as Pitcairn 
legal representatives under Ordinance, and not 
English barristers who might have been expected to 
have provided better educated advice on PACE 
requirements. All this was effected without any 
apparent advance consultation with Pitcairners and 
as a matter of convenience, it seems, once it had 
been decided prosecutions could follow the 
investigation.  
 
303. The complaint here is not that the Governor did not 
have the right to make laws relating to the machinery 
of justice and the constitution of a workable legal 
system.  The Court of Appeal was created by Order 
in Council in 2000. It is conceded that the Governor 
had wide powers to legislate and similarly wide 
powers of appointment to office. Ibrelebbe v The 
Queen [1964] AC 900, at 923 (Tab    ), ‘the widest 
law-making powers”, but to adopt the colourful 
phrase of Laws LJ in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of 
State for Sovereign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2001] QB 1067, at 1103 (Tab     ) "every tapestry 
has a border".  Bancoult was a case involving a 
different aspect of governance and the attempt to 
displace an indigenous people from their land for a 
reason which could not be said to be necessitous, 
but is it any less serious to divest a British subject 
charged with a very serious crime under the 
governing law of England from access to the British 
legal system when England has accepted 
sovereignty over that territory?   
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304. It is submitted that the Governor abused his power in 
the sense that he either acted invalidly or 
unreasonably in the meaning given to this expression 
by Lord Wilberforce in Bromley LBC v Greater 
London Council [1983] AC 769 at p813 and Lord 
Scarman at p836 (Tab   ) by in particular delegating 
the power of prosecution and trial to New Zealand 
Judges with the Court of Appeal constituted by New 
Zealand Judges also.  It is submitted further that this 
deprived the Appellants also of the sentiment behind 
Chapter 29 of Magna Carta which provided that "a 
free man should not be taken or imprisoned … nor 
should he be condemned but by lawful judgment of 
his peers ….".  It is submitted that New Zealand 
functionaries were not the Appellants' peers. 
 
305. The submission is made that whilst from time to time 
ad hoc appointments are made to courts in overseas 
jurisdictions of New Zealanders, without objection, 
here there was an entire delegation of the legal 
machinery of justice to the responsibility of New 
Zealand officers. Aside from the Office of Public 
Prosecutor and the Judges, there was also a 
Sentencing Ordinance and a Parole Ordinance 
culled from New Zealand precedent, and other 
procedures taken from New Zealand, effecting an 
unusual hybrid of English penal law and New 
Zealand sentencing law and other procedures.  No 
doubt it is submitted that the implementation of New 
Zealand based procedures and practices such as the 
Sentencing Ordinance was because the legal adviser 
was a New Zealander and the Judges were from 
New Zealand.  
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306. In any event, it is submitted that radical steps such 
as these if within, the Governor’s power to effect, 
should not have been taken without advance 
consultation and approval of Pitcairners.  
 
307. This argument was raised in the Court of Appeal for 
the first time. The Court observed that the 
submission was without merit. The basis for this 
reasoning was that there was no apparent limit to the 
Governor’s powers to appoint to judicial and other 
relevant office whomsoever he chooses under 
relevant Ordinances (other than the Judges of this 
Court) who must have certain qualifications. The 
point was made that there had been no complaint 
about the way in which the Supreme Court judges 
had discharged their duties, which the Court 
considered added to the unreality of this situation. 
 
308. It is accepted there was no complaint about the 
discharge of the judicial functions. The argument was 
not about this. It was about the principle and validity 
of the appointment of the entire machinery of justice 
and functionaries from New Zealand. Taken 
individually, there may be no objection to what was 
done, but when considered in its totality, 
responsibility for prosecution and adjudication and 
defence was passed to New Zealand. 
 
309. Although Pitcairn may have certain modern day 
connections with New Zealand, no compelling reason 
has been advanced why the functions of prosecution 
and adjudication were passed to New Zealand.  The 
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police who investigated were from Kent, and the 
police who attended the Island for trial and after were 
Ministry of Defence police. There is no apparent 
reason either why sentencing could not follow 
English practice or law given English criminal law 
was being prosecuted, under English governance. In 
this regard, in at least the case of the Appellant, Len 
Brown, an old man a sentence of a suspended kind 
available under English law but no longer available 
under New Zealand law would have practically been 
more appropriate than a sentence of imprisonment 
with leave to apply for home detention, on the Island.   
 
310. It is speculation to consider, as did the Court of 
Appeal based on arguments of convenience raised 
by the Prosecution as to why it was determined to so 
heavily draw on New Zealand resources, and 
authority. Request has been made both of the 
Governor’s office and the Foreign office why it was 
decided to proceed in this way and in particular 
appoint a New Zealand Prosecutor and New Zealand 
District Court Judges to try these matters.  Legal 
professional privilege has been claimed by the 
Governor in recent correspondence as to the 
reasons why this was done. 
 
311. Is it good enough in the modern age that Pitcairn 
defendants charged with offences carrying life 
imprisonment were tried by Judges who were not 
competent to try life cases in New Zealand? They 
were Judges admittedly familiar with sexual crimes, 
and no criticism is made of their conduct of the 
cases, but as a model in today’s world is it 
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acceptable, where English law is being prosecuted 
and a defendant is exposed to such condign 
sentences that Judges of any lesser standing than 
an Englishman could expect to be tried by should be 
appointed and those from a country to whom he 
owes no allegiance? Is this an expression of that 
reciprocity of expectation between lawgiver and 
subject that Professor Lon Fuller speaks of when he 
talks of reciprocity being part of the idea of a 
functioning legal order? 
 
312. It is true that Harry Christian was tried by an 
Assistant Judicial Commissioner from the West 
Pacific Commission, under the Pacific Order 1893, 
with assessors, not a Judge. He was convicted of 
murder on Pitcairn, sentenced to death and hanged 
in Fiji. The Western Pacific Commission that was 
responsible for his trial was a British institution. 
 
313. It is submitted that delegation of the powers of 
prosecution and adjudication to New Zealand and 
the implementation of Ordinances that largely 
embodied New Zealand practice and on the scale 
here was exceptional, unnecessary and an abuse of 
the power of administration. There must it is 
submitted be a necessity demonstrated for this to 
legally be effected.  If the Public Defender is wrong 
on this point and the Governor had the power to do 
what he did, then it is a factor still to be taken into 
account when considering the overall propriety or 
justice of commencing these proceedings that 
Pitcairners knew nothing about all this before the 
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investigation was commenced, and the legal system 
for prosecution was constituted. 
 
PART V - FURTHER LEAVE 
 
THE ELEMENTS OF FORCE OR RESISTANCE UNDER 
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1956 
 
Rape - whether Submission and an Absence of Proof of 
Force or threat of Force is sufficient to constitute Rape 
under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 
 
314. The submission is that the Appellant, Stevens 
Raymond Christian, was insofar as the allegations 
relate to a period before 1976 entitled to a direction 
and consideration of the law as it was applied in 
terms of the directions given in Morgan v DPP [1976] 
AC 182 at 186 (Tab     ) and the definition of rape 
therein stated by the Trial Judge which referred to 
force as an essential ingredient of rape. 
 
315. The complaint relates to Charge 9 and it is submitted 
that the evidence does not disclose the use of force 
or threat of force. 
 
316. The argument is that under English law at the time of 
the offending, rape involved force or the threat of 
force and in the absence of proof of force or 
resistance, a conviction could not be entered. 
English authorities on point besides the trial direction 
are: Morgan v DPP and Lord Hailsham at p210, lines 
F to G (Tab      ); R v Harling (1937) 26 Cr App R 127 
at p128 per Humphries J affirming the direction of the 
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trial judge Hilbery J (Tab     );  Lord Chief Justice 
Parker in R v Howard (1965) 50 Cr App R 56 at 58-
59 (Tab      ); R v Lang (1976) 62 Cr. App. R.50 (Tab      
)  
 
317. Submission could not be treated as evidence of non-
consent unless the complainant was a child of tender 
years; R v Howard at p58 (Tab      ). Cases involving 
insensible complainants or those whose consent had 
been fraudulently induced are it is submitted in 
another category and were not relevant. 
 
318. The Public Prosecutor contended based upon certain 
statements expressed in the Helibron report, and 
some older English authority that the common law as 
at the time of this offending did not reflect such a 
view. It is submitted that English practice at the time 
of the offending was to the contrary and it did not 
change until the 1976 amendment was effected and 
in the light of the statements of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R v Olugboja (1981) Cr App R 443 at p446 
(Tab     ).  See further R v Malone [1988] 2 Cr App R 
447 (Tab    ). 
 
319. It is submitted that there was no evidence of force or 
threats of force associated with the complaints. Nor 
at the time of the offending was she a child of tender 
years whose submission could be treated as non- 
consent.  It is further submitted in response to the 
case of R v R (1991) 93 Cr App R 1 (Tab      ) cited 
by the prosecution at authority for the proposition 
that a later approach to the law could be imposed in 
relation to earlier offending that the definition of rape 
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is material to the crime itself and not a defence by 
way of immunity.  
 
DATED at Auckland this 7th day of June 2006   
 
 
 
       
Paul Dacre 
(Public Defender) 
 
 
       
Charles Cato 
(Counsel) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
